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A NOTE ON STYLE  
 
As can be seen upon examining each of the papers which form part of this thesis, each paper 
is presented in a distinct style. This is due to each paper being presented, so far as is possible, 




















































































































In March 2012, the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department issued a brief but wide-
ranging discussion paper which explored the possibility of codifying or otherwise significantly 
reforming Australian contract law. Though the 2012 Discussion Paper attracted 58 insightful 
and closely-argued submissions along with a number of thoughtful papers, there nonetheless 
remains a clear disjunct between the significance and scope of the questions raised by the 
discussion paper and the response which it attracted. Indeed, though the notion of codifying 
Australian contract law has been mooted several times in the past fifty years, the merit of such 
a reform has rarely been the subject of sustained and detailed analysis. This thesis seeks to go 
some way towards filling this gap.  It grapples with a wide range of important issues thrown 
up by the question of whether the Australian law of contract ought to be codified, with the aim 
of arriving at a concluded view as to whether that significant step ought to be taken.  It shows 
that there are strong reasons to conclude that the Australian law of contract ought not to be 
codified.  It shows that many of the traditional arguments proffered in favour of the codification 
of Australian contract law – including the notion that such a reform would promote ‘certainty’ 
in the law and amount to an ideal mechanism for substantive law reform – begin to break down 
upon sustained scrutiny. It further shows that there are a number of serious cultural, practical, 
and theoretical hurdles which would have to be overcome if codification were to be successful. 
These hurdles are all the more imposing for having been paid too little attention by the 
proponents of reform. The result is that, in addition to the serious difficulties which attend the 
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Contract law seldom captures the interest of policymakers.  Though it undergirds much 
economic activity, appetite for its reform and development has for the most part been limited 
and sporadic.1 
 
March 2012 saw contract law take a respite from anonymity.  In a brief but wide-ranging 
discussion paper, the then Commonwealth Attorney-General, Nicola Roxon, issued a 
discussion paper which, among other things, canvassed the possibility of codifying Australian 
contract law so as to achieve a range of ostensibly worthwhile objectives (‘the 2012 Discussion 
Paper’).2 
 
Though the 2012 Discussion Paper attracted 58 insightful and closely-argued submissions 
along with a number of thoughtful papers,3 there is nonetheless a clear disjunct between the 
significance and scope of the questions raised by the discussion paper and the response which 
it attracted. Indeed, though the notion of codifying Australian contract law has been mooted 
several times in the past fifty years, the merit of such a reform has rarely been the subject of 
sustained and detailed analysis. 
                                                      
1 For a recent contract law reform proposal which was met with muted enthusiasm by the Commonwealth, see 
Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Australian Government Response: ‘Harmonisation of legal systems 
within Australia and between Australia and New Zealand’ (2008). 
2 Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Improving Australia’s Law and Justice Framework: A Discussion 
Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law (2012).  The subject matter of the discussion 
paper was canvassed by the Attorney General in: Nicola Roxon, ‘Time for the great contract reform’, The 
Australian, 23 March 2012, 30. Roxon’s initiative built on earlier suggestions for reforms canvassed in 2011 by 
her predecessor, Robert McClelland. McClelland was extremely optimistic as to the speed with which reform 
could be achieved. See the (sceptical) discussion in: Andrew Stewart, ‘What’s Wrong with the Australian Law 
of Contract’ (2012) 29 Journal of Contract Law 74, 74-75.  
3 See, eg, Andrew Stewart, ‘What’s Wrong with the Australian Law of Contract’ (2012) 29 Journal of Contract 
Law 74; Warren Swain ‘Codification of Contract Law: Some Lessons from History’ (2012) 31 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 39; Warren Swain, ‘Contract Codification in Australia: Is it Necessary, Desirable and 
Possible?’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 131; Martin Doris, ‘Promising Options, Dead Ends and the Reform of 
Australian Contract Law’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 24; Mary Keyes and Therese Wilson (eds) Codifying 
Contract Law: International and Consumer Law Perspectives (Ashgate, 2014); Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, ‘Taking 
(Legal) Traditions Seriously, Or Why Australian Contract Law Should Not Be Codified: An Unconventional 
Inquiry’ (2015) 34 University of Queensland Law Journal 99. 
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This thesis seeks to go some way towards filling this gap.  It grapples with a wide range of 
important issues thrown up by the question of whether the Australian law of contract ought to 
be codified, with the aim of arriving at a concluded view as to whether that significant step 
ought to be taken.  The five papers completed in the course of this thesis, taken together, show 
that there are strong reasons to conclude that the Australian law of contract ought not to be 
subject to a reform of this type.  As will be seen, many of the traditional arguments proffered 
in favour of the codification of Australian contract law fail to withstand sustained scrutiny. In 
short, it will be seen that the affirmative case for codification breaks down under close 
examination.   
 
It will further be seen that there are, in any event, a number of serious hurdles which would 
have to be overcome in order to codify Australian contract law. These hurdles are all the more 
imposing for having been paid too little attention by the proponents of reform. The result is 
that, in addition to the serious difficulties which attend the positive case for codification, there 
is also a strong negative case which has received too little serious attention. 
 
This thesis is presented not as a conventional dissertation, but instead as a series of related 
papers which together develop and sustain a coherent argument. One consequence of 
presenting the thesis in this way is that each of the five papers can be read and appreciated as 
a freestanding work of scholarship. It is thus not necessary here to engage in a lengthy 
examination of the legal and historical backdrop against which the Australian contract 
codification debate must be understood – where necessary, that task is taken up in the papers 
themselves.4  
 
It is helpful, however, to give an overview of the argument which emerges in the course of the 
thesis, and to explain how each of the papers is linked to the debate respecting contract 
codification. It is also necessary to consider at the outset how the terms ‘codification’ and 
‘code’ ought to be understood for the purposes of this thesis, and to offer a brief overview of 
the principal contributions which this thesis makes to the codification debate. Finally, it is 
                                                      
4 A further consequence of presenting the thesis as a series of discrete papers is that the papers do overlap to 
some small degree. Indeed, it is necessary, if each paper is to be capable of being understood as a freestanding 
work of scholarship, for some background material to be re-traversed in brief form in each paper.  
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necessary to say something as to the methodology which this thesis employs, along with its 




II DEFINING ‘CODIFICATION’ 
 
There has long been a clash of ideas in respect of codification.5  It is therefore unsurprising that 
there exists a vast literature, spanning years and jurisdictions, in which the merits and demerits 
of particular codification proposals are subjected to close examination.6 There also exist 
writings which examine codification from a theoretical standpoint, and which seek to derive 
insights applicable to codes and codification generally.7 Thus, while any serious discussion of 
‘codification’ must obviously proceed by reference to some understanding of what that term 
connotes, setting out a clear definition of ‘codification’ is by no means straightforward. 
 
In seeking to define ‘codification’, a number of relatively uncontroversial observations might 
be made at the outset. First, ‘codification’ is a term apt to embrace a process. Indeed, it most 
naturally refers to the mechanism by which a ‘code’ is enacted, drafted or instituted. Though 
part of the debate respecting codification is concerned with the process by which codes are 
drafted and enacted, a still greater part is concerned with the merits and demerits of ‘codes’ 
once enacted and in operation. It follows that any detailed discussion of ‘codification’ will 
                                                      
5 For a recent examination of the historical contest in respect of contract codification and its principal 
belligerents, see: Warren Swain ‘Codification of Contract Law: Some Lessons from History’ (2012) 31 
University of Queensland Law Journal 39.   
6 For just some of the many constituents of this genre, see, eg, M D Chalmers, ‘Codification of Mercantile Law’ 
(1902) 2 Canadian Law Review 146; Mackenzie Chalmers, ‘An Experiment in Codification’ (1886) 2 Law 
Quarterly Review 125; Mackenzie Chalmers, ‘Codification of Mercantile Law’ (1903) 19 Law Quarterly 
Review 9; Aubrey Diamond, ‘Codification of the Law of Contract’ (1968) 31 Modern Law Review 361; Edith 
Palmer, ‘The Austrian Codification of Conflicts Law’ (1980) 28 American Journal of Comparative Law 197; 
Mathias Reimann, ‘The Historical School against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and the Defeat of the New 
York Civil Code’ (1989) 37 American Journal of Comparative Law 95; Ole Lando, ‘Is Codification Needed in 
Europe?  Principles of European Contract Law and the Relationship to Dutch Law’ (1993) 1 European Review 
of Private Law 157; Mary Arden, ‘Time for an English Commercial Code?’ [1997] Cambridge Law Journal 
516; PB Maggs, ‘The Process of Codification in Russia: Lessons Learned from the Uniform Commercial Code’ 
(1999) 44 McGill Law Journal 281. 
7 See, eg, Leslie Scarman, ‘Codification and Judge Made Law: A Problem of Coexistence’ (1967) 42 Indiana 
Law Review 355; S Herman, ‘The Fate and Future of Codification in America’ (1996) 40 American Journal of 
Legal History 408; Arthur von Mehren, ‘Some Reflections on Codification and Case Law in the Twenty First 
Century’ (1997) 31 University of California Davis Law Review 659; Gunther Weiss, ‘The Enchantment of 
Codification in the Common Law World’ (2000) 25 Yale Journal of International Law 435. 
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necessarily embrace not just an assessment of the process of codification, but of the family of 
legal instruments which might be said to fall within the category of ‘codes’. 
 
An equally uncontroversial proposition is that both ‘codification’ and ‘code’ are terms capable 
of taking on a great many different meanings. One might, for instance, speak of ‘codification’ 
as a process initiated and directed not by a body politic, but by private individuals – parties to 
a contract, for instance, might be said to have sought by express provision in their contract to 
‘codify’ the remedies available for breach.8 As this example ought to make clear, not all of the 
meanings of ‘codification’ or ‘code’ are relevant to a thesis such as this.  
 
Beyond uncontroversial observations such as these, the task of giving meaning to the terms 
under discussion here becomes far more challenging. Perhaps the most obvious way of 
proceeding is to look to examples of instruments and reform initiatives which have been 
characterised as ‘codes’ or exercises in ‘codification’, and to seek to identify the underlying 
elements which such reforms have in common. At least in the present context, one might further 
seek to focus upon codification initiatives which have been concerned with the law of contract. 
Taking that approach, a great number of examples present themselves.9 One might look, for 
instance, to the experience of contract codification in India, which saw the enactment of a 
lengthy and detailed code under the guidance of Mackenzie Chalmers – a form of which 
continues in force to this day.10 Alternatively, one might instance the ‘partial codification’ of 
contract law in New Zealand, under which limited parts of the law of contract were codified 
through the enactment of a series of statutes on specific subjects.11 To consider a reform 
                                                      
8 See, eg, the argument put in: Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Co [1998] 1 WLR 574. A contract 
which seeks to ‘codify’ the parties’ common law rights might be distinguished from one which seeks merely to 
circumscribe or exclude particular common law rights. One might also point to other special settings within 
which such terms might be used. Some, for instance, might describe the process by which customary rules are 
embodied in a formal instrument as being a process of ‘codification’. See, eg: T W Bennett and T Vermeulen, 
‘Codification of Customary Law’ (1980) 24 Journal of African Law 206; Timothy Meyer, ‘Codifying Custom’ 
(2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 995. 
9 The examples set out here are, of course, not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the reforms which might 
be said to fall into this category. As will be explained below, the methodology adopted in this thesis means it is 
not necessary to traverse the field of historical examples in exhaustive detail (and indeed, there is good cause to 
doubt whether such an exercise would even be possible within the scope of this project). 
10 For a detailed discussion of contract codification in India, see: Stelios Tofaris, A Historical Study in the 
Indian Contract Act 1872 (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011). 
11 For the original New Zealand statutes, see: Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 (NZ); Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 
(NZ); Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (NZ); Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ); Illegal Contracts Act 1970 
(NZ); Minors’ Contracts Act 1969 (NZ). These statutes (along with some other instruments) have recently been 
consolidated in the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 (NZ). Calls for such a consolidating statute had 
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demarcated not by jurisdiction but by subject-matter, one might instance the sale of goods 
legislation, which originated in Victorian Britain but came to be widely adopted across the 
Commonwealth.12 Equally, one might point to one of the many contract codification initiatives 
which were ultimately not successful.13 One notable example of such a reform is the abortive 
attempt at codification of the British law of contract in the early years of the Law Commission. 
This project – carried out under the auspices of both the Law Commission and the Scottish 
Law Commission – resulted in a detailed draft code, prepared by the late Harvey McGregor 
QC. Though the skill with which the draft code was prepared serves as a remarkable example 
for would-be reformers, disagreements between the two Commissions resulted in the project’s 
abandonment.14 
 
The identification of the elements common to each of these reforms is by no means 
straightforward. Though each might fairly be described as an example of ‘codification’, they 
are each nonetheless distinctive. The abortive British code of the mid-twentieth century, for 
instance, was a detailed and exhaustive statement of the whole of the law of contract, whereas 
the New Zealand experience of codification is instead one under which only limited parts of 
contract law have been embodied in statute. The experience of ‘codification’ in these two 
                                                      
been made for some time. See, eg: Thomas Gibbons, ‘A Contracts (Consolidation) Act for New Zealand’ (2003) 
11 Waikato Law Review 13. For some important writings on the New Zealand Contract statutes, see: J W Carter 
and John Ren (eds) Coote on the New Zealand Contract Statutes (Thomson Reuters, 2017). For discussion of 
the New Zealand experience of ‘partial codification’, see: Rick Bigwood, ‘The Partial Codification of Contract 
Law: Lessons from New Zealand’ in Mary Keyes and Therese Wilson (eds) Codifying Contract Law: 
International and Consumer Law Perspectives (Ashgate, 2014); F G Barton, ‘The Effect of the Contract 
Statutes in New Zealand’ (2000) 16 Journal of Contract Law 233; David McLauchlan, ‘Contract and 
Commercial Law Reform in New Zealand’ (1984) 11 New Zealand Universities Law Review 36. 
12 For a discussion of the sale of goods legislation and other contemporaneous reforms, see: Alan Rodger, ‘The 
Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain’ (1992) 108 Law Quarterly Review 570. It should be 
noted that while the various versions of the sale of goods legislation share many core features, there are 
nonetheless some variations from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The British statute, for instance, included some 
provisions directed specifically to matters of Scots law. For an example in the original British statute, see: Sale 
of Goods Act 1893 (UK) s 40. For an example of an Australian statute which broadly follows the British statute, 
see: Sale of Goods Act 1895 (SA). 
13 There are also Australian examples which fall within this category, each of which are discussed in detail 
throughout this thesis. 
14 Though a reference to a ‘British’ law of contract may seem inherently misconceived, it is – as will become 
plain in the course of the discussion below – used here advisedly. For the abortive British code, see: Harvey 
McGregor, Contract Code: Drawn Up on Behalf of the English Law Commission, (Guiffré,1993). For an 
overview of the nature and fate of McGregor’s code, see: F M B Reynolds, ‘Contract: Codification, Legislation 
and Judicial Development’ (1995) 9 Journal of Contract Law 11, 13-17; S Waddams, ‘Codification, Law 
Reform and Judicial Development’ (1996) 9 Journal of Contract Law 192.  
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jurisdictions was thus radically different. Similarly, the sale of goods legislation differs from 
each of the other examples above insofar as it seeks to make special provision for a particular 
species of contract. While the Indian Contract Act is similar to the proposed British code 
insofar as each encompasses the whole of the law of contract, the two instruments nonetheless 
differ significantly in their substantive content.15 
 
The diversity of the reforms which fall under the umbrella of ‘codification’ poses some 
difficulty for those who seek to assess the case for ‘codifying’ the Australian law of contract. 
On the one hand, it is simply impossible to undertake such an inquiry without seeking to proffer 
some definition of what such a reform should be understood to involve. At the same time, one 
ought to be cautious not to adopt an unduly narrow definition of ‘codification’ in this setting. 
Indeed, one might well think that the value of a thesis such as this would be considerably 
reduced if it were to proceed upon a highly specific understanding of what ‘codification’ 
entails. Such a thesis would, after all, be vulnerable to the criticism that its conclusions might 
well have been different had it adopted a more expansive conception of the possible avenues 
of reform. 
 
‘Codification’ and ‘code’ are accordingly employed in this thesis in a broad sense, which seeks 
to encompass reforms which differ from one another in significant respects. In discussing 
‘codification’ of the law of contract, this thesis means to refer to any reform aimed at the 
enactment of a binding, statutory instrument which constitutes the key source of law in respect 
of a particular legal domain. A similar definition is provided by Catherine Skinner:  
 
[A]n instrument enacted by the legislature which forms the principal source of law on a 
particular topic.  It aims to codify all leading rules derived from both judge-made and 
statutory law in a particular field.  And codification is the process of drafting and enacting 
such an instrument.  A code by this definition is distinct from an ordinary statute because it 
is designed to be a comprehensive and coherent presentation of the law.  Thus it has an 
organising and indexing role than an ordinary statute does not share.16 
 
                                                      
15 For just one example of the relevant divergences, see the comparative analysis of the treatment of indemnities 
under the Indian Contract Act in: Wayne Courtney, ‘Indemnities and the Indian Contract Act 1872’ (2015) 27 
National Law School of India Review 66. 
16 Catherine Skinner, ‘Codification and the Common Law’ (2009) 11 European Journal of Law Reform 225, 
228.  For a discussion of the various different senses in which ‘codification’ might be understood, see: Shona 
Wilson Stark, The Work of the British Law Commissions: Law Reform … Now?, (Hart Publishing, 2017) 157-9. 
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Such an approach has a number of strengths. First, as noted above, it maximises the utility of 
the conclusions at which the thesis arrives. Indeed, the definition proffered here is sufficiently 
broad to encompass the New Zealand, British and Indian experiences of contract codification. 
Though the Indian Contract Act and the code of British contract law drafted by Harvey 
McGregor differ in their detail, each is – or was intended to be – a binding statutory instrument 
which constitutes the key source of law in respect of a particular legal domain. The New 
Zealand experience of contract codification, along with the sale of goods legislation, can also 
be said to conform to this definition, provided a suitably sophisticated notion of ‘legal domain’ 
is adopted.17 Second, it means it is not necessary to devote a great deal of space to the task of 
explaining why a particular, narrow conception of ‘codification’ has been preferred over others 
which might also have reasonably been selected.18  
 
Of course, the difficulty posed by such an approach is that it makes it necessary to ensure that 
the arguments advanced throughout this thesis have broad relevance, rather than being 
applicable only to particular types of code. On a small number of occasions in this thesis, a 
point is made which is explicitly acknowledged as being applicable only to particular types of 
code.19 For the most part, however, the arguments set out in this thesis are equally applicable 
to each of the different ‘models’ of codification which might be said to exist. The points made 
in the fifth paper in respect of ‘harmonisation’ for instance, are applicable in equal measure to 
any code which falls within the scope of the definition proffered here.20 
 
Before turning to a consideration of the argument and structure of this thesis, it is important to 
identify explicitly some notable types of instrument which do not fall within the scope of the 
definition of ‘code’ adopted here. A non-binding restatement is perhaps the most obvious 
                                                      
17 In respect of the New Zealand reforms, for instance, one might conceive of the relevant ‘domain’ as being a 
sub-domain of the law of contract as a whole. Similarly, in respect of the sale of goods legislation, the relevant 
‘domain’ might be said to be the law respecting contracts for the sale of goods. 
18 This is not to suggest, of course, that the adoption of a narrow definition of codification is necessarily 
unworkable. Indeed, in some settings, there might be a compelling case for the adoption of a restrictive 
definition.  
19 An example can be seen in the fourth paper, which acknowledges that the difficulty of drawing boundaries 
around ‘the law of contract’ is one which does not arise to the same extent when seeking to codify only part of 
the law. 
20 It would thus be misconceived to criticise this thesis for its omission of a detailed traversal of all historical 
exercises in contract codification. The methodology utilised here has been taken up precisely because its breadth 
of application renders an exhaustive historical survey otiose. 
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species of instrument excluded from the definition set out above. In addition to the well-known 
restatements published by the American Law Institute, non-binding restatements have, in 
recent years, played an increasingly prominent role in English law.21 Their exclusion from the 
definition of ‘code’ in this thesis should therefore not be understood to imply that such 
restatements are academically or practically insignificant. The metes and bounds of the present 
inquiry are to a great extent a product of the exigencies of space – though an examination of 
the desirability of a non-binding restatement of the Australian law of contract would doubtless 
be a profitable inquiry, the extension of this thesis to encapsulate such a question would also 
necessitate the answering of a range of related questions which cannot be accommodated 
within the limits of this project.22 A similar point might be made in respect of the exclusion of 
other non-binding international instruments or model laws. At the same time, it must be 
stressed that this thesis does not ignore the existence of restatements, international instruments 
or model laws in the course of its analysis – indeed, as will be seen, the thesis draws upon a 
great many instruments of the types instanced here in the course of its analysis.23 
 
 
III THE ARGUMENT AND ITS STRUCTURE 
 
The first paper in this thesis is focused on the question of whether the adoption of a contract 
code would promote ‘certainty’.24 As the paper explains, this task is complicated by the 
                                                      
21 For the recent English restatements of the law of contract, see: Andrew Burrows, A Restatement of the English 
Law of Contract (Oxford University Press, 2016); Neil Andrews, Contract Rules: Decoding English Law 
(Intersentia, 2016). The English law of unjust enrichment has also been the subject of a recent restatement. See: 
Andrew Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press, 2012). For 
a discussion of the impact of the latter restatement, see: Kit Barker, ‘Centripetal Force: The Law of Unjust 
Enrichment Restated in England and Wales’ (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 155. 
22 The most obvious ancillary question would be a comparative one – namely that of whether the drafting of a 
non-binding restatement of the Australian law of contract would be more or less desirable than the enactment of 
a binding code. More generally, it might be sought to ‘rank’ the relative desirability of the maintenance of the 
status quo, the drafting of a non-binding restatement, and the enactment of a binding code. Though these are the 
most obvious questions which would arise, other more subtle difficulties would also present themselves. One 
question which has never been adequately addressed is that of what it is that separates a ‘restatement’ from an 
authoritative reference work. The question might be posed in more general terms as being that of what are the 
definitional characteristics of a ‘restatement’. Why, for instance, is a major reference work such as Contract 
Law in Australia not generally said to be a ‘restatement’ of the Australian law of contract? See: J W Carter, 
Contract Law in Australia (LexisNexis, 7th ed, 2018). 
23 The fourth paper, for instance, draws lessons from the drafting process employed in the preparation of 
Professor Burrows’ restatements. The fifth paper addresses international instruments and model laws at some 
length. 
24 This paper was published in 2018: John Eldridge, ‘Contract Codification and ‘Certainty’’ (2018) 35 Journal 
of Contract Law 146. 
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terminological confusion apparent in much of the literature, along with a widespread tendency 
towards exploring questions of ‘certainty’ without first explicitly defining what this concept 
entails.  In light of the absence of an established conception of ‘certainty’ in the codification 
literature, the paper considers what insights might be derived from a range of more general 
writings on the subject of ‘certainty’.  Though a consideration of that literature highlights a 
number of important points, it will nonetheless be seen that none of the existing frameworks 
are capable of being directly transposed to the present context.   
 
Accordingly, the paper posits its own framework.  It is suggested that the general notion of 
‘certainty’ in this setting is capable of being divided into two interrelated concepts.  The first 
can be deemed ‘legal certainty’, and concerns the confidence with which the content and scope 
of substantive legal principles can be stated.  The second is best termed ‘accessibility’, as it 
concerns the ease with which the law’s ‘users’ can ascertain with accuracy the way in which 
particular real-world questions would be resolved if they were to be submitted to formal 
adjudication. 
 
After developing this distinction, the paper proceeds to analyse each of these concepts in turn.  
That analysis first casts serious doubt on the notion that the codification of the Australian law 
of contract would usher in a materially greater degree of ‘legal certainty’. Having thus traced 
the difficulties as stemming from underlying approaches to appellate decision-making, it is 
difficult to see how codification could operate to resolve them. 
 
The paper then turns to a consideration of ‘accessibility’.  The first point made in this respect 
is that care must be taken to ensure that the importance of legal ‘accessibility’ is not overstated.  
There is, as is well-known, a rich literature which explores the question of the degree to which 
the positive rules of contract law ‘matter’ to the law’s users.25  The paper canvasses this 
scholarship with a view to identifying its ramifications for the codification debate.  As will be 
seen, though there are good reasons for attaching normative importance to ‘accessibility’, there 
is a clear disjunct between the conclusions to be drawn from the empirical scholarship and the 
zeal exhibited in respect of ‘accessibility’ by the proponents of codification. 
                                                      
25 A leading example is the scholarship of Stewart Macaulay.  For an overview, see: Jean Braucher, John 
Kidwell and William C Whitford (eds), Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the 
Empirical and the Lyrical (Hart Publishing, 2013). For Macaulay’s seminal work, see: Stewart Macaulay, 'Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study' (1963) 28 American Sociological Review 55. 
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The paper then moves on to examine the many factors which militate against codification 
having a positive impact upon ‘accessibility’, with particular attention being paid to the 
significance of those dimensions of ‘accessibility’ – such as the high fixed costs of access to 
justice – which are very unlikely to be impacted by such a reform.  The paper shows, in sum, 
that there is significant cause to doubt the claim that the codification of Australian contract law 
would promote its ‘accessibility’. 
 
The second paper is not directly concerned with codification, but instead develops a point 
adverted to in the first paper.26 It is concerned with a controversy which has emerged in recent 
years as to whether it is necessary to point to ‘ambiguity’ as a precondition for the use of 
evidence of ‘surrounding circumstances’ as an aid to the construction of a contract.  Though 
this question is fundamental and of some considerable importance, the task of answering it is 
far from straightforward. The object of the second paper is to give a brief overview of the 
nature of the difficulty in respect of this question, and to consider a number of recent 
developments both in the High Court and in intermediate appellate courts.  In doing so, it seeks 
to offer an assessment of the present state of the law and a view as to its likely future 
development.  
 
Given the second paper is not directly concerned with codification, it is important to explain 
its connection with the central argument developed throughout this thesis. That connection, put 
simply, is that the second paper seeks to substantiate several of the key observations made in 
the first paper. Indeed, the second paper is intimately connected with the first insofar as it 
demonstrates that ‘legal uncertainty’ in the Australian law of contract, in the sense defined in 
the first paper, stems at least in part from the judicial technique of the High Court of Australia, 
which has, put simply, failed to deliver the leadership and clarity in this arena which might be 
expected of an apex court.27  There is no basis for concluding that this driver of ‘legal 
uncertainty’ would be affected by the adoption of a contract code. Indeed, insofar as the 
uncertainty which attends the Australian law of contract stems from a want of leadership on 
                                                      
26 This paper was published in 2018: John Eldridge, ‘‘Surrounding Circumstances’ in Contractual Interpretation: 
Where are we Now?’ (2018) 32(3) Commercial Law Quarterly 3. 
27 In this, the paper builds on earlier work which has arrived at similar conclusions.  See, eg: Andrew Stewart 
and J W Carter, ‘The High Court and Contract Law in the New Millennium’ (2003) 6 Flinders Journal of Law 
Reform 185. 
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the part of the High Court, there is every reason to think that this driver of uncertainty would 
manifest itself in the High Court’s interpretation and application of a code.  
 
The third paper is concerned with recent developments in the law respecting contractual 
penalties in both Australia and England.28 The paper traverses a wide range of matters in 
respect of the recent changes in the rule’s scope and substance, and identifies a number of 
important open questions. It also suggests means by which some of these questions might be 
resolved. 
 
Given the third paper is not directly concerned with codification, it must again be stressed that 
it is nonetheless closely connected with the central argument developed throughout this thesis. 
The relevance of the third paper to the question of codification is again its highlighting of the 
way in which legal uncertainty in the Australian law of contract is in many cases driven not by 
difficulties peculiar to the common law, but instead by a want of judicial leadership. As is seen 
in the third paper, the uncertainty and difficulty in the sphere of penalties derives in large 
measure from a number of recent judicial decisions which have confounded lower courts and 
commentators alike. The final section of the third paper explicitly engages with these questions, 
and links the subject matter of that paper to the broader debate respecting the Australian law 
of contract and the role of the High Court in its development.29 
 
In the fourth paper, the focus shifts so as to illuminate the barriers to codification and the 
challenges and difficulties posed by such a reform.30 The paper, which examines the Australian 
experience in respect of contract codification for a British audience, seeks to identify and 
examine two challenges inherent in contract codification which have been given too little 
attention by the proponents of reform in Australia.  It proceeds in three parts. It first gives a 
critical overview of the history of Australian contract codification initiatives. Against this 
                                                      
28 This paper was published in 2018: John Eldridge, ‘The New Law of Penalties: Mapping the Terrain’ [2018] 
Journal of Business Law 637. 
29 It might also be noted that though the difficulties surrounding contractual interpretation and relief against 
penalties have been singled out for detailed examination in this thesis, the making of that choice should not be 
taken to suggest that there do not exist other examples which might be thought to substantiate the points made in 
the first paper regarding judicial leadership. The approach taken here is one of depth in preference to breadth – 
rather than traversing a great number of examples in light detail, a smaller number of examples have been 
examined at length. 
30 This paper will be published in 2019: John Eldridge, ‘Contract Codification: Cautionary Lessons from 
Australia’ (2019) 23 Edinburgh Law Review (forthcoming). 
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backdrop, it then proceeds to examine two difficulties which must necessarily beset any 
contract codification project. 
   
The first species of difficulty arises from the conceptual and cultural dimensions of 
codification.  As the paper shows, building support for a contract code is made especially 
challenging by the continued lack of agreement as to contract law’s proper purpose. After 
offering a very brief overview of the nature and extent of the continuing controversy, the paper 
explains that these unresolved theoretical questions have real ramifications for the way in 
which the codification process ought to be carried out, and the nature and content of any code.  
In addition to this conceptual challenge, the successful implementation of a contract code is 
made difficult by the lack of enthusiasm typically evinced for codifying instruments on the part 
of practitioners and judges. As the paper explains, much has been written in respect of common 
lawyers’ tendency to view statute as an extraneous incursion upon the common law. 
Comparatively little, however, has been said about the degree to which codes are susceptible 
to being undermined by judicial and professional resistance. It is suggested that the proponents 
of codification ought to do far more to engage with stakeholders in the judiciary and the 
profession.   
 
Finally, the paper moves on to an examination of the second type of difficulty, which is that 
encountered in seeking to identify a core body of rules and principles which together constitute 
‘contract law’.  Any contract code must grapple not only with contract’s intersection with other 
bodies of law, but with the divisions and fault lines internal to the law of contract. As the paper 
demonstrates, proponents of codification in Australia have too often sought to treat the law of 
contract as a monolithic and internally homogenous legal structure. In consequence of this, 
codification proposals have tended to elide important distinctions within the law of contract, 
and to pay too little attention to the important question of how any contract code will interact 
with other spheres of law with which the law of contract overlaps.31 It is concluded that until 
an appropriate degree of sophistication is brought to the challenges posed in this area, contract 
codification is unlikely to proceed successfully. 
 
                                                      
31 Any of a great number of examples might be proffered here. Does, for instance, the doctrine of undue 
influence form part of the law of contract?  Or is it instead a general equitable doctrine that may, in some cases, 
apply to vitiate a contract? 
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The fifth and final paper in this thesis seeks to identify some practical next steps which might 
be taken by way of reform of the Australian law of contract.32  It seeks in particular to identify 
those reforms which are sufficiently uncontroversial as to attract support on the part of 
government.  
 
In the course of its analysis, the paper also grapples with the question of whether the more 
radical options set out in the 2012 discussion paper – including the prospect of codification – 
were ever suitable responses to the challenges facing the Australian law of contract. In the 
course of that discussion, the paper makes and defends a point which is of some considerable 
importance.  This point, put simply, is that though many would-be reformers of the Australian 
law of contract have advanced their proposals through the rubric of codification, it must be 
remembered that there remain a number of other mechanisms for substantive reform which, 
while promising, have been paid relatively little attention of late. It is consequently necessary 
to uncouple questions of substantive law reform from the question of whether the law ought to 
be codified.  Though there may well exist scenarios in which a body of law is in need of such 
thoroughgoing and fundamental substantive reform that codification is the only sensible means 
by which reform can be effected, there has been no serious effort made to demonstrate that this 
is so in respect of the Australian law of contract.  
 
The final paper proceeds in two broad parts. The first offers up a short overview of past contract 
law reform initiatives in Australia. Against that backdrop, the second part proceeds to identify 
and assess several key opportunities for reform. As is explained, each of those potential reforms 
can be seen as steps towards an overarching goal – namely that of creating a ‘uniform’ law of 
contract within Australia, free of the inconsistencies and irregularities which, while minor, are 
nonetheless productive of considerable inconvenience.  
 
An important caveat ought to be made in respect of the examples of potential reforms – in 
respect of privity, contractual capacity and frustration – singled out for discussion in the final 
paper. As is explicitly noted in the paper itself, it is by no means suggested that the reforms 
instanced there are the only reforms, or even the most important reforms, which might be 
attempted in the law of contract today. Indeed, some may object that some of the reform 
opportunities singled out in the final paper – such as harmonisation of statutes which make 
                                                      
32 John Eldridge, ‘Reforming the Australian Law of Contract: Some Practical Next Steps’ (2019) 93 Australian 
Law Journal (forthcoming). 
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special provision for the adjustment of rights in respect of frustrated contracts – are of relatively 
little commercial significance, and therefore cannot be said to amount to a law reform 
priority.33 Yet the common thread which unites the examples cited in the final paper is not their 
importance - it is instead that they are each likely to be relatively uncontroversial.34 As the 
paper explains, its object is not to set out an exhaustive list of all potential reforms of the 
Australian law of contract, but instead to offer up a number of clear examples of attractive and 
uncontroversial reforms which might readily be undertaken. In doing so, it serves up a reminder 
that worthwhile statutory reforms of the law of contract can be undertaken without any 
necessity of embarking upon a wide-ranging codification exercise. 
 
 
IV THE PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
 
In light of the long history of the debate respecting codification, it might be thought that the 
resolution of the question of whether the Australian law of contract ought to be codified is 
simply a matter of attending closely to the existing literature.  Yet as will become apparent 
upon a consideration of the papers which constitute this thesis, such a view would be 
misconceived.   
 
Though the literature in respect of codification is vast, its constituent writings are for the most 
part preoccupied with the challenges and imperatives of the particular codification proposals 
with which they are concerned. Since the bulk of these writings concern proposals which are 
at a far jurisdictional remove from Australia, they largely fail to take account of the objectives 
and challenges peculiar to the reform of the Australian law of contract.35  It follows that if the 
insights which these writings promise are to be brought to the fore, they must be supplemented 
                                                      
33 Though it might be conceded that the reform opportunities instanced in the final paper are not first-order 
priorities, it would be quite wrong to think them wholly devoid of practical importance. Indeed, the doctrine of 
frustration has commanded the attention of some of the law of contract’s most esteemed scholars. See, eg: G H 
Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure (Sweet & Maxwell, 1994). 
34 It is, of course, not suggested that the reforms singled out in the final paper would be wholly uncontroversial. 
Some resistance and objection must be expected even in respect of the most anodyne of reforms. 
35 There is a considerable body of writing which debates the existence and nature of a distinctively ‘Australian’ 
contract law.  See, eg, Anthony Mason, ‘Australian Contract Law’ (1988) 1 Journal of Contract Law 1; M P 
Ellinghaus, ‘An Australian Contract Law?’ (1989) 2 Journal of Contract Law 13; John Gava, ‘An Australian 
Contract Law? – A Reply’ (1998) 12 Journal of Contract Law 242. 
 16 
by analysis informed by the legal, social, and economic context of twenty-first century 
Australia. It is this gap which this thesis fills.  
 
While there is little to be gained from embarking here upon an exhaustive survey of the 
arguments which have been advanced in the codification debate, it is nonetheless worth setting 
out clearly the principal contributions which this thesis makes to the literature. The points 
identified here cannot be taken to be an exhaustive statement of the scholarly contribution made 
by the papers which comprise this thesis.36 The points set out here must also be read in 
conjunction with the more elaborate discussions which follow in the substantive papers.37 Even 
so, the points below serve to highlight the key contributions which this thesis makes to the 
codification debate. 
 
First, this thesis makes a contribution to the understanding of how the ‘success’ of a contract 
codification exercise ought to be understood and ascertained. As is illustrated in the first paper, 
much of the existing literature in respect of codification discusses the objectives or anticipated 
dividends of codification in terminology which wants for rigorous definition or interrogation. 
A clear example of such a tendency can be seen in the 2012 Discussion Paper itself, which sets 
out what are suggested to be the principal ‘drivers of reform’ in connection with contract law. 
These drivers are themselves drawn in part from the principles articulated in the 
Commonwealth’s 2009 Strategic Framework for Access to Justice,38 and are said to be:39 
• Accessibility 
• Certainty 
• Simplification and removal of technicality 
                                                      
36 To give just two examples not instanced in the course of the points made here, papers two and three each 
make a number of contributions to the literature on contractual interpretation and penalties. Though these 
contributions ought not to be ignored, they can be put to one side in identifying the principal contributions 
which the thesis as a whole (including papers two and three) makes to the literature respecting contract 
codification. 
37 The exact scope of each contribution, and its relationship with the existing literature, can be made clear only 
upon a full consideration of the context in which each point is developed. That context emerges upon a 
consideration of the substantive papers. 
38 Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil 
Justice System (2009). 
39 This is an abbreviated form of the factors which are set out in the Discussion Paper. See: Attorney-General’s 
Department (Cth), Improving Australia’s Law and Justice Framework: A Discussion Paper Exploring the Scope 
for Reforming Australian Contract Law (2012), 3-6. 
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• Setting acceptable standards of conduct40 
• Supporting innovation 
• Maximising participation in the digital economy 





Though there is nothing inherently objectionable in the choice of these reform ‘drivers’, it is 
nonetheless clear that – at least in the absence of considerable exegesis – they leave much to 
be desired as metrics of a code’s success or failure. In addition to their obvious and considerable 
overlap, the precise meaning of many of the ‘drivers’ set out above is far from clear. What, for 
instance, ought to count as ‘innovation’ in this context? When can a rule or principle be said to 
involve ‘technicality’? Is it necessary, when determining whether a code is a success, to inquire 
into whether the ‘technicality’ of a rule contained therein is warranted? 
 
Of course, any of a great number of other potential metrics might conceivably be utilised in 
judging codification exercises and their resultant codes. If the existence (or incidence) of 
academic criticism is to be an indication of a code’s failure, there is at least some cause to 
conclude that various iterations of the sale of goods legislation have failed.43 If a code is to be 
deemed to be a failure to the extent that it gives rise to interpretive difficulty, virtually every 
                                                      
40 The Discussion Paper cites the need, in this connection, for recognition of the diversity of Australia’s culture.  
As the Discussion Paper explains: ‘Standards of acceptable conduct should be unambiguous, simple to 
understand and take particular account of the needs of people from different cultural backgrounds or 
experiencing disparate circumstances. Australia’s cultural diversity demands that our contract law should be 
readily translatable into other languages to facilitate domestic and international trade and improve general public 
awareness of the law.’ See: Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Improving Australia’s Law and Justice 
Framework: A Discussion Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law (2012), 4. 
41 The paper explains that ‘elasticity … may help support relational contracts; that is, long-term contracts which 
support successful continuing relationships. Many contracts involve complex projects which rely on cooperation 
between the parties over a significant period of time. The use of flexible, gap-filling concepts like good faith, 
reasonableness or adaptation for hardship may be needed to help these contracts work as time passes and 
circumstances change.’ See: Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Improving Australia’s Law and Justice 
Framework: A Discussion Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law (2012), 5. 
42 In the Discussion Paper this term connotes harmonisation with international norms. 
43 See, eg, the discussion in: Samuel Stoljar, 'Conditions, Warranties and Descriptions of Quality in Sale of 
Goods - I' (1952) 15 Modern Law Review 425; Samuel Stoljar, 'Conditions, Warranties and Descriptions of 
Quality in Sale of Goods - II' (1953) 16 Modern Law Review 174; Michael Lambiris, ‘Reform of the Law of 
Sale in Australia’ (1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 690. 
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code will eventually face censure.44 Alternatively, if a code’s need of ‘corrective’ amendments 
is to be seen as indicative of failure, the sale of goods legislation must again be marked down. 
Of the many changes which have been made to the legislation’s original text, a number were 
directed solely to the correction of error – such as the difficulties which stemmed from the 
original statute’s use of concepts and terminology which were alien to Scots law.45  Equally, if 
a code’s success is to be measured by the degree to which the judicial interpretation and 
application of the code conforms to the intentions and expectations of those who drafted it, 
there is some cause to doubt the success of the New Zealand experience of contract 
codification.46 Determining whether these metrics ought to be used to judge a code’s success 
is far from straightforward. Furthermore, even if it is established that a particular metric may 
legitimately be employed, the task of giving precise meaning to the relevant terminology and 
concepts poses further significant challenges.  
 
Though this thesis does not purport to resolve all of these difficulties, it does make significant 
strides in exploring one of the most important ‘drivers’ of codification – the attainment of 
‘certainty’. Though the literature sometimes employs a cognate expression in place of 
‘certainty’, it is nonetheless clear that a code’s propensity to deliver ‘certainty’ is widely seen 
as a metric by which its success can be measured. The first paper in this thesis makes a 
significant contribution to the codification debate insofar as it identifies the gap in the existing 
literature in this connection, and proffers a workable answer. As noted above, it is suggested 
in the first paper that the general notion of ‘certainty’, when used in the context of contract 
codification, is capable of being divided into two interrelated concepts.  The first can be deemed 
‘legal certainty’, and concerns the confidence with which the content and scope of substantive 
legal principles can be stated.  The second is best termed ‘accessibility’, as it concerns the ease 
with which the law’s ‘users’ can ascertain with accuracy the way in which particular real-world 
questions would be resolved if they were to be submitted to formal adjudication. The first paper 
then goes on to explain how this framework might be applied in the context of Australia.  
                                                      
44 For some recent discussion of such difficulties in respect of the Indian Contract Act, see: Shivprasad 
Swaminathan and Ragini Surana ‘Minors’ Contracts: A Major Problem with the Indian Contract Act, 1872’ 
(2019) Statute Law Review (forthcoming). 
45 See the discussion in: Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Sale and Supply of Goods (Law Com. 
No. 160) (Scot. Law Com. No. 104), 1987. 
46 See: Warren Swain, ‘Contract Codification in Australia: Is it Necessary, Desirable and Possible?’ (2014) 36 
Sydney Law Review 131, 149. One contemporaneous commentator described the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 
(NZ) as ‘well-intentioned but ill-executed’. See: J N Finn, ‘The Contractual Mistakes Act 1977’ (1979) 8 New 
Zealand Universities Law Review 312, 320. 
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The second principal contribution made by this thesis relates to and builds upon this first point. 
As is explained in the first paper, though a number of commentators have criticised the lack of 
judicial leadership shown by the High Court in the sphere of contracts, few have sought to link 
these observations to the codification debate.47 This thesis is the first contribution to the 
Australian contract codification debate which supports its analysis of the merits of codification 
by reference to detailed doctrinal analysis. The second and third papers in this thesis, while 
superficially concerned with matters at some remove from the codification debate, are in truth 
integral to structure of the thesis. In addition to suggesting that a lack of judicial leadership on 
the part of the High Court might undermine ‘certainty’ even after the enactment of a code, this 
thesis goes on to demonstrate that want of leadership at considerable length. This 
methodological feature of the thesis is itself one aspect of its contribution to the literature. 
 
Thirdly, and finally, this thesis makes a key contribution to the literature insofar as it seeks to 
highlight the significance of legal and professional culture in the codification process. Though 
some commentators have sought to draw attention to this and related aspects of the codification 
debate, relatively few have devoted significant attention to its study.48 One of the key 
components of the fourth paper in this thesis is its examination of the role of judicial and 
professional culture in the development, interpretation and application of codes. Similarly, the 
fifth paper takes regard of the significance of these factors insofar as it seeks to identify reform 
projects which are likely to be relatively uncontroversial. In exploring this neglected aspect of 
the codification debate, this thesis fills an important gap in the existing literature. 
 
 
V THE METHODOLOGY AND BOUNDARIES OF THIS THESIS 
 
It might be thought sufficient, when defining the methodology utilised in this thesis, simply to 
say that it belongs to the genre of law-reform scholarship, which has long been recognised as 
                                                      
47 For a notable exception, see the discussion in: Andrew Stewart, ‘What’s Wrong with the Australian Law of 
Contract’ (2012) 29 Journal of Contract Law 74. 
48 For a discussion of the importance of ‘genuine consultation’ and the involvement of a broad range of 
stakeholders in the codification process, see: Warren Swain, ‘Contract Codification in Australia: Is it Necessary, 
Desirable and Possible?’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 131, 147. 
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a distinct form of legal research.49 Yet it is important also to offer a brief explanation of the 
nature of this genre of legal writing, and to explain how the methodology has been implemented 
here. 
 
As is common in law-reform research, this thesis draws on a range of different analytic 
techniques, with a view to combining the strengths of each.50  The analysis of the current 
Australian law of contract in papers 2 and 3 is best categorised as doctrinal legal analysis,51 
whereas the analysis in papers 1, 4 and 5 involve engagement with both practical and 
theoretical questions.52 The thesis as a whole is also informed to a significant degree by the 
techniques of comparative law.  Indeed, as will be seen throughout the papers, the literature in 
respect of comparative law is drawn upon in order to ensure the utilisation of comparative 
materials is robust and appropriate.53   
 
Perhaps the most important question to address when discussing the methodology of this thesis 
is that of whether it involves the gathering of fresh empirical evidence to test the questions 
which it canvasses.  The short answer to this question is that this thesis does not involve 
                                                      
49 See, eg, the taxonomy of legal research set out in: Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, 
Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (1983). See 
further: Council of Australian Law Deans, Statement on the Nature of Legal Research (2005).  In addition to the 
myriad examples of law-reform research, there also exists a burgeoning body of scholarship which traces the 
history of law-reform as a discipline and phenomenon.  See, eg: David Weisbrot (ed) The Promise of Law 
Reform (Federation Press, 2005); Matthew Dyson, James Lee, Shona Wilson-Stark (eds) Fifty Years of the Law 
Commissions: The Dynamics of Law Reform (Hart Publishing, 2016). 
50 For the view that all legal research is in truth an amalgam of disparate analytic techniques, see: Richard 
Posner, ‘Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline’ (1988) 38 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 333, 345. 
51Much has been written about the nature of doctrinal legal analysis, see, eg: Jan M Smits, ‘What is Legal 
Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research’ in Rob van Gestel, Hans W Micklitz and 
Edward L Rubin (eds) Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue (Cambridge University Press, 
2017); Jan Vranken, ‘Methodology of Legal Doctrinal Research: A Comment on Westerman’ in Mark Van 
Hoecke (ed) Methodologies of Legal Research: What Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 
Publishing, 2013).  In addition to general writings of this type, there also exist writings which focus on 
jurisprudential questions which are of importance in doctrinal legal research, such as the distinction between 
notions of ‘principle’ and ‘policy’: see, eg: Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’ (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 
1057, 1060. 
52 This is not the place for a detailed exploration of the various types of contract theory.  For such a discussion, 
see, eg: Peter Benson (ed), The Theory of Contract Law (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Stephen Smith, 
Contract Theory (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
53 For a general discussion of the potential pitfalls in the utilisation of comparative materials, see: Otto Kahn-
Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1. 
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research of this kind – the empirical analysis it contains is confined to the assessment and 
analysis of existing data.  This methodological choice is not at all a consequence of scepticism 
as to the merits of empirical research.54  Indeed, this thesis does draw on empirical scholarship 
and derives several useful insights from it.  Instead, the decision not to gather fresh empirical 
data is a consequence of the resource constraints inherent in a project of this type. 
 
It is also important at the outset to note with care the boundaries of this thesis.  There are a 
number of questions which, while undoubtedly of interest, are beyond this work’s remit, and 
others which are touched upon only incidentally. Indeed, the complexity of the codification 
debate, along with the resource and space constraints which are inherent in a project of this 
type, means that some interesting matters must necessarily be left unexplored.  
 
Perhaps the first question which arises when considering the boundaries of this thesis is that of 
whether it amounts to an exhaustive exploration of whether, and how, the Australian law of 
contract ought to be reformed.  It should be stressed that this thesis expressly disavows any 
intention of taking up such a task.  Even if such a project were possible, it would plainly be a 
task of mammoth proportions, and one which could not be completed within the bounds of a 
thesis such as this.  This thesis is instead concerned with answering the question of whether a 
particular type of reform, namely codification, ought to be undertaken.  Its engagement with 
broader questions is incidental to this core task.  
 
Once this thesis is understood as being focused principally upon codification, there then arises 
the question of the degree to which it explores the subject of codification in general, as opposed 
to the particular question of the codification of the Australian law of contract.  The short answer 
to this is that this is a thesis which is concerned with the codification of Australian contract 
law.  Though it may shed light upon general questions which arise in connection with 
codification, it does so only incidentally.  Though this may be thought to be an unduly narrow 
approach, or one which baulks at the difficult task of identifying general patterns or themes, it 
is in truth simply a consequence of a choice which must be taken as to where focus ought to be 
                                                      
54 For a general discussion of the value and importance of empirical legal scholarship, see: Theodore Eisenberg, 
‘Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?’ (2004) 41 San Diego Law Review 1741.  As is widely-known, 
empirical legal research has enjoyed a steady rise in volume and influence in recent decades. See, eg: Michael R 
Heise ‘An Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 1990 – 2009’ (2011) University of 
Illinois Law Review 1729. 
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directed.  There is little doubt that a sustained theoretical analysis of the general subject of 
codification could be carried out, and that such an analysis could be fruitful and worthwhile. 
Equally, one could embark upon a rigorous exercise in comparative legal scholarship, seeking 
to explore codification projects elsewhere in the common law world with a view to identifying 
lessons for Australia. Yet, as will become apparent, it is necessary, if the questions relating to 
Australian contract law are to be explored in sufficient depth, to deal with a great deal of 
material which is peculiar to the Australian law of contract.  
 
Further, out of an abundance of caution, it ought to be added that this thesis should not be taken 
to make any claim as to the relative merits of common law and civilian legal systems.  Though 
there does indeed exist an interminable debate as to which scheme of law is ‘superior’,55 the 
question of whether the Australian law of contract ought to be codified has little to do with that 
question.  It is inexcusably simplistic to understand the process of codification in a common 
law legal system to involve an adoption of a civilian scheme – any code enacted in a jurisdiction 
such as Australia will inevitably be shaped by the methods and techniques of the common 
law.56 It is equally wrongheaded to conclude that a favourable view of the merits of contract 
codification in Australia must entail a general belief as to the superiority of codified schemes 
of law. 
 
Finally, it is worth saying something as to the relationship between this thesis and the 2012 
Discussion Paper mentioned above.  Two points should be made in this respect.  First, it should 
be noted that this thesis does not seek to give a comprehensive answer to all of the questions 
posed in that paper.  As will be seen, the 2012 Discussion Paper, while preoccupied with 
codification, also sought views on a number of other questions in respect of the reform of the 
Australian law of contract.  As has already been explained, this is a thesis which is focused on 
codification, and which grapples with related questions only insofar as is necessary to deal with 
that central topic.  Second, it should be made clear at the outset that this thesis should not be 
                                                      
55 This debate intersects with the ongoing discussion in respect of legal origin theory, as to which, see: Edward 
L Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Legal Origins’ (2002) 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1193; Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’ (2008) 
46 Journal of Economic Literature 285; Simon Deakin and Katharina Pistor (eds) Legal Origin Theory (Edward 
Elgar, 2012).  For the debate as to whether the common law offers the more fertile soil for economic activity, 
see: F A Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and 
Political Economy (Routledge, 1982); Paul G Mahoney ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek 
Might Be Right’ (2001) 30 Journal of Legal Studies 503. 
56 This is a point which is taken up further in the first paper. 
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thought of as a study of the 2012 Discussion Paper itself or of its aftermath.  As the paper is 
the most recent major law reform exercise in respect of the Australian law of contract, the 
papers necessarily refer to it with great frequency.  Yet it should be clearly understood that the 
2012 Discussion Paper is merely one among many important sources which this thesis draws 
upon in seeking to answer the questions with which it is concerned. 
 
 
VI CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
As noted above, the core contention of this thesis that there are strong reasons to think that the 
Australian law of contract ought not to be codified. Many of the arguments traditionally 
advanced in favour of the codification of the law of contract fail to withstand sustained scrutiny. 
At the same time, there are a number of serious challenges which would have to be overcome 
in order to codify Australian contract law successfully. Put simply, in addition to the serious 
difficulties which attend the positive case for codification, there is a strong negative case which 
has received too little serious attention. 
 
Though this conclusion might at first seem to offer little to proponents of codification or 
reform, this thesis in fact offers many suggestions as to how the task of redressing the 
shortcomings of the Australian law of contract might be approached. Indeed, the final paper in 
this thesis is centred on the task of identifying what next steps ought to be taken in the reform 
of the Australian law of contract. Though that paper rejects codification as a desirable option, 
it is far from reticent in suggesting desirable reforms. In a similar vein, the fourth paper sets 
out a number of suggestions as to how future Australian contract codification projects might 
avoid the pitfalls which have derailed past efforts at reform. It would thus be quite wrong to 
view this thesis as being wholly opposed to reform or legal change. Indeed, in addition to the 
many specific reforms which are suggested throughout, the thesis offers up a good deal of 
general advice on the subject of codification which may be of some considerable use to future 
would-be codifiers. 
 
Though this thesis is firm in its conclusion that the Australian law of contract ought not to be 
codified, it acknowledges at a number of points that key questions in the contract codification 
debate ought to be the subject of further investigation and analysis. These questions are for the 
most part those which can only be answered through the gathering of empirical evidence. In 
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the final paper, for instance, it is observed that much might be gained from building an 
understanding of the factors which drive parties to prefer (or eschew) Australian law as the 
governing law of their contract.57  The answer to questions such as this might either cast yet 
further doubt on the case for codification, or instead offer some support to those who maintain 
that the case for codification is a convincing one. A number of other questions in a similar vein 
are identified throughout this thesis.  
 
The resolution of empirical questions of this kind are among the more pressing tasks which 
remain in connection with the Australian contract codification debate. Though this thesis was 
constrained from exploring those questions, it does identify them with some care, and seeks to 
place them within their broader context. It is hoped that a future research project will take up 





























                                                      
57 Some empirical scholarship in this vein already exists elsewhere. See, eg: Gilles Cuniberti, ‘The International 
Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws’ (2014) 34 Northwestern Journal of International 
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In March 2012, the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department issued 
a brief but wide-ranging discussion paper which canvassed the possibility 
of codifying or otherwise reforming the Australian law of contract.  This 
article is concerned with a particular dimension of the debate sparked by 
that paper: namely the question of whether codification would promote 
‘certainty’ in the Australian law of contract.  It first seeks to establish an 
understanding of the likely nature of any successful Australian contract 
codification project.  It then proceeds to set out and apply a framework for 
understanding the concept of ‘certainty’ in the present context.  It is 
concluded that although there may be cause to think that codification might 
promote ‘certainty’ to at least some extent, there are good reasons to think 
that its impact in this respect would likely be less significant than has often 
been suggested.   
 
In March 2012, the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department issued a brief but wide-
ranging discussion paper which canvassed the possibility of codifying or otherwise reforming 
the Australian law of contract.1  Though it attracted 58 submissions and a number of thoughtful 
papers, there is nonetheless a clear disjunct between the significance and scope of the questions 
raised by the paper and the response which it attracted.2  Indeed, though the codification of 
Australian contract law has been mooted several times in the past fifty years, the merit of such 
a reform has rarely been the subject of sustained analysis.3   
 
In the wake of the 2012 Discussion Paper, governmental enthusiasm for the reform of the law 
of contract appears to have waned.4  There is good reason to think that codification – or any 
                                                      
 BA LLB(Hons) (Adelaide) LLM(Cambridge); Lecturer, University of Sydney Law School; PhD Candidate, 
Adelaide Law School.  Thanks are due to Professor John Carter, Professor Andrew Stewart, and the anonymous 
referee for helpful advice and comments.  Any errors remain the author’s own. 
1 Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Improving Australia’s Law and Justice Framework: A Discussion 
Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law, 2012.   
2 See, eg, A Stewart, ‘What’s Wrong with the Australian Law of Contract?’ (2012) 29 JCL 74; W Swain, 
‘Contract Codification in Australia: Is it Necessary, Desirable and Possible?’ (2014) 36 Sydney LR 131; M 
Doris, ‘Promising Options, Dead Ends and the Reform of Australian Contract Law’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 24; 
M Keyes and T Wilson, eds, Codifying Contract Law: International and Consumer Law Perspectives, Ashgate, 
Farnham 2014; L Siliquini-Cinelli, ‘Taking (Legal) Traditions Seriously, Or Why Australian Contract Law 
Should Not Be Codified: An Unconventional Inquiry’ (2015) 34 University of Queensland LJ 99. 
3 For writings which examine the prospect of codifying Australian contract law but which pre-date the 2012 
Discussion Paper, see, eg, M P Ellinghaus, E W Wright and M Karras Models of Contract Law: An Empirical 
Evaluation of their Utility,Themis Press, Sydney, 2005; J Starke, ‘A Restatement of the Australian Law of 
Contract as a First Step Towards an Australian Uniform Contract Code’ (1978) 49 ALJ 234; D Svantesson 
‘Codifying Australia’s Contract Law - Time for A Stocktake in the Common Law Factory’ (2008) 20 Bond LR 
1. 
4 The Discussion Paper was not followed by any significant further activity on the part of the Attorney General’s 
Department, and the reform of contract law appears no longer to be a priority. 
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similar such reform – is unlikely to eventuate in the near future.5  Even so, it is well worth 
continuing to grapple with the questions raised by the paper and by the debate which it 
prompted, not the least because of the arguably unmerited optimism evident in much of what 
has been written by the proponents of reform. 
 
It is no object of this article to canvass the full range of issues thrown up by the question of 
whether Australian contract law ought to be codified or otherwise significantly reformed.6  
Such a discussion would require engagement with a wide range of issues, including the 
important question of whether the Australian law of contract ought to be ‘harmonized’ with 
the law of other jurisdictions or with transnational instruments.  It instead grapples at length 
with a particular dimension of the debate: namely the question of whether codification would 
promote ‘certainty’ in the Australian law of contract.  As one of the focal points of the argument 
surrounding contract codification, it is somewhat surprising that this question is yet to be the 
subject of detailed consideration from an Australian perspective.7  This article seeks to fill this 
gap.  It shows, after canvassing a range of doctrinal and practical considerations, that although 
there is cause to think that codification might promote ‘certainty’ to at least some extent, there 
are good reasons to think that its likely impact in this respect would likely be less significant 
than has often been suggested.     
 
This article proceeds in four parts.  It first seeks to establish an understanding of the likely 
nature of any successful Australian contract codification project.  Such an exercise is 
unavoidably conjectural and is necessarily capable of being carried out only at a relatively high 
level of generality.  Even so, as will be seen, it is both possible and necessary to put certain 
species of reform to one side on the basis that they are distinctly unlikely to be taken up in 
Australia.  Without doing so, it is very difficult to engage in a focused and realistic assessment 
of the impact which a reform of this type would have if taken up. 
 
Having confined the analysis in this way, this article then proceeds to set out a framework for 
understanding the concept of ‘certainty’ in the present context.  As will be seen, this task is 
                                                      
5 See the discussion in: W Swain, ‘’The Steaming Lungs of a Pigeon’’: Predicting the Direction of Australian 
Contract Law in the Next 25 Years’ in K Barker, K Fairweather and R Grantham, eds, Private Law in the 21st 
Century, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2017. 
6 That task has been ably undertaken elsewhere.  See, in particular: Swain, above, n 2. 
7 Other key dimensions of the debate surrounding the 2012 Discussion Paper have been the subject of focused 
analysis.  In respect of the ‘harmonisation’ of Australian contract law, for instance, see: D Robertson, ‘The 
International Harmonisation of Australian Contract Law’ (2012) 29 JCL 1. 
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complicated by the terminological confusion apparent in much of the codification literature, 
along with a widespread tendency towards exploring questions of ‘certainty’ without first 
explicitly defining what this concept entails.  In light of the absence of an established 
conception of ‘certainty’ in the codification literature, this paper considers what insights might 
be derived from a range of more general writings on the subject of ‘certainty’.  
 
This article suggests that the general notion of ‘certainty’ in this setting is capable of being 
divided into two interrelated concepts.  The first can be deemed ‘legal certainty’, and concerns 
the confidence with which the content and scope of substantive legal principles can be stated.  
The second is best termed ‘accessibility’, as it concerns the ease with which the law’s ‘users’ 
can ascertain with accuracy the way in which particular real-world questions would be resolved 
if they were to be submitted to formal adjudication. 
 
After setting out this distinction, this article proceeds, in parts 3 and 4, to analyse each of these 
concepts in turn.  It should be noted at the outset that the analysis in each of these parts grapples 
with a number of important normative questions which arise in connection with these two 
dimensions of ‘certainty’.  It is suggested in part 4, for instance, that the normative importance 
of ‘accessibility’ must be qualified in light of the important lessons to be derived from empirical 
contracts scholarship.   
 
Part 4 also engages with the important question of the degree to which further empirical 
research would be helpful in resolving the questions which arise in this area.  The conclusion, 
in both parts 3 and 4, is that the impact which codification would have upon the ‘certainty’ of 





There has long been a clash of ideas in respect of codification.8  It is thus unsurprising that 
there exists an abundant literature, spanning years and jurisdictions, in which the merits and 
                                                      
8 For a recent examination of the historical contest in respect of contract codification and its principal 
belligerents, see: W Swain, ‘Codification of Contract Law: Some Lessons from History’ (2012) 31 University of 
Queensland LJ 39.  For a survey focused principally on European codification, see: S Stoljar, ed, Problems of 
Codification, Australian National University Research School of Social Sciences, Canberra, 1977.  
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consequences of particular codification proposals are subjected to critical scrutiny.9 There also 
exist writings which assess the phenomenon of codification from a broader stance, and which 
seek to derive insights applicable to codes and codification generally.10 
 
It might well be thought, in light of the long history of the debate surrounding codification, that 
the resolution of the question of whether the Australian law of contract ought to be codified is 
simply a matter of attending closely to this existing body of work.  Yet as will be seen in the 
course of the discussion below, such a view would be misconceived.   
 
Though the canon of work in respect of codification is indeed vast, its constituent writings are 
for the most part preoccupied with the challenges and imperatives of the particular codification 
proposals with which they are concerned. So much is unsurprising. But since the bulk of these 
writings concern proposals which are at a far jurisdictional remove from Australia, they largely 
fail to take account of the objectives and challenges peculiar to the reform of the Australian 
law of contract.11  It follows that if the insights which these writings promise are to be brought 
to the fore, they must be supplemented by analysis informed by the legal, social, and economic 
context of twenty-first century Australia.  
 
The necessity for attention to context is no less important when building an understanding of 
what ‘codification’ entails.  Though this is a task which may seem, at first glance, relatively 
straightforward, it is in reality liable to lead to confusion if not undertaken with care. 
 
The starting point in building such an understanding is straightforward.  There exist many 
uncontentious statements of the core features of codes or of codification, each of which 
traverses similar matters.  To take just one such definition which can be readily accepted, 
                                                      
9 It is difficult to give an accurate sense of just how significant and disparate is the body of writing which falls 
within this category, only a very small part of which is referred to here. 
10 See, eg, F Stone, 'A Primer on Codification' (1955) 29 Tulane LR 303; L Scarman, ‘Codification and Judge 
Made Law: A Problem of Coexistence’ (1967) 42 Indiana LR 355; A von Mehren, ‘Some Reflections on 
Codification and Case Law in the Twenty First Century’ (1997) 31 University of California Davis LR 659; G 
Weiss, ‘The Enchantment of Codification in the Common Law World’ (2000) 25 Yale Journal of International 
Law 435. 
11 There is a considerable body of writing which debates the existence and nature of a distinctively ‘Australian’ 
contract law.  See, eg, A Mason, ‘Australian Contract Law’ (1988) 1 JCL 1; M P Ellinghaus, ‘An Australian 
Contract Law?’ (1989) 2 JCL 13; J Gava, ‘An Australian Contract Law? – A Reply’ (1998) 12 JCL 242. 
 32 
Catherine Skinner has suggested that a code, in the context of a common law system, should 
be understood as: 12 
 
[A]n instrument enacted by the legislature which forms the principal source of law on a 
particular topic.  It aims to codify all leading rules derived from both judge-made and 
statutory law in a particular field.  And codification is the process of drafting and enacting 
such an instrument.  A code by this definition is distinct from an ordinary statute because it 
is designed to be a comprehensive and coherent presentation of the law.  Thus it has an 
organising and indexing role than an ordinary statute does not share. 
 
It is once it is sought to move beyond this relatively clear starting point that difficulties begin 
to emerge.  A particularly significant risk is that of eliding potentially important distinctions 
between the operation of codes in common law systems and their operation in civilian legal 
systems.13  One question which arises in this connection and which is especially relevant to 
much of what follows below is that of what role is to be played by judicial precedents after a 
code is enacted in a common law system.  
 
The best way of exploring this question is through a brief case study centred on the Australian 
Contract Code, an instrument drawn up on behalf of the Law Reform Commission of Victoria 
by Fred Ellinghaus and Ted Wright and first published in 1992.14  The Australian Contract 
Code is unusual in virtually every respect.  It is comprised, for instance, of only 27 articles, 
marking it as a clear outlier when assessed against comparable instruments elsewhere in the 
common law world.  Harvey McGregor’s ill-fated code of the English law of contract, for 
instance, was comprised of 673 clauses.15  Similarly, the recent restatements of the English law 
of contract by Andrew Burrows and Neil Andrews contain 50 statements and 198 articles 
respectively (though the former figure is misleadingly low, as many of Burrows’ statements are 
comprised of multiple parts).16  
 
                                                      
12 C Skinner, ‘Codification and the Common Law’ (2009) 11 European Journal of Law Reform 225 at 228.  For 
a discussion of the various different senses in which ‘codification’ might be understood, see: S Wilson Stark, 
The Work of the British Law Commissions: Law Reform … Now?, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2017 at 157-9. 
13 See, for instance, the observations of Hein Kötz in respect of the debate surrounding codification in England: 
H Kötz, ‘Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously’ (1987) 50 MLR 1 at 2 (‘First, it was assumed implicitly that 
codification in England would be more or less tantamount to what it is on the Continent.  Secondly, Continental 
codes were described as being based on a number of distinctive and uniform characteristics.’) 
14 Law Reform Commission of Victoria, An Australian Contract Code, Discussion Paper No 27, 1992. 
15 H McGregor, Contract Code: Drawn Up on Behalf of the English Law Commission, Guiffré, Milan, 1993.  
For a brief overview of the nature and fate of McGregor’s code, see: F M B Reynolds, ‘Contract: Codification, 
Legislation and Judicial Development’ (1995) 9 JCL 11 at 13-17; S Waddams, ‘Codification, Law Reform and 
Judicial Development’ (1996) 9 JCL 192. 
16 A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Contract, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016; N 
Andrews, Contract Law Rules: Decoding English Law, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2016. 
 33 
The Australian Contract Code is further marked out as unusual by its enthusiastic embrace of 





A person may not assert a right or deny an obligation to the extent that it would be 
unconscionable to do so. 
 
To term this provision radical would be an understatement.18 Ellinghaus and Wright’s 
enthusiasm for this discretion-based approach was bolstered by the findings of an empirical 
study which concluded that the Australian Contract Code operated no less predictably than the 
common law.19  It is not necessary to dwell on this empirical study at present, nor is it possible 
to engage here with the normative question of the desirability of such a discretion-based 
approach.20  It is instead for present purposes important to focus upon the interpretive provisions 
in the Code, the most important of which provides: 21 
 
Article 3 
Neither past nor future decisions govern the application of the Code. 
 
This provision gives a clear answer to the question of what role case law would play under the 
Australian Contract Code: stare decisis would, at least formally, be swept away, and in its place 
would be an approach under which the text of the Code alone would provide the answer to any 
legal question in the domain of contract.  Such an approach must be contrasted with the real 
operation of civilian codes, in which judicial precedents do play a meaningful role, as well as 
the typical operation of codes in common law systems.22 
 
                                                      
17 Law Reform Commission of Victoria, above, n 14, p 17. 
18 Among other things, it seems precisely the type of approach which Lord Radcliffe had in mind when 
cautioning that ‘'unconscionable' must not be taken to be a panacea for adjusting any contract between 
competent parties when it shows a rough edge to one side or the other’.  See: Campbell Discount Co Limited v 
Bridge [1962] AC 600 at 626. 
19 See: Ellinghaus, Wright and Karras, above, n 3.  See also: M P Ellinghaus and E W Wright, ‘The Common 
Law of Contracts: Are Broad Principles better than Detailed Rules? An Empirical Investigation’ (2005) 11 
Texas Wesleyan LR 399. 
20 Any such discussion must necessarily engage with the extensive body of literature respecting the notion of 
‘discretionary remedialism’.  See, eg, P Birks, ‘Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism’ (2000) 
29 University of Western Australia LR 1; S Evans, ‘Defending Discretionary Remedialism’ (2001) 23 Sydney 
LR 463. 
21 Law Reform Commission of Victoria, above, n 14. 
22 The status of case law in a civilian legal system differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Its status has, 
notably, been likened to that of ‘soft law’: V Fon and F Parisi, ‘Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A 
Dynamic Analysis’ (2006) 26 International Review of Law and Economics 519.  For a recent overview of the 
status of case law in German law, see the discussion in: J A Bargenda and S Wilson Stark, ‘The Legal Holy 
Grail? German Lessons on Codification for a Fragmented Britain’ (2018) 22 Edinburgh LR 183. 
 34 
In respect of the latter point, it must be emphasised that the approach taken to judicial precedent 
under the Australian Contract Code is at odds with that taken under every significant legislative 
code which has been adopted in Australia and in England.23  These codes, without exception, 
permit the accretion of a body of exegetical case law which is as important in understanding 
and applying the code as the language of the code itself.  This is a point which, though often 
implicitly acknowledged, is not always made explicit.24 
 
It is difficult to discuss the impact which codification might have in the absence of a clear and 
confined understanding of the general nature of such a reform.  In particular, it is difficult to 
arrive at a realistic assessment of the likely impact of codification upon ‘certainty’ if it is 
necessary to consider in equal detail every conceivable type of code, even where some, like the 
Australian Contract Code, are at a far remove from the mainstream. 
 
This article accordingly proceeds on the footing that any contract code adopted in Australia 
would, like every other significant code in the Australian context, permit judicial exegesis of 
the type which is customarily applied to codifying statutes. The classic statement of the relevant 
principles is found in the speech of Lord Herschell in Bank of England v Vagliano Brothers: 25 
 
I think the proper course is in the first instance to examine the language of the statute and to 
ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the previous 
state of the law, and not to start with inquiring how the law previously stood, and then, 
assuming that it was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the words of the 
enactment will bear an interpretation in conformity with this view. 
 
The case law which emerges from this process will, over time, come to constitute a considerable 
body of jurisprudence which sits alongside the code itself. 
 
The approach adopted may well be criticised for taking too narrow a view of the possibilities 
of reform. It is nonetheless defensible for both pragmatic and principled reasons: it is necessary 
to keep the present discussion within reasonable bounds, and it seems distinctly improbable 
that a code of the type posited by Ellinghaus and Wright stands a real chance of being 
adopted.26   
                                                      
23 In addition to the examples discussed below, see, eg, the sale of goods legislation as enacted in each 
Australian jurisdiction. 
24 Though see, for instance: A Diamond, ‘Codification of the Law of Contract’ (1968) 31 MLR 361 at 384. 
25 [1891] AC 107 at 144.  The question of the extent to which courts in fact look to pre-code case law can be put 
to one side at present. 
26 Indeed, the Australian Contract Code has never commanded significant support, and it seems even its authors 
have moved towards a more orthodox approach in later work.  See, for instance, the code drafted by Ellinghaus 
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Claims that codification renders the law more ‘certain’, ‘accessible’, ‘clear’, or ‘intelligible’ 
recur with great frequency.  Though it is now uncommon for such views to be expressed with 
the zeal exhibited by the early proponents of codification,27 and modern proponents of 
codification sometimes seek to distance themselves from particular claims in this sphere,28  it 
nonetheless remains common for writings in respect of codification to highlight the potential 
of codification to promote the ease with which law can be ascertained, understood and applied.  
Thus, Ellinghaus and Wright, in their 1992 Discussion Paper on behalf of the Law Reform 
Commission of Victoria, stressed the fact that the Australian Contract Code can ‘be easily read 
and understood by people who are not lawyers.  Indeed, it is possible to read the entire Code 
in the time it takes to travel the two kilometres between Collins Street, Melbourne, and Grattan 
Street, Carlton, by the No. 19 Tram’.29  Similarly, the 2012 Discussion Paper issued by the 
Attorney-General’s Department cited ‘accessibility’ and ‘certainty’ as two potential ‘drivers 
for reform’.30 
 
Before claims of this type can be properly interrogated, it is necessary to consider the terms 
employed in this arena, and to develop definitions against which the claims of codification’s 
proponents can be tested.  It is the task of this section to set out a framework, under the rubric 
of the term ‘certainty’, through which the issues which arise in this sphere can be explored. 
 
The difficulty in this task stems from the fact that the terminology in this area is often used 
inconsistently and without recourse to clear definitions.  The greatest difficulties are posed by 
the term ‘certainty’ itself, which is often employed as a general, overarching label which 
                                                      
and Wright (along with David Kelly) in response to the 2012 Discussion Paper, which is comprised of 109 
articles and eschews the more unusual features of the Australian Contract Code.  See: M P Ellinghaus, D StL 
Kelly and E W Wright, ‘A Draft Australian Law of Contract’ Working Paper No 03-03-14, Newcastle Law 
School. 
27 Particularly Jeremy Bentham, as to which, see: Swain, above, n 8. 
28 See, eg, M R Topping and J P M Vanderlinden, ‘Ibi Renascit Jus Commune’ (1970) 33 MLR 170 at 170. 
29 Law Reform Commission of Victoria, above, n 14, p 1. 
30 Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), above, n 1, p 3.  For further examples of claims of this kind, see: 
Svantesson, above, n 3; L Nottage, ‘The Government’s Proposed Review of Australia’s Contract Law: An 
Interim Positive Response’ in Keyes and Wilson, above, n 2; A Tettenborn ‘Codifying Contracts – An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come?’ (2014) 67 CLP 273. 
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encompasses a range of related subsidiary concepts. This point is well-illustrated by 
considering the approach taken in the 2012 Discussion Paper, where, in respect of ‘certainty’, 
the paper states: 31 
 
Improving certainty in those areas of contract law which are unsettled or unclear would have 
a number of benefits. When the legal consequences of actions or omissions are clear and 
predictable, individuals and businesses have the information they need to make informed 
choices and to develop long-term plans. Legal certainty also has important economic benefits 
such as allowing contracting parties to allocate risk more efficiently. Greater certainty in the 
law lessens the likelihood of disputes arising or being escalated, reducing costs both for 
parties and for governments. That said, the degree to which certainty is valued may need to 
be balanced against its potential to produce unfairness. 
 
Clearly, the matters canvassed here are capable of being described in general terms as being 
issues of ‘certainty’.  Yet insofar as they concern the ease of ascertaining the legal 
consequences of an act or omission, they intersect with concepts which are often dealt with in 
the literature under the rubric of ‘accessibility’.32  Difficulties of this kind recur regularly.33  
Indeed, even where an effort is made to focus solely upon a particular dimension of the debate, 
there is a tendency for terminological distinctions to quickly break down.  Aubrey Diamond, 
for instance, when seeking to assess the potential of codification to promote the ‘[a]ccessibility 
of the law to the legal profession’,34 sets out the following hypothetical, in which ‘certainty’ 
and ‘accessibility’ eventually blur together: 35 
 
A client consults his solicitor with a problem. He has ordered twenty-four cases of whisky.  
The seller now tells him that eight cases will be delivered tomorrow, eight cases at the end 
of the week, and the remaining eight cases early next week.  Can the client insist on delivery 
of all twenty-four cases at one go?  This is a problem of sale, the law on which was codified 
by the Sale of Goods Act 1893.  If we can imagine the solicitor faced with these facts in 1890, 
he would turn to the books for guidance and there be referred to the cases.  The most recent 
case was Reuter v Sala in 1879 [(1879) 4 CPD 239].  In that case Thesiger LJ said: “… the 
sellers cannot call upon the buyers to accept any greater or less quantity of the article 
bargained for than the specified quantity.”  But before advising his client that he would not 
be bound to accept delivery of any less than twenty-four cases, the solicitor would have been 
well advised to look at the case more closely … One does not have to be an experienced 
lawyer to be uncertain whether Reuter v Sala would govern the problem of the whisky. In 
our problem we have no contractual time mentioned, and unlike [Reuter v Sala] there is no 
question of an irremediable breach … Now consider the solicitor faced with this problem in 
1967.  He will first turn to the Sale of Goods Act 1893, and he hardly need read more than 
the sixteen words in section 31(1): “Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer of goods is not bound 
                                                      
31 Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), above, n 1, p 3.  The paper cites, in support of its concluding 
observation, the oft-cited: M A Eisenberg, ‘The bargain principle and its limits’ (1982) 95 Harvard LR 741, at 
769-70. 
32 See, eg: M Arden, ‘Time for an English Commercial Code?’ [1997] 56 CLJ 516 at 532. 
33 Indeed, the Discussion Paper goes on to discuss ‘accessibility’ in a manner which seems to be focused upon 
the ease with which legal rules can be understood, rather than the ease with which the legal consequences of 
particular acts and omissions can be discerned.  See: Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), above, n 1, p 3.  
(‘There is an inherent benefit in as many people as possible being able to understand rules which affect them.’) 
34 Diamond, above, n 24, p 363. 
35 Diamond, above, n 24, pp 368-70 (footnotes omitted). 
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to accept delivery thereof by instalments.”  The law has not only been made more accessible 
(our 1890 solicitor would undoubtedly have investigated many more cases beyond Reuter v 
Sala) it has also been made more certain. 
 
In other cases, a seemingly clear analytic scheme is seen, on close examination, to provide 
only limited guidance.  Andrew Tettenborn, for instance, utilises a framework which makes 
distinctions between matters of ‘uncertainty’,36 ‘communication’,37 and ‘indeterminacy’.38  
Despite the apparent rigour of this approach, it is compromised by the absence of an explicit 
and clear definition in respect of each of these labels. 
 
Presented with these difficulties, and faced with the need to craft clear definitions, it is 
necessary to look beyond the literature in respect of codification, and to consider what lessons 
might be derived from more general writings on the subject of ‘certainty’.  Some care must 
be taken when surveying this literature, since the notion of ‘certainty’ has figured regularly in 
jurisprudential debates, not all of which have relevance in the present context. 
 
One body of writing which can be largely set to one side is that concerned with the degree to 
which legal decision-making is ‘bounded’ by law.  Though the central issues in this debate 
can be formulated in a number of different ways, the key question is the degree to which the 
answers to legal problems are a function of the application of legal doctrine, and to what extent 
answers are instead the products of what can for present purposes be termed ‘extra-legal’ 
considerations.39  The scholarship on this subject can be sub-divided into various schools of 
thought, among which can be counted the realists and the critical legal studies movement.40  
Throughout the literature in this area, terms such as ‘indeterminacy’ are often used as a 
shorthand for the contention that legal doctrine is not determinative of legal problems.41   
 
                                                      
36 Tettenborn, above, n 30, pp 278-80. 
37 Tettenborn above, n 30, pp 280-3. 
38 Tettenborn above, n 30, pp 283-5. 
39 For some examples of contributions to this debate, see: J W Singer ‘The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and 
Legal Theory’ (1984) 94 Yale LJ 1; R Posner How Judges Think, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 
2008. 
40 For a general overview of the emergence, nature and influence of legal realism, see: M J Horwitz The 
Transformation of American Law 1870 – 1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1992; W W Fisher, M J Horwitz and T A Reed American Legal Realism, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1993.  For an account of the core project of critical legal studies, see: R Unger The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement: Another Time, A Greater Task, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1983. 
41 For examples of this usage, see: D Kennedy ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1976) 89 
Harvard LR 1685; L B Solum ‘On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Legal Dogma’ (1987) 52 University of 
Chicago LR 462. 
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Though it is beyond doubt that this debate is of great importance, it has little direct application 
in the present context.  This is because the debate as to legal ‘indeterminacy’ is not concerned 
with practical questions such as whether some bodies of legal doctrine are more or less 
‘indeterminate’ than others.  It is instead focused on more fundamental questions as to the 
nature of law and of judicial decision-making.  The critical legal scholars, for instance, have 
had nothing to say on the question of whether the codification of the law of contract (or of any 
other body of law) can assist in ushering in a more ‘determinate’ legal order.42  Instead, such 
scholarship is focused on the question of whether legal decision-making is ever divorced from 
political and cultural drivers.  
 
More assistance can be found in an examination of a second (albeit somewhat related) debate 
as to the competing merits of clear rules and flexible, discretionary standards. The two sides 
of the debate have been explained by Cass Sunstein in the following terms: 43 
 
The first, associated with Jeremy Bentham and more recently with Justices Hugo Black and 
Antonin Scalia, places a high premium on the creation and application of general rules. On this 
view, public authorities should avoid "balancing tests" or close attention to individual 
circumstances. They should attempt instead to give guidance to lower courts, future legislators, 
and citizens through clear, abstract rules laid down in advance of actual applications.  The 
second conception, associated with William Blackstone and more recently with Justices Felix 
Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan, places a high premium on law-making at the point of 
application through case-by-case decisions, narrowly tailored to the particulars of individual 
circumstances. On this view, public authorities should stay close to the details of the 
controversy before them and avoid broader principles altogether. 
 
Though the terminology used in this debate is not always consistent, the literature 
nonetheless shares common concepts and frameworks.  Peter Schuck, for instance, uses the 
term 'indeterminacy' interchangeably with ‘uncertainty’, and explains that it: 44 
 
[I]s a quality of both rules and of legal processes and institutions.  Indeterminate rules, 
processes, and institutions are usually open-textured, flexible, multi-factored, and fluid.  The 
familiar reasonableness standard in tort law is an example of an indeterminate rule.  Turning 
                                                      
42 This is not to say that critical legal scholars have neglected the law of contract altogether.  For some examples 
of a critical approach to contract law, see: J M Feinman ‘Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method’ (1984) 97 
Harvard LR 678; C Dalton ‘An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine’ (1985) 94 Yale LJ 997.  For 
an overview with a particular focus on Australia, see: P Drahos and S Parker, ‘Critical Contract Law in 
Australia’ (1990) 3 JCL 30.  Richard Hyland has discussed the implications of critical legal theory for 
codification, but has done so with the object of discerning what modern jurisprudential debates may have to 
teach us about the process of codification: R Hyland ‘Codification and the American Discussion About How 
Judges Decide Cases’ in Keyes and Wilson, above, n 2. 
43 C Sunstein, ‘Problems With Rules’ (1995) 83 California LR 956 at 956-7 (footnotes omitted).  For further 
examples of analyses which employ this framework, see, eg, L Kaplow ‘Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis’ (1992) 42 Duke LJ 557; E Friedman and A L Wickelgren ‘A New Angle on Rules versus Standards’ 
(2014) 16 American Law and Economics Review 499.   
44 P H Schuck, 'Legal Complexity' (1992) 42 Duke LJ 1 at 4.   
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on diverse mixtures of fact and policy, indeterminate rules tend to be costly to apply and their 
outcomes are often hard to predict. 
 
Though the terminology here is somewhat at odds with Sunstein’s, it is clear that both are 
concerned with a tension between clear yet inflexible rules, and flexible yet unpredictable 
standards.45   
 
The principal value of this literature for present purposes is its highlighting of the competing 
normative dimensions of ‘certainty’.  Indeed, as is reflected in the closing sentence of the 
passage from the 2012 Discussion Paper quoted above,46 there are a number of explicit 
acknowledgements in the codification literature of the fact that ‘certainty’ can, at least on 
some understandings, be a double-edged sword.47 Any framework for the assessment of 
‘certainty’ as a dividend of codification must incorporate a consideration of this important 
normative question. 
 
On the other hand, the weakness of this literature for present purposes is in its failure to take 
full account of the real-world operation of legal doctrine.  The distinctions contemplated in 
the passages set out above are of great use in assessing the ‘certainty’ inherent in particular 
legal principles by characterizing them as either rules or standards (or, perhaps more 
accurately, placing them on a spectrum which has these two concepts at its poles).  Yet these 
distinctions fail to engage with questions such as the ‘accessibility’ or ‘intelligibility’ of the 
law for its users.  This is, of course, unsurprising: the analytic framework described by 
Sunstein and Schuck was never intended to be used a means of assessing the ‘certainty’ of 
law in the context of codification. What is needed is a framework for analyzing ‘certainty’ 
which is specifically adapted to the issues and concerns which arise in this setting.   
 
In line with this, the framework which will be utilized here subdivides the general notion of 
‘certainty’ in this setting into two interrelated concepts.  The first can be deemed ‘legal 
certainty’: that is, the confidence with which it is possible to state the content and scope of 
substantive legal principles.  A body of law can be said to be ‘certain’ in this sense if it is 
                                                      
45 For an example of terminology which differs yet further, see: J Braithwaite ‘Rules and Principles: A Theory 
of Legal Certainty’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 47. 
46 ‘That said, the degree to which certainty is valued may need to be balanced against its potential to produce 
unfairness’, citing Eisenberg, above, n 31. 
47 See, eg, M Keyes and T Wilson, ‘Codifying Contract Law: Internationalization Imperatives and Regional 
Perspectives’ in Keyes and Wilson, above, n 2, p 12. 
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possible to confidently state its constituent principles in the abstract of their application to a 
particular set of facts.   
 
The second aspect is best termed ‘accessibility’, as it connotes the ease with which the law’s 
‘users’ can ascertain with accuracy the way in which particular real-world questions would 
be resolved if they were to be submitted to formal adjudication.  Understood in this way, 
‘accessibility’ is a function not only of the ease with which legal sources can be accessed and 
understood, but also of the degree to which the law’s ‘users’ can confidently predict the 
outcome of adjudicative processes.  As is no doubt apparent, any analysis of this second aspect 
of ‘certainty’ must grapple with the points discussed above as to the comparative normative 
merits of rules and standards. 
 
Two points should be made in respect of this framework.  First, there is nothing revolutionary 
or startling about these definitions.  Indeed, there is good reason to think that the framework 
proposed here does little more than give clear expression to ideas which are implicit in much 
of what has been written in respect of codification.  
 
Second, it is not suggested that this framework is the only means by which ‘certainty’ in this 
context might be adequately analyzed.  One could well proceed, for instance, by separating 
‘accessibility’ into the two constituent parts noted above, and proceeding with a tripartite 
framework for assessing ‘certainty’ as a whole.48  Even so, it is not necessary to dwell on the 
various ways in which this framework could be subdivided or reframed.  It is preferable to 
proceed instead to its application. 
 
 
‘LEGAL CERTAINTY’ UNDER A CODE 
 
There is a logical and intuitive appeal to the suggestion that a code can make easier the task of 
confidently stating legal principles.  At least at first glance, codification does away with some 
features of the common law which can hamper ‘legal certainty’.  A code can, for instance, pre-
empt legal questions, thus providing an answer without the necessity of waiting for an 
                                                      
48 Indeed, it seems to be something of this kind which Andrew Tettenborn has in mind in respect of the 
framework discussed above, though, as also noted above, the point is not made explicit.  For an example of an 
alternative framework for understanding ‘certainty’ which, though drawing upon much of the theoretical 
literature discussed above, differs in some key respects from the framework used here, see: I MacNeil, 
‘Uncertainty in Commercial Law’ (2009) 13 Edinburgh LR 68. 
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appropriate test case.49  Codes also typically employ uniform terminology and internally 
coherent conceptual frameworks, each of which facilitates the ease with which substantive 
legal principles can be identified and stated.50 
 
Even so, it would be quite wrong to exaggerate these advantages enjoyed by a codified body 
of law. The fact that codes are subject to judicial exegesis has two important ramifications 
which are relevant here. The first is that, at least in the immediate wake of their enactment, 
codes operate to promote uncertainty, given the necessity of building up a body of guiding case 
law.51  Thus, the effect of an amendment of the codifying legislation in respect of bills of sale 
was described by a contemporaneous commentator thus:52 
 
The words with which the Master of the Rolls began his judgment in one of the earliest 
cases that came before the Court of Appeal were ominous.  The Act, he said, ‘will give rise 
to many discussions on questions of law.’  Not only has this turned out to be a prophecy 
painfully true to litigants, but, had he added that Judges of great and acknowledged ability 
and experience would differ among themselves, and even at times change their opinions as 
to the construction of the provisions of the statute, it would have been equally true.  The 
tests of the validity of bills of sale under the Act have varied from time to time, and words 
and a form, which were at first supposed to be simple, have been found to be full of internal 
difficulties and complications.  In fact a legislative riddle has been put forth, and though 
some of its knots have been cut by the Courts, the difficulties can hardly be deemed to have 
been solved by that process. 
 
The second is that, once such a body of case law begins to build up, codes are capable of giving 
rise to precisely the sorts of difficulties which often cause uncertainty in areas of the law which 
are comprised largely or wholly of common law rules. To give just one example, there was, up 
until very recently, a long-running controversy as to the proper construction of the Uniform 
                                                      
49 A practically important example of this type of uncertainty in the common law of contract is that of the legal 
effect of clicking ‘I agree’ on an electronic form (in particular, that of whether it has the same effect as a 
signature).  Though the question was addressed in eBay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty 
Limited (2006) 170 FCR 450; [2006] FCA 1768, the unsatisfactory way in which the issue was dealt with meant 
that the position remained unclear.  A similar example may be the application of the postal acceptance rule to 
email, which for some time generated considerable controversy.  See: S Hill, ‘Flogging a Dead Horse: The 
Postal Acceptance Rule and Email’ (2001) 17 JCL 151.  Of course, a code’s ability to pre-empt the answers to 
new legal questions which flow from changes in technology and social conditions depends on whether it is 
updated from time to time. 
50 R Goode, ‘The Codification of Commercial Law’ (1988) 14 Monash University LR 135 at 137-8.  For a 
discussion of the potential of a non-binding restatement to address uncertainty, see: K Barker, ‘Centripetal 
Force: The Law of Unjust Enrichment Restated in England and Wales’ (2014) 34 OJLS 155. 
51 This point has been explicitly recognised on a number of occasions. See, eg, H R Hahlo ‘Here Lies the 
Common Law: Rest in Peace’ (1967) 30 MLR 241 at 249-50. 
52  E Cooper Willis, ‘Observations on the working of the Bills of Sale Act 1878, Amendment Act 1882’ (1887) 
3 LQR 300 at 300-1. This example is also cited in Swain, above, n 2, p 141.  For a further discussion of 
difficulties encountered under the legislation in respect of bills of sale, see: V H Kulp ‘The Fictitious Payee’ 
(1920) 18 Michigan LR 296.  For a general discussion of the codification of commercial law in this period, see: 
A Rodger, ‘The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain’ (1992) 108 LQR 570. 
 42 
Evidence Legislation provisions relating to the conditions for the admissibility of tendency 
evidence in criminal trials.53  The difficulty arose from different constructions being adopted 
by the courts of New South Wales and the courts of Victoria, and was resolved only upon the 
High Court pronouncing upon the matter.54  It is, put simply, quite wrong to think of the 
difficulties caused by conflicting or inconsistent authorities as being a problem which can be 
wholly done away with through codification. 
 
These points, though perhaps obvious, cast some doubt on the real impact which codification 
would be likely to have in this sphere.  Yet there remains a more fundamental point to be made.  
In recent decades, many commentators have suggested that one of the principal sources of 
uncertainty in the Australian law of contract has been the lack of judicial leadership shown by 
the High Court of Australia.  It is not possible here to canvass the full range of writings in 
respect of this point, or to test whether such criticisms are merited.55  It should be emphasised, 
however, that if a lack of leadership on the part of the High Court is indeed a key driver of 
uncertainty in the law of contract, there can be little basis for thinking that this difficulty would 
be remedied by the adoption of a contract code.   
 
 
‘ACCESSIBILITY’ UNDER A CODE 
 
As was explained above, ‘accessibility’ is used here to connote the ease with which the law’s 
‘users’ can ascertain with accuracy the way in which particular real-world questions would 
be resolved if they were to be submitted to formal adjudication.  Understood in this way, 
‘accessibility’ is a function not only of the ease with which legal sources can be accessed and 
understood, but also of the degree to which the law’s ‘users’ can confidently predict the 
outcome of adjudicative processes.  This part thus proceeds by addressing each of these points 
in turn.  Before undertaking that task, however, it is necessary to say something in respect of 
                                                      
53 See, eg: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 97.  Though it is not material for present purposes, there is a question as to 
whether the Uniform Evidence Legislation can properly be termed a code, given it seems to presuppose the 
continued operation of some common law rules. See: Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588 at 631-2; 
[2011] HCA 21 at [110] per Heydon J. 
54 The question was resolved in Hughes v The Queen (2017) 344 ALR 187; [2017] HCA 20.  For examples of 
the competing constructions in New South Wales and Victoria, see: Saoud v The Queen (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; 
[2014] NSWCCA 136; Velkoski v The Queen (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121. 
55 Though see, eg: J W Carter and A Stewart, ‘Commerce and Conscience: The High Court’s Developing View 
of Contract’ (1993) 23 University of Western Australia LR 49; A Stewart and J W Carter, ‘The High Court and 
Contract Law in the New Millennium’ (2003) 6 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 185; Stewart, above, n 2, pp 
79-81; J W Carter, W Courtney, E Peden, A Stewart and G J Tolhurst, ‘Contractual Penalties: Resurrecting the 
Equitable Jurisdiction’ (2013) 30 JCL 99 at 128-30. 
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the normative importance of ‘accessibility’ in the domain of contract.   
 
There are many powerful general statements of the normative importance of the accessibility 
of law and legal sources.  Lord Bingham, for instance, has given the following explanation 
which canvasses the principal points which are typically invoked: 56 
 
The law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable.  Why 
must it?  I think there are really three reasons.  First, and most obviously, if you and I are 
liable to be prosecuted, fined and perhaps imprisoned for doing or failing to do something, 
we ought to be able, without undue difficulty, to find out what it is we must or must not do 
on pain of criminal penalty.  This is not because bank robbers habitually consult their 
solicitors before robbing a branch of the NatWest, but because many crimes are a great deal 
less obvious than robbery, and most of us are keen to keep on the right side of the law if we 
can.  One important function of the criminal law is to discourage criminal behaviour, and 
we cannot be discouraged if we do not know, and cannot reasonably easily discover, what 
it is we should not do.  The second reason is rather similar, but not tied to the criminal law.  
If we are to claim the rights which the civil (that is, non-criminal) law gives us, or to perform 
the obligations which it imposes on us, it is important to know what our rights or obligations 
are.  Otherwise we cannot claim the rights or perform the obligations.  It is not much use 
being entitled to, for example, a winter fuel allowance if you cannot reasonably easily 
discover your entitlement, and how you set about claiming it.  Equally, you can only 
perform a duty to recycle different kinds of rubbish in different bags if you know what you 
are meant to do.  The third reason is rather less obvious, but extremely compelling.  It is 
that the successful conduct of trade, investment and business generally is promoted by a 
body of accessible legal rules governing commercial rights and obligations.  
Each of these points can, of course, be accepted without demur.  More prosaic accounts of the 
normative importance of the accessibility of legal sources to the legal profession can also be 
found.  An example is seen in the comments of Windeyer J in Incorporated Council of Law 
Reporting (Queensland) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation: 57 
 
In any country governed by the common law, the publication of the reports of decisions of 
the superior courts is essential for the continuance of the rule of law. The continuity of the 
common law and its characteristic capacity for development and change depend upon those 
who are concerned with its administration having a means of knowing the current course 
of precedents. Without that the law would become stagnant and cease to be a living stream. 
Ever since the time of the Year Books law reports have been the essential nourishment of 
the life of the common law. 
 
Again, these points can be accepted without objection.  There can indeed be little doubt that 
the ability of the legal profession and the public to access and comprehend legal sources is of 
significant importance.  The difficulty, however, is that this importance can easily be 
exaggerated in the debate surrounding contract codification.  This risk is particularly likely to 
                                                      
56 T Bingham, The Rule of Law, Allen Lane, London, 2010, pp 37-8.  Bingham’s conception of the rule of law 
clearly owes a great deal to Dicey, among others, but it is not necessary to explore the provenance of Bingham’s 
views on this point. 
57  (1971) 125 CLR 659 at 672. 
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eventuate if inadequate attention is given to the lessons offered by the now mature literature in 
respect of the degree to which the positive rules of contract law ‘matter’ to the law’s users.  
 
It is neither possible nor necessary to survey here the whole of the empirical literature in this 
sphere.  It is enough, given the now uncontroversial nature of the core claims upon which 
reliance is placed here, simply to offer a brief sketch of a number of key points.  The first point 
relates to the importance placed upon formal contract law by business entities.  As is well 
known, the scholarship in this field is overshadowed by the figure of Stewart Macaulay, who, 
with ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business’,58 profoundly influenced the development of 
empirical contracts scholarship.59 As John Gava has explained: 60 
 
Macaulay made six key claims in ‘Non-contractual Relations’.  The first was that firms, 
large and small, tried to plan their transactions.  Second, planning and recourse to contract 
law were used when the gains were thought to outweigh the costs.  Third, legal sanctions 
were often unnecessary and could have undesirable effects.  Fourth, legal enforcement 
harmed trust and existing business relationships.  Fifth, legal sanctions were rarely used to 
settle disputes, with trust and various reputations mechanisms the preferred means to adjust 
relationships and settle disputes.  Finally, businesspeople preferred trust to contract even in 
transactions that involved risk and large amounts of money. 
 
Though groundbreaking, the core of Macaulay’s findings – that formal legal sanctions, and 
the formal rules of contract, matter to business actors far less than might be thought – are now 
taken largely for granted.  Indeed, the debate in this sphere is now largely focused on the 
question of what ought to flow from these findings.61 
 
A related body of literature has arrived at similar conclusions in respect of consumer 
contracting.  Most notable in this regard is a string of empirical studies in the United States 
which has shown that consumers have little propensity to seek to familiarize themselves with 
the provisions of standard-form contracts, even where it seems important to do so.62  The 
                                                      
58 S Macaulay, 'Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study' (1963) 28 American Sociological 
Review 55. 
59 For a consideration of the legacy of Macaulay’s scholarship as a whole, see: J Braucher, J Kidwell and W C 
Whitford, eds, Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the Empirical and the Lyrical, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013.   
60 J Gava ‘Taking Stewart Macaulay and Hugh Collins Seriously’ (2016) 33 JCL 108 at 110.  Gava’s summary 
draws in turn upon that provided by Robert Scott.  See: R Scott ‘The Promise and the Peril of Relational 
Contract Theory’ in Braucher, Kidwell and Whitford, above, n 59, pp 108-11. 
61 Gava, above, n 60, pp 108-9. 
62 See, eg: Y Bakos, F Marotta-Wurgler and D R Trossen ‘Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer 
Attention to Standard-Form Contracts’ (2014) 43 Journal of Legal Studies 1.  This empirical literature has been 
supplemented in recent years by theoretical analyses in a similar vein.  See, eg, M J Radin, Boilerplate: The 
Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2013.  
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lesson, put simply, is that consumer contracting, much like business contracting, seems to 
take place at something of a remove from considerations as to strict legal rights and duties.63   
 
Though the accessibility of legal sources, both to the public and the profession, is undoubtedly 
important, it must always be remembered that lawyers have a wholly natural tendency to 
exaggerate the importance of contract law in the conduct of the everyday affairs of 
businesspeople and consumers. It is thus necessary, when considering the analysis which 
follows, to ensure that the normative importance of ‘accessibility’ is tempered by an 
acknowledgement of the findings of this scholarship.64   
 
Accessing and Understanding Legal Sources 
 
Though the questions which arise in this setting may at first seem ripe for empirical analysis, 
there is in reality quite limited scope for such work as a means of directly answering the key 
questions in issue here.65 This is so for two reasons. First, and most obviously, contract codes 
differ drastically in length, content, detail, style, and expression. It is thus not possible to 
conduct an empirical analysis measuring the relative accessibility of a code and the common 
law unless it is possible to identify a specific code in respect of which the analysis is to be 
carried out.  
 
Second, even if a particular code were under analysis, there are real difficulties in conceiving 
of an experimental design that adequately emulates the conditions in which law is actually 
used. It is thus difficult, even in a case where it is sought to compare the common law with a 
particular code, to undertake empirical work which yields useful findings.  The point is well-
illustrated by considering the approach which was adopted in the empirical study carried out 
                                                      
63 Warren Swain has made a related point, noting that ‘Even [if] the law of contract were rendered accessible by 
a code, this would be unlikely to alter the process of contracting very much. The average consumer is rarely in a 
position to negotiate rather than accept standard terms.’  See: Swain, above, n 2, p 140.   
64 This is not to say that this scholarship has been wholly ignored.  See, eg, Swain, above, n 2, pp 140-1; R 
Bigwood, ‘The Partial Codification of Contract Law: Lessons From New Zealand’ in Keyes and Wilson, above, 
n 2, p 167; R Brownsword, ‘After Brexit: Regulatory-Instrumentalism, Coherentism and the English Law of 
Contract’ (2017) 34 JCL 139 at 148. 
65 This is not to deny the potential utility of empirical research in exploring other dimensions of the contract 
codification debate.  In particular, it seems likely that an empirical investigation of the demand among 
businesses and consumers for further ‘internationalization’ of Australian contract law could be of considerable 
use in shedding light upon a number of issues.  In this connection, it is worth noting that the contract 
codification debate as a whole must be understood in light of the availability, at least in some circumstances, of 
transnational legal instruments such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods. 
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in respect of the Australian Contract Code.66 
 
The goal of the study was to experimentally evaluate the comparative ‘utility’ of three different 
models of contract law: the Australian law of contract as it stood at the time of the study, the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (‘UPICC’), and the Australian 
Contract Code. One object of this approach was to test the relative merits of broad principles 
and detailed rules.67  As the authors explained, the study: 68 
 
[A]dopted a conception of utility which reflects the demands which are in fact most often 
made of legal systems by lawyers and non-lawyers alike.  These are that the law should be: 
• certain (predictable outcomes) 
• just (fair outcomes) 
• accessible (clear language and logic) 
• efficient (easy to comprehend and apply)   
The authors sought to test the relative utility of each of the models through a series of 
experiments involving 1800 Australian university students.  The authors described their 
experiments as follows: 69 
 
In the first experiment, law students enrolled in Contract Law were given the facts of a 
dispute and a statement of the relevant law, drawn from one of the three models, and asked 
to decide the dispute.  They were asked to record their decision (for plaintiff or defendant), 
along with the time at which it was reached.  They were also asked to supply a brief statement 
of their reasons indicating how they applied the law.  A maximum of 80 minutes was allowed 
to complete these tasks.  After this time the students were asked to rank their level of 
agreement with a number of propositions relating to the utility of the law model (the Likert 
technique).  They were given 10 minutes for this task … Experiment 2 was a replication of 
Experiment 1 with one difference, namely the student judges worked in pairs … In 
Experiment 3, university students not enrolled in law were asked to read a statement of the 
facts of a dispute and a judgment deciding the dispute, using one of the law models.  They 
were also asked to complete a questionnaire by responding to a number of propositions about 
the judgment, again using the Likert technique.  Then they were asked to re-familiarise 
themselves with the facts, read a second judgment in favour of the other party, based on the 
same or a different law model, and complete an identical questionnaire.  They had a 
maximum of one hour to complete these tasks. 
 
Though reasonable minds may differ as to whether an experiment of this type is capable of 
yielding useful results,70 it seems clear beyond argument that it can never hope to capture 
                                                      
66 See: Ellinghaus, Wright and Karras, above, n 3. 
67 Ellinghaus, Wright and Karras, above, n 3, p 7. 
68 Ellinghaus, Wright and Karras, above, n 3, pp 25-6.  It should be noted that this terminological framework 
differs yet again from those considered above, lending further support to the conclusion that there exists 
widespread confusion as to what ‘certainty’ connotes. 
69 Ellinghaus, Wright and Karras, above, n 3, pp 27-8. 
70 The authors argued strongly that the conditions sufficiently emulated real-world results so as to yield useful 
findings.  See: Ellinghaus, Wright and Karras, above, n 3, pp 32-3. 
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fully the conditions in which law is actually used and applied.71 Much the same can be said 
of other quantitative approaches, such as Aubrey Diamond’s technique of analyzing cases in 
both codified and uncodified areas of law in an effort to collate statistical information as to 
the cases cited therein.72 As Diamond acknowledges, this approach too suffers from 
methodological limitations: 73 
 
Although these figures give us some insight into the operation of our system of case-law, it 
is fair to say that they will not give a precise picture of the amount of case investigation 
involved in legal practice. No account is taken of the cases read and rejected for one reason 
or another. Nor are the reported cases I have chosen necessarily representative (though there 
is sufficient similarity between each of the three volumes of 1965 to suggest that none of 
them is wildly unusual).  Moreover, the study is looking at - can only look at - reported cases:  
cases reported are likely to be those involving important, interesting or novel points of law.  
There must be many cases fought where no authorities were cited and the sole issue is one of 
fact.  Without a different type of inquiry we can know little of the cases not reported, and 
even less of those not brought to hearing. 
 
It is consequently preferable to put empirical analyses to one side, and to consider instead 
what can be said in respect of the general plausibility of the contention that a code is easier 
for both the profession and the public to access and understand.  
 
This task is complicated by the fact that the arguments adduced on this point are often difficult 
to test, involving assertions, unsupported by clear evidence, as to the difficulties engendered 
by the status quo or the supposed superiority of alternative arrangements.74 It seems unlikely, 
in short, that the competing claims can be clearly resolved,75 and it may be that this question 
is one which, along with other recurring questions in the codification debate, is simply not 
susceptible of a firm answer.76 
 
Even in the face of these difficulties, however, several points can be established quite clearly. 
The first is that, whatever may be the challenges involved in building an understanding of the 
common law from a consideration of the cases alone, unaided by a treatise or reference work, 
                                                      
71 Similar points have been made elsewhere.  See: N Thompson, ‘Book Reviews’ (2006) 27 Queensland Lawyer 
80 at 82-3. 
72 Diamond, above, n 24, pp 363-8. 
73 Diamond, above, n 24, p 368.  Of course, the last difficulty identified by Diamond could today be addressed 
to some degree by the wider availability of unreported judgments. 
74 See, for instance: Nottage, above, n 30, p 134. 
75 See the comments on this point in: Hahlo, above, n 51, p 248. (‘Ex cathedra statements of this sort, even if 
supported by an “of course” or “no doubt”, are in the nature of things capable of neither proof nor disproof’). 
76 J Farrar, ‘The Codification of Commercial Law’, in J Finn and S Todd, eds, Law, Liberty, Legislation, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008, p 57. 
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such difficulties are of little relevance here.77  To ask whether the law can more readily be 
identified from the law reports or from a code is to pose a question of little practical 
significance. A more meaningful comparison would be that between a standard reference text 
on the one hand and an annotated code on the other.78 Of course, the resolution to this 
comparison is not at all obvious.  Yet once it is put in these terms, the intuitive appeal of the 
arguments on behalf of a code is considerably diminished. 
 
Second, it must be acknowledged that the impact of codification upon the accessibility of 
legal sources is not necessarily wholly positive. Indeed, though the point is largely 
overlooked, there is a plausible case to be made that codification may operate in some 
circumstances to hamper the ability of members of the public to arrive at accurate 
understandings of the law.  The point, though important, can be illustrated simply.   
 
Where members of the public seek to inform themselves as to a body of law which is 
comprised largely of common law rules, there is no single authoritative instrument, 
promulgated by the state, to which recourse can be had. In such a setting, it seems likely that 
the individual concerned will consult a resource – whether it be online advice provided by 
other members of the public, a guide published by a commercial entity, state agency or NGO, 
or instead a textbook or reference work – which will synthesise and state the common law.  
 
If a member of the public sought similar information in respect of a codified system of law, 
he or she would – likely at a keystroke – be presented with what appears on its face to be an 
exhaustive and state-sanctioned statement of the law in respect of the relevant subject.  The 
natural conclusion to be drawn by a non-lawyer when faced with such an instrument may well 
be that the instrument is itself the final word. If the code has been construed in a manner 
somewhat at odds with its natural or apparent meaning, the potential for confusion and error 
is clear.  As Anthony D’Amato has noted, and as any lawyer can attest: 79 
 
[A] statute that seemed to mean one thing may be construed by a court to mean something 
different. Although the court will usually say that it is clarifying the statute, it does not always 
do so. It may create an exception, an exemption, a privilege; it might construe the rule 
narrowly to avoid constitutional problems, or broadly to give effect to an unnoticed 
                                                      
77 See: Diamond, above, n 24, p 364. (‘The truth is that there are many practitioners who rarely open a law 
report more than two years old’). 
78 Of course, both must be supplemented by a general research resource whenever there is a risk, in respect of a 
particular point, that the annotated code or reference work may have been superseded by later developments. 
79 A D’Amato, ‘Legal Uncertainty’ (1983) 71 California LR 1 at 2. 
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legislative intent buried in the legislative history. The court's decision becomes a part of the 
meaning of the rule, so that the rule now becomes more complex-it is a statute plus a judicial 
decision. 
 
There is, of course, no clear means of ascertaining the degree to which this phenomenon might 
manifest itself.80 There is, moreover, good reason for thinking its significance may be greater 
in some spheres than in others: sophisticated commercial actors may be less likely to fall 
victim to such an error than consumers. It is also quite right to say that this risk might be 
ameliorated by the taking of active steps, such as ensuring any code is published alongside an 
explanation that its provisions are subject to judicial exegesis. Even so, it can hardly be denied 
that the risk is a real one.81   
 
It is, in sum, difficult to arrive at a firm view as to the impact which codification might have 
upon the ease with which legal sources can be accessed and used. What can be said, however, 
is that the intuitive appeal of the arguments on behalf of codification is considerably 
diminished upon close examination.   
 
 
Predicting Adjudicative Outcomes 
 
It is now necessary to turn finally to a consideration of whether the introduction of a code 
would likely affect the degree to which the law’s ‘users’ could predict the outcome of 
adjudicative processes. Several points should be made at the outset. 
 
First, it would of course be a mistake to suggest that formal adjudication is itself of the first 
order of importance to either consumers or business. Such a contention would be flatly at odds 
with the empirical scholarship canvassed above. Even so, the ability to ascertain with relative 
ease how a dispute would be determined if it were submitted to formal adjudication is of some 
considerable importance to both consumers and business. This is, of course, unsurprising, and 
is reflected in the submissions made to the 2012 Discussion Paper by a range of groups, many 
of whom stressed the importance of being able to readily gauge the likely answer to legal 
                                                      
80 There is limited information available as to the degree to which individuals, when encountering legal 
problems, seek to resolve their difficulties by consulting published sources. See: Law and Justice Foundation of 
New South Wales, Justice Made to Measure: NSW Legal Needs Survey in Disadvantaged Areas, 2006, pp 99-
110. 
81 Such a risk has been acknowledged, though only in general terms.  See, eg: Reynolds, above, n 15, p 16. (‘A 
further function is to promote accessibility.  There is no need to go so far as supposing a garage proprietor with 
a small copy of the contract code in his back pocket.  Informed persons from outside the charmed circle can 





Second, the analysis of this dimension of ‘certainty’ must grapple with the point canvassed 
earlier as to the comparative normative merits of rules and standards.83 The reason for this is 
plain: if codification were to increase the degree to which the outcome of adjudicative 
processes can be accurately predicted, but were to achieve this by curtailing the flexibility 
afforded by the common law, it might well be thought – depending on one’s view as to the 
comparative normative merits of rules and standards – that the added certainty were won at 
too great a cost. It is precisely this type of calculus which underlies the many expressions of 
concern that codification may lead to a loss of flexibility and a concomitant loss of the ability 
to achieve just outcomes in individual cases.84   
 
It is plainly impossible here to seek to resolve the debate as to the relative merits of rules and 
standards.85 Two points can nonetheless be made. First, it is important to acknowledge that 
even if codification were to increase the ease with which the outcome of adjudicative 
processes could be predicted, it would be necessary to consider whether, or to what extent, 
such certainty was won at the expense of flexibility. If indeed such a trade-off were involved, 
the question as to whether the balance was appropriately struck would be normatively 
complex. 
 
Second, it should be stressed that codification need not necessarily lead to the fettering of 
adjudicative discretion.  This point is best illustrated by reflecting again on the Australian 
Contract Code, which confers far more discretion on the court than does the common law of 
contract.86 Indeed, as was seen, the Australian Contract Code is a code which has discretion 
                                                      
82 See for example the submission of the Civil Contractors Federation (Submission No 17), which highlights the 
difficulties which can flow from uncertainty as to how a contract will be construed. 
83 For arguments in favour of the normative importance of rules, see, eg: J Raz ‘Legal Principles and the Limits 
of Law’ (1972) 81 Yale LJ 823; A Scalia ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’ (1989) 56 University of Chicago 
LR 1175.  For a contrary view, see: Y Feldman and S Lifshitz ‘Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty’ (2011) 74 
Law and Contemporary Problems 133. 
84 See, eg: Keyes and Wilson, above, n 47, p 12.  This type of concern should not be confused with the rather 
different concern that codification will prevent the law from evolving so as to meet the needs presented by 
changing technological and social conditions.  This point can be put to one side at present, though it is worth 
noting that there is some cause to question the degree to which the common law of contract evolves in this way.  
See, eg, the discussion in: M J Radin, ‘The Deformation of Contract in the Information Society’ (2017) 37 OJLS 
505. 
85 It seems distinctly improbable, of course, that this question has a ‘right’ answer. 
86 Of course, the authors of the Australian Contract Code would likely resist this contention, since, as explained 
above, the Code rests on the empirical claim that detailed rules in truth yield no more predictable outcomes than 
broad principles. 
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at its core. It would thus be quite wrong to proceed on the footing that codification would 
inevitably involve a reduction in flexibility in the law of contract.87 
 
Having dealt with these conceptual points, it is now necessary to consider two particularly 
important practical considerations which tend against the likelihood of codification having a 
meaningful impact in this sphere.   
 
The first point is entirely straightforward, but it is nonetheless of great importance. This is 
that it is important, when considering the degree to which it is possible to predict the outcome 
of an adjudicative process, to distinguish between uncertainty which stems from questions of 
law and uncertainty which is referable to the facts of the dispute in question. The outcome of 
many forensic contests can, at the outset, aptly be termed 'uncertain' insofar as their outcomes 
are difficult to predict.88 But this uncertainty relates, in many cases (and especially those in 
the lower courts, where the vast majority of disputes are heard), to the difficulty of predicting 
what will be the findings of fact in the dispute in question. It is, for instance, very difficult to 
foresee how evidentiary material will be received by the tribunal of fact, or whether evidence 
will be shaken in cross-examination. Furthermore, in contractual disputes, difficulties often 
flow from disagreements as to the proper construction of the parties’ agreement.89 Though 
this type of uncertainty is undoubtedly not welcomed by parties to litigation, it is for the most 
part unavoidable. Indeed, there would be cause for concern if the outcome of forensic disputes 
were generally predictable: such a state of affairs would suggest that matters which ought to 
have been the subject of settlement agreements were being brought to hearing unnecessarily.   
 
There is no sense in which codification can be expected to ameliorate uncertainty which has 
its genesis in the facts of particular disputes.90 There is accordingly a limit to how far the 
uncertainties inherent in many disputes could be influenced by the introduction of a code. 
                                                      
87 This is in fact implicitly acknowledged whenever it is argued that codification along ‘civilian’ lines – that is, 
the adoption of a code that states principles at a high level of abstraction – is alien to a common law system.  
See, for instance, the discussion in: M Kerr, 'Law Reform in Changing Times' (1980) 96 LQR 515 at 527-8. 
88 There is considerable empirical evidence which suggests that even lawyers have a limited ability to accurately 
predict the outcomes of forensic contests.  See, eg, J Goodman-Delahunty, P Anders Granhag, M Hartwig, and 
E F Loftus, 'Insightul or Wishful: Lawyers' Ability to Predict Case Outcomes' (2010) 16 Psychology, Public 
Policy, and Law 133. 
89 Predicting the outcome of a construction dispute is a notoriously hazardous undertaking.  See: J Steyn, ‘The 
Intractable Problem of the Interpretation of Legal Texts (2003) 25 Sydney LR 5; D McLauchlan, ‘Contract 
Interpretation: What Is It About?’ (2009) 31 Sydney LR 5 at 5. 
90 This point was recognised by the submission made to the 2012 Discussion Paper by T F Bathurst, the Chief 
Justice of New South Wales (Submission No 11). 
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The second point concerns the issue of access to justice, which has been the subject of a recent 
and thoroughgoing assessment in Australia by the Productivity Commission.91 It is, of course, 
trite to observe that the practical enforceability of legal rights is in part a function of the degree 
to which legal advice can be sought and readily obtained.92 Yet the availability of legal advice 
is of equal importance in ascertaining whether a practically enforceable right exists in the first 
place. It is, in other words, of critical importance in ascertaining how a question would likely 
be resolved if it were submitted to a formal adjudicative process.  
 
Recent years have seen a steady increase in concern as to the cost and difficulty of accessing 
professional legal advice and the courts.93 These concerns were underscored by the findings 
of the Productivity Commission. The Commission explained, for instance: 94 
 
While many disputes can be resolved with some basic information and direction, 
where people do need to engage a private legal professional, they find selecting a 
service provider challenging. The irregular need for legal advice, combined with 
different billing arrangements and services offered by providers, makes drawing 
comparisons difficult and often inconclusive.  The difficulties consumers face in 
selecting lawyers — and switching lawyers, should they prove dissatisfied — have 
meant that they have not fully appropriated the benefits of the increased supply of 
lawyers in recent years. 
 
Of course, the receipt of professional legal advice is only one way in which the existence and 
nature of legal rights can be ascertained. Yet even when taking a broad view of the means by 
which individuals and businesses can obtain relevant information, there are many practical 
barriers which remain.95 
 
Again, the uncertainty which is consequent on an inability to obtain adequate legal advice and 
information is a species of uncertainty which would not be affected by the introduction of a 
code. It is of course no answer to say that under a code, the cost of legal representation would 
be lower as a result of the increased ease and speed with which practitioners could ascertain 
                                                      
91 Productivity Commission, Access to Justice Arrangements: Inquiry Paper, 2014. 
92 This point, though of undoubted importance, cannot be said to be an issue of ‘certainty’, and as such can be 
put to one side at present. 
93 See, eg: W Martin, ‘Creating a just future by improving access to justice’, Community 
Legal Centres Association WA Annual Conference, Perth, 2012; T F Bathurst, ‘The Role of the Courts in the 
Changing Dispute Resolution Landscape’ (2012) 35 UNSWLJ 870 at 870; K M Hayne, ‘The Australian Judicial 
System: Causes for Dissatisfaction’ (2018) 92 ALJ 32 at 33. 
94 Productivity Commission, Access to Justice Arrangements: Inquiry Paper, Overview, 2014, p 9. 
95 See, for instance, the matters canvassed in: Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), A Strategic Framework for 
Access to Justice in the Federal Civil Justice System, 2009, pp 16-25. 
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the relevant law. Such an argument presupposes that a code would indeed be more accessible, 
whereas, as explained above, such a conclusion is in truth questionable.   
 
There is, in sum, real reason to doubt that codification would meaningfully affect the 
‘accessibility’ of the law, either by promoting the ease with which legal sources can be 
accessed and understood, or by facilitating the prediction of the outcome of adjudicative 
processes. These conclusions, taken together with those above, suggest that codification’s 





This article has sought to explore the question of whether the codification of the Australian law 
of contract would promote ‘certainty’. Having undertaken that analysis, it remains only to make 
a number of final points in order to situate its conclusions within the broader context of the 
contract codification debate.  
 
As was noted at the outset, this article has conceded that codification might plausibly improve 
‘certainty’ to some small extent. Its core contention has been that this effect would be 
considerably less significant than is commonly suggested.   
 
The concession that codification may yield some slight dividend in respect of ‘certainty’ might 
be thought to amount, at least insofar as ‘certainty’ is concerned, to a prima-facie case for 
reform. Though it is not possible here to enter at length into the general debate respecting the 
desirability of contract codification, it should nonetheless be emphasised that the costliness and 
difficulty of codification as a law reform exercise means it is necessary to establish a very 
strong positive case in its favour in order to support the conclusion that it ought to be 
undertaken. Where there is reason to think codification would promote a particular normative 
goal, the degree to which it does so must be weighed against the various costs and difficulties 
which are unavoidable in such a reform. Such a view is hardly controversial.96 Indeed, the 
                                                      
96 Such an approach is at least implicit in almost all analyses of the merits and demerits of codification. 
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many practical challenges inherent in any codification project are well-canvassed in the 
literature.97    
 
Although a concluded view could only be offered upon a detailed analysis of all of the relevant 
competing factors in respect of contract codification, it is nonetheless suggested that the 
relatively modest positive effect which codification may have upon ‘certainty’ means that its 
significance as a factor in favour of codification is quite minor. Though it may be that other 
drivers of codification nonetheless tilt the scales in favour of reform – and this article offers no 
view either way on this point – it is nonetheless plain that the discussion above has cast doubt 
upon the confidence with which the case for codification has often been put. 
 
                                                      
97 See, eg, Diamond, above, n 24, pp 375-84; B Donald, ‘Codification in Common Law Systems’ (1973) 47 ALJ 
160 at 172-3; H R Hahlo, ‘Codifying the Common Law: Protracted Gestation’ (1975) 38 MLR 23; A E Anton, 
'Obstacles to Codification' (1982) 15 Juridical Review 15; Swain, above, n 2, p 149.  It is worth noting that the 
literature has engaged only obliquely with a fundamental challenge to any contract codification project – namely 
that of the entrenched and fundamental disagreement as to the purpose which contract law ought to serve.  The 
debate is often described as being between ‘formalism’ and ‘contextualism’, though to do so is to oversimplify 
the nature of the disagreement.  The debate is far from being merely academic, and has a range of practical 
ramifications.  For an overview of this controversy, see: J Gava, ‘How Should Judges Decide Commercial 
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For several decades, the High Court’s pronouncements on the subject of contractual 
interpretation have generated confusion in intermediate appellate courts and caused considerable 
academic debate.   The key difficulty relates to the question of when recourse may be had to 
evidence of ‘surrounding circumstances’ as an aid to construction. In particular, a controversy 
has emerged in recent years as to whether it is necessary to point to textual ‘ambiguity’ as a 
precondition for the use of such evidence as an aid to construction.  Though this question is 
fundamental and of some considerable importance, the task of answering it is far from 
straightforward. The object of this short article is to explain the nature of the difficulty in respect 
of this question, and to consider a number of recent developments both in the High Court and in 
intermediate appellate courts.  In doing so, it is sought to offer an assessment of the present state 






Given the regularity with which disputes as to the proper construction of contracts present 
themselves in legal practice, it might well be thought that the basic principles in this sphere 
should be well-settled.1  Though it may be accepted that academic debate in respect of 
construction will inevitably be characterised by disagreement,2 and that some technicality 
might necessarily attend the rules which apply to the construction of special categories of 
                                                      
 BA LLB(Hons) (Adelaide) LLM(Cambridge); Lecturer, University of Sydney Law School; PhD Candidate, 
Adelaide Law School. This paper was presented in September 2018 at a seminar delivered by the Commercial 
Law Association of Australia. Part of the material in this paper was previously printed in the Australian Law 
Journal (see: John Eldridge, ‘Recent Cases – Cherry v Steele-Park’ (2018) 92 Australian Law Journal 249). 
That material is reproduced with the permission of Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited: 
legal.thomsonreuters.com.au 
1 On the regularity with which questions of construction arise in practice, see: David McLauchlan ‘Contract 
Interpretation: What is it About?’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 5, 5. 
2 In recent years, for instance, the question of whether the implication of terms forms part of the exercise of 
construction has generated considerable controversy and disagreement.  The debate owes its genesis to the 
advice of the Privy Council in Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] 1 WLR 1988, a decision 
which has recently been revisited by the UK Supreme Court in Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities 
Services Trust Company (Jersey) Limited [2015] 3 WLR 1843. See, on this point: Wayne Courtney and J W 
Carter, ‘Implied Terms: What is the Role of Construction?’ (2014) 31 Journal of Contract Law 151; Joanna 
McCunn, ‘Belize it or Not: Implied Contract Terms in Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas’ (2016) 79 Modern 
Law Review 1090; J W Carter and Wayne Courtney, ‘Unexpressed Intention and Contract Construction’ (2017) 
37 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 326. 
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contractual term,3 it should nonetheless be possible to state simply and with some confidence 
the core principles of contractual interpretation.4 
 
This is far from true in Australian law today.  For several decades, the High Court’s 
pronouncements on this subject have generated confusion in intermediate appellate courts and 
attracted astringent academic commentary.5  The key difficulty relates to the question of when 
recourse may be had to evidence of ‘surrounding circumstances’ as an aid to construction. In 
particular, a controversy has emerged in recent years as to whether it is necessary to point to 
textual ‘ambiguity’ as a precondition for the use of such evidence as an aid to construction.  
Though this question is fundamental and of some considerable importance, the task of 
answering it is far from straightforward.  
 
The object of this short article is to explain the nature of the difficulty in respect of this question, 
and to consider a number of recent developments both in the High Court and in intermediate 
appellate courts.  In doing so, it is sought to offer an assessment of the present state of the law 
and a view as to its likely future development.   
 
Before taking up this task, it is important to note that there are a number of matters which, 
while undoubtedly of great importance and interest, are not dealt with here.  First, this article 
does not seek to grapple in detail with the question of what can properly be said to form part 
of the ‘surrounding circumstances’ admissible as an aid to construction.  It is often necessary, 
for instance, to ask whether particular evidence of which direct use cannot be made can 
nonetheless be used indirectly to prove objective background facts known to both the parties 
to a contract.6  Though the questions which arise in connection with this point are of great 
practical significance, they can be put to one side for present purposes. 
                                                      
3 Special rules apply, for instance, to the construction of exclusion clauses.  See: Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco 
Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500.  For an unusually candid discussion of the history of judicial attitudes 
towards the construction exclusion clauses, see: George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd 
[1983] QB 284, 297 (Lord Denning). 
4 The terms ‘construction’ and ‘interpretation’ are used interchangeably in this paper. 
5 For particularly strong criticism, see: J W Carter, ‘Context and Literalism in Construction’ (2014) 31 Journal 
of Contract Law 100 and Andrew Stewart, ‘What’s Wrong with the Australian Law of Contract?’ (2012) 29 
Journal of Contract Law 74, where it is said (at 84) that ‘[i]t is almost as if the High Court regards this as a 
private joke that need not be shared’. 
6 See: Ryan Catterwell ‘The Indirect Use of Evidence of Prior Negotiations and Subjective Intention: Part of the 
Surrounding Circumstances’ (2012) 29 Journal of Contract Law 183; Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail 
Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337, 352; WIN Corporation Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2016] 
NSWCA 297, [57]; Angas Securities Ltd v Small Business Consortium Lloyds Consortium No 9056 [2016] 
NSWCA 182, [112]; Cherry v Steele-Park [2017] NSWCA 295, [57] – [67]. 
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Second, this article engages only obliquely with the many normative questions which arise in 
this setting.  In particular, this article does not seek to enter the debate as to the limits which 
ought to be placed upon the evidence to which courts may have recourse when construing 
contracts.  Though this debate is of considerable interest and of equally considerable practical 
importance, and must be engaged with in passing in order to offer an adequate account of the 
likely development of the law, it too can largely be put to one side at present.7   
 
 




In explaining the controversy in this area, it is best to proceed by giving a roughly chronological 
account of the key developments. Before turning to the Australian position, however, it is 
necessary to give some brief consideration to the approach taken to contractual interpretation 
in English law.  Though it would be quite misleading to suggest that the English position is 
wholly settled,8 it remains the case that the interpretation of contracts in English courts is 
governed by reference to the following principles, first enunciated by Lord Hoffmann in 
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 
(hereafter ‘the ICS principles’): 
 
(1)      Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would 
convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would 
reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the 
time of the contract.  
(2)      The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the "matrix of 
fact," but this phrase is, if anything, an understated description of what the background 
may include. Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to 
the parties and to the exception to be mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything 
which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have 
been understood by a reasonable man.  
(3)      The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the 
parties and their declarations of subjective intent. They are admissible only in an action 
for rectification. The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this 
respect only, legal interpretation differs from the way we would interpret utterances in 
ordinary life. The boundaries of this exception are in some respects unclear. But this is 
not the occasion on which to explore them.  
                                                      
7 The practical importance of the debate is seen in the concern, expressed on a number of occasions, that the 
expansion of the field of material to which courts may have recourse when construing contracts will operate to 
increase the cost and complexity of litigation.  See, eg: Sir Christopher Staughton, ‘How do the Courts Interpret 
Commercial Contracts’ (1999) 58 Cambridge Law Journal 303, 307; J J Spigelman, ‘From Text to Context: 
Contemporary Contractual Interpretation’ (2007) 81 Australian Law Journal 322, 334. 
8 For criticism of the approach which has obtained in England in recent years, and a suggestion that change is 
afoot, see: Lord Sumption, ‘A Question of Taste: The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of Contracts’ (2017) 
17 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 301. 
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(4)      The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a 
reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words 
is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties 
using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been 
understood to mean. The background may not merely enable the reasonable man to 
choose between the possible meanings of words which are ambiguous but even (as 
occasionally happens in ordinary life) to conclude that the parties must, for whatever 
reason, have used the wrong words or syntax. (see Mannai Investments Co. Ltd. v. Eagle 
Star Life Assurance Co. Ltd. [1997] 2 WLR 945. 
(5)      The "rule" that words should be given their "natural and ordinary meaning" reflects 
the common sense proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made 
linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other hand, if one would 
nevertheless conclude from the background that something must have gone wrong with 
the language, the law does not require judges to attribute to the parties an intention which 
they plainly could not have had.9 
 
Most important for present purposes is the fact that, under these principles, a court may have 
recourse to evidence of relevant ‘background’ as a matter of course, without it being 
necessary first to demonstrate ‘ambiguity’.10  Of course, care must be taken not to overstate 
the significance these principles accord to extrinsic evidence: as principle (5) makes clear, a 
court will be slow to conclude that the ‘background’ against which a contract was concluded 
mandates a construction which is at odds with the language in which it is expressed.11 
 
The position in Australia is far more vexed.  It is necessary to begin with the authority which 
has been the source of much of the difficulty.  In Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail 
Authority of NSW ('Codelfa'),12
 
Mason J (as his Honour then was) set out the following 
‘rule’ in respect of the admissibility of surrounding circumstances when construing a contract: 
 
The true rule is that evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the 
interpretation of the contract if the language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than 
                                                      
9 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912 – 913.  It 
should be noted that it is somewhat misleading to treat the ICS principles as amounting to a radical break with 
all that had gone before.  In addition to Lord Hoffmann’s explicit reliance upon the speeches of Lord 
Wilberforce in Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 and Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen 
[1976] 1 WLR 989, it should also be noted that Joanna McCunn has shown that the shift towards contextual 
construction is in truth something of a return to an approach which prevailed in the early modern period.  See: 
Joanna McCunn ‘Revolutions in Contractual Interpretation: A Historical Perspective’ in Sarah Worthington, 
Andrew Robertson and Graham Virgo (eds) Revolution and Evolution in Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2018).  
For an example of an authoritative endorsement of a contextual approach to interpretation as late as 1877, see 
River Wear Commissioners v Adamson (1877) 2 App Cas 743, 763 (Lord Blackburn).  Though his Lordship’s 
comments were made in the immediate context of the construction of a statute, the principles are said to be 
relevant to the construction of any ‘instrument in writing’.  See further: Lord Bingham of Cornhill, ‘A New 
Thing Under the Sun?  The Interpretation of Contract and the ICS Decision’ (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 
374. 
10 The terminological differences in this sphere – as between, for instance, ‘context’, ‘background’, and 
‘surrounding circumstances’ – are not wholly insignificant, but they can be put to one side for present purposes. 
11 For further discussion, see: J W Carter, The Construction of Commercial Contracts (Hart Publishing, 2013) 
chs 6 and 7. 
12 (1982) 149 CLR 337. 
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one meaning. But it is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract when it 
has a plain meaning.13 
 
At least on one view, this statement can be taken to mean that, when construing a contract, it 
is necessary to point to textual ‘ambiguity’ before recourse can be had to evidence of 
‘surrounding circumstances’ as an aid to interpretation.14  Whatever may be said against such 
an approach – and it is indeed open to criticism on a number of bases, some of which are 
discussed below – it might, but for later developments, have come to enjoy a secure place in 
the Australian law of contract.15 
 
Difficulties began to emerge however, when, in a series of decisions over a considerable 
period, the High Court began to proffer statements of the law which seemed to be at odds with 
that set out in Codelfa.  As there already exist a number of detailed surveys of these 
authorities, it is best simply to draw attention to the nature of the remarks which began to 
recur in the High Court’s decisions.16 In Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd,
 
for 
instance, the majority stated that: 
Interpretation of a written contract involves, as Lord Hoffmann has put it: ‘the 
ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person 
having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to 
the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.'17 
 
The statement of Lord Hoffmann which the High Court has quoted in this passage is no doubt 
recognisable as the first of the ICS principles set out above.  This explicit endorsement of Lord 
Hoffmann’s principles sits uneasily alongside the approach apparently required by Codelfa.   
 
In a similar vein, the High Court unanimously stated in Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas: 
 
The construction of the letters of indemnity is to be determined by what a reasonable 
person in the position of Pacific would have understood them to mean. That requires 
                                                      
13 Ibid 352. 
14 It is worth noting that Sir Anthony Mason, writing extra-curially, has expressed regret at the manner in which 
he expressed his view on this point.  See: Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Opening Address’ (2009) 25 Journal of 
Contract Law 1, 3.  As was observed by Allsop P (as his Honour then was) in Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm 
Assets Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 234 (at [1]), the statement of the ‘true rule’ in Codelfa might also be contrasted 
with later statements of Mason J as to the proper approach to the interpretation of legal instruments. See, eg: K 
& S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 309, 315 (though here the context was 
statutory interpretation). 
15 For an example of this approach being endorsed in an intermediate appellate court, see: Brambles Holdings 
Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153, 163 (Heydon JA). 
16 For a detailed survey of the relevant authorities, see, eg: David McLauchlan, 'Plain Meaning and Commercial 
Construction: Has Australia Adopted the ICS Principles?' (2009) 25 Journal of Contract Law 7. 
17 (2001) 210 CLR 181, 188 (footnotes omitted). 
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consideration, not only of the text of the documents, but also the surrounding 
circumstances known to Pacific and BNP, and the purpose and object of the transaction.18 
And yet again, in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd, the Court stated: 
The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to be determined by what a 
reasonable person would have understood them to mean. That, normally, requires 
consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to the 
parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction.19 
Each of these statements appears to amount to an endorsement of the ICS principles by the 
High Court, at least insofar as the use of ‘surrounding circumstances’ in construction is 
concerned.  They suggest, put simply, a departure from the approach apparently mandated 
by Codelfa, and the abandonment of any requirement of ‘ambiguity’ as a precondition to the 
use of evidence of ‘surrounding circumstances’ as an aid to construction.    
Such conclusions might have been arrived at without difficulty by intermediate appellate 
courts, were it not for the difficulties posed by the High Court’s own statement as to the 
status of Codelfa.  In Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council 
(‘Royal Botanic’), the majority explained: 
[R]eference was made in argument to several decisions of the House of Lords, delivered 
since Codelfa but without reference to it ... It is unnecessary to determine whether their 
Lordships there took a broader view of the admissible "background" than was taken 
in Codelfa or, if so, whether those views should be preferred to those of this Court. Until 
that determination is made by this Court, other Australian courts, if they discern any 
inconsistency with Codelfa, should continue to follow Codelfa.20 
 
As is no doubt plain, lower courts were placed in an invidious position.  Though the decisions 
in Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas and Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd were 
delivered after Royal Botanic,21 the High Court offered no explicit explanation for how they 
were each to be reconciled.  In the wake of these decisions, a number of intermediate appellate 
courts surveyed the relevant authorities and concluded that it was no longer necessary to point 
to ‘ambiguity’ as a precondition to the use of evidence of ‘surrounding circumstances’.22 
 
                                                      
18 (2004) 218 CLR 451, 461 – 462 (footnotes omitted). 
19 (2004) 219 CLR 165, 179 (footnotes omitted). 
20 (2002) 240 CLR 45, 53 (footnotes omitted). 
21 And see also, for example: Wilkie v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 522, 529 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, 
Gummow and Kirby JJ); International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd (2008) 234 
CLR 151, 160 (Gleeson CJ), 174 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 
22 See, eg: Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd v Coopers Brewery Ltd (2006) 156 FCR 1; Franklins Pty Ltd v 
Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603; Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 
234, [1] – [3]. 
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Matters were soon to be complicated further, chiefly by the reasons given in the disposition of 
a special leave application in Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd 
('Jireh').23 In the course of those reasons, Gummow, Heydon and Bell JJ stated: 
 
The primary judge had referred to what he described as "the summary of principles" in 
Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd. The applicant in this Court refers to that 
decision and to MBF Investments Pty Ltd v Nolan as authority rejecting the requirement 
that it is essential to identify ambiguity in the language of the contract before the court 
may have regard to the surrounding circumstances and object of the transaction. The 
applicant also refers to statements in England said to be to the same effect, including that 
by Lord Steyn in R (Westminster City Council) v National Asylum Support Service. 
Acceptance of the applicant's submission, clearly would require reconsideration by this 
Court of what was said in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW by 
Mason J, with the concurrence of Stephen J and Wilson J, to be the "true rule" as to the 
admission of evidence of surrounding circumstances. Until this Court embarks upon that 
exercise and disapproves or revises what was said in Codelfa, intermediate appellate 
courts are bound to follow that precedent. The same is true of primary judges, 
notwithstanding what may appear to have been said by intermediate appellate courts.  The 
position of Codelfa, as a binding authority, was made clear in the joint reasons of five 
Justices in Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council and it 
should not have been necessary to reiterate the point here. We do not read anything said 
in this Court in Pacific Carriers Ltd v BNP Paribas; Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm 
Pty Ltd; Wilkie v Gordian Runoff Ltd and International Air Transport Association v Ansett 
Australia Holdings Ltd as operating inconsistently with what was said by Mason J in the 
passage in Codelfa to which we have referred.24  
 
Though these remarks emphasise the necessity of demonstrating ‘ambiguity’ before having 
recourse to evidence of ‘surrounding circumstances’, their utility for lower courts is limited for 
two reasons.  First, as was later observed by the High Court in Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v 
Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (‘Wright Prospecting’)25 the reasons given upon the disposition of 
a special leave application do not amount to a binding precedent.26  It is thus unclear how Jireh 
ought to be reconciled with the apparently inconsistent passages quoted above.     
                                                      
23 (2011) 282 ALR 604.  Though they have had a more muted impact than the special reasons in Jireh, it is 
worth noting also the remarks in the joint judgment of Heydon and Crennan JJ in Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 
CLR 253, 285 (fn 155):  
This Court said in Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council 
(2002) 240 CLR 45 at 62-63 [39] that until this Court had decided on whether there were 
differences between Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building 
Society [No 1] [1998] 1 WLR 896; [1998] 1 All ER 98 and Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd 
v State Rail Authority (NSW) (1982) 149 CLR 337, and if so which should be preferred, 
the latter case should be followed in Australia. The question has not been argued or 
decided in this Court. The opinions stated in Masterton Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty 
Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 382 at 384-385 [1]-[4], 406-407 [112]-[113] and Franklins Pty Ltd 
v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603 at 616-618 [14]-[18], 621-622 [42], 626 
[63], 663-678 [239]-[305] must be read in this light. 
24 Jireh, 605 (footnotes omitted). 
25 (2015) 256 CLR 104.  Every member of the Court was in agreement on this point.  See: Wright Prospecting, 
117 (French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ), 133 (Kiefel and Keane JJ), 134 (Bell and Gageler JJ). 
26 The same point has been made by the High Court on a number of other occasions.  See, eg: North Ganalanja 
Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (1996) 185 CLR 595, 643; Attorney-General (Cth) v Finch (No 2) (1984) 
155 CLR 107, 114 – 115. 
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Second, the High Court, in the wake of Jireh, quickly resumed its practice of setting out general 
statements of the law respecting contractual interpretation which appear to be at odds with the 
notion that it is necessary to point to ‘ambiguity’ before recourse can be had to ‘surrounding 
circumstances’.  In Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd, for instance, 
the Court stated: 
 
The meaning of the terms of a commercial contract is to be determined by what a 
reasonable businessperson would have understood those terms to mean. That approach is 
not unfamiliar. As reaffirmed, it will require consideration of the language used by the 
parties, the surrounding circumstances known to them and the commercial purpose or 
objects to be secured by the contract.27 
 
Similarly, in the very recent decision in Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees 
Pty Ltd, the majority explained: 
 
It is well established that the terms of a commercial contract are to be understood 
objectively, by what a reasonable businessperson would have understood them to mean, 
rather than by reference to the subjectively stated intentions of the parties to the contract. 
In a practical sense, this requires that the reasonable businessperson be placed in the 
position of the parties. It is from that perspective that the court considers the 
circumstances surrounding the contract and the commercial purpose and objects to be 
achieved by it.28 
 
The High Court authorities are, in sum, in a state of disarray.29 Faced with the unenviable task 
of negotiating a path through the conflicting passages set out above, intermediate appellate 
courts have diverged in their conclusions as to what the law now is.  Though it is not necessary 
here to canvass these divergent views in detail, it is worth noting some of the key differences 
which have emerged. 
 
In New South Wales, there is now a well-established line of authority which holds that it is not 
necessary to point to ‘ambiguity’ before having recourse to evidence of ‘surrounding 
                                                      
27 (2014) 251 CLR 640, 656 (footnotes omitted). 
28 Ecosse Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Gee Dee Nominees Pty Ltd [2017] HCA 12, [16] (footnotes omitted). 
29 For some of the many discussions of these difficulties, see, in addition to the works cited above: M Walton, 
‘Where now ambiguity?’ (2011) 35 Australian Bar Review 176; Derek Wong and Brent Michael, ‘Western 
Export Services v Jireh International: Ambiguity as the gateway to surrounding circumstances?’ (2012) 86 
Australian Law Journal 57; David McLauchlan and Matthew Lees, ‘Construction Controversy’ (2011) 28 
Journal of Contract Law 101; David McLauchlan and Matthew Lees, ‘More Construction Controversy’ (2012) 
29 Journal of Contract Law 97; The Hon Justice Kenneth Martin, 'Contractual Construction: Surrounding 
Circumstances and the Ambiguity Gateway' (2013) 37 Australian Bar Review 118; The Hon Kevin Lindgren, 
'The Ambiguity of Ambiguity in the Construction of Contracts' (2014) 37 Australian Bar Review 153; Thomas 
Prince, ‘Defending Orthodoxy: Codelfa and Ambiguity’ (2015) 89 Australian Law Journal 491; Daniel 
Reynolds, ‘Construction of Contracts After Mount Bruce Mining v Wright Prospecting’ (2016) 90 Australian 
Law Journal 190. 
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circumstances’.30  Perhaps the most important authority in this connection is Mainteck Services 
Pty Ltd v Stein Heurtey SA (‘Mainteck’), in which Leeming JA stated, in the course of a careful 
consideration of the difficulties discussed above: 
 
To the extent that what was said in Jireh supports a proposition that "ambiguity" can be 
evaluated without regard to surrounding circumstances and commercial purpose or 
objects, it is clear that it is inconsistent with what was said in Woodside at [35]. The 
judgment confirms that not only will the language used "require consideration" but so too 
will the surrounding circumstances and the commercial purpose or objects. Although the 
High Court in Woodside did not expressly identify a divergence of approach, Jireh was 
notoriously controversial in precisely this respect … It cannot be that the mandatory 
words "will require consideration" used by four Justices of the High Court were chosen 
lightly, or should be "understood as being some incautious or inaccurate use of language": 
cf Fejo v Northern Territory [1998] HCA 58; 195 CLR 96 at [45].31 
 
This conclusion has been endorsed by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia.32 It has 
also been reiterated on a number of occasions in the courts of New South Wales, often bolstered 
by reference to further High Court judgments delivered since Mainteck, in particular Victoria 
v Tatts Group Limited33 and Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation.34 In 
WIN Corporation Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd, for instance, Barrett AJA stated: 
 
[T]he notion that it may first be necessary to consider context when construing a contract 
is not inconsistent with Mason J’s ‘true rule’. On this footing, it does not follow that the 
task of assessing whether a phrase or expression is ambiguous or susceptible of more than 
one meaning must be undertaken without regard to evidence of surrounding 
circumstances. This position corresponds with the approach of the High Court in Victoria 
v Tatts Group Ltd where the relevant contract was construed by reference to its text, 
context and purpose without any anterior finding of ambiguity as a precondition to a 
consideration of surrounding circumstances as an aid to discovering or elucidating 
context and purpose.35 
 
Similarly, in the recent decision in Cherry v Steele-Park,36 Leeming JA (with whom Gleeson 
and White JJA agreed on this point) reviewed the relevant authorities and concluded that 
‘[t]here is now a deal of authority for the proposition that whether there is in truth a 
constructional choice available to a written contract cannot be determined without first at least 
considering evidence of surrounding circumstances’.37 
 
                                                      
30 In addition to the authorities considered below, see, eg: Righi v Kissane Family Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 238, 
[44]; Calvo v Ellimark Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 136, [55]; Zhang v ROC Services (NSW) Pty Ltd; National 
Transport Insurance by its manager NTI Ltd v Zhang [2016] NSWCA 370, [79]. 
31 (2014) 89 NSWLR 633, 653 (footnotes omitted). 
32 Stratton Finance Pty Ltd v Webb [2014] FCAFC 110, [36] – [40] (Allsop CJ, Siopis and Flick JJ). 
33 [2016] HCA 5. 
34 [2016] HCA 47. 
35 [2016] NSWCA 297,[59] (footnotes omitted). 
36 [2017] NSWCA 295. 
37 Ibid 76. 
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Different approaches can be seen elsewhere.  In Victoria, the matter was considered recently 
in Apple and Pear Australia Ltd v Pink Lady America LLC.38  The most extensive treatment of 
the point is found in the judgment of Tate JA, who, after careful consideration of the reasons 
in Wright Prospecting, was sceptical of the conclusion arrived at in Mainteck: 
 
In my view, it follows from what was said in [Wright Prospecting] that it would be wrong 
to conclude that the High Court has endorsed an approach to the construction of 
commercial contracts, whereby the surrounding circumstances, including, relevantly, pre-
contractual negotiations, can invariably be relied upon to assist construction.  This is not 
to deny that the objective approach to contractual interpretation requires, as confirmed by 
French CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ in [Wright Prospecting], reference to the ‘text, context 
(the entire text of the contract as well as any contract, document or statutory provision 
referred to in the text of the contract) and purpose’ … [T]here has been controversy, 
reflected in the judgments of many intermediate appellate courts, about when, and in what 
manner, surrounding circumstances can be relied upon in the construction of commercial 
contracts, the questions surrounding the extent to which surrounding circumstances can 
be relied upon in the construction of commercial contracts raise large issues and their fate 
remains to be resolved by the High Court on another day. It is not in dispute that this 
Court must follow the precepts of the High Court.  While this Court may, as a matter of 
judicial comity, extend deference to the observations made by other intermediate 
appellate courts with respect to their understanding of principles enunciated by the High 
Court, it is ‘bound directly’ by what the High Court has said and ‘is not bound indirectly 
by another court’s interpretation of what the High Court said’.39 
 
Ferguson and McLeish JJA dealt with the point more briefly, concluding: 
 
Consistently with the foregoing, at least where the contractual language is ambiguous or 
susceptible of more than one meaning, evidence of events, circumstances and things 
external to the contract is permissible.  The requirement of ambiguity was stated by 
Mason J in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW), and this Court is 
bound to apply that decision unless and until the High Court says otherwise.  As Tate JA 
has explained, that is this Court’s primary obligation, and it is not bound to adopt the 
interpretations of the High Court’s reasons propounded by other intermediate appellate 
judges or courts in preference to its own interpretation of those reasons.  In our opinion, 
it is not necessary in this appeal to address the controversy that exists as to whether or not 
evidence of matters external to the contract may be called in aid to establish the ambiguity 
to which Mason J referred.40   
 
The courts of Western Australia have now repeatedly stated that they will continue to subscribe 
to the requirement of an ‘ambiguity gateway’ until the High Court expressly indicates that a 
different approach is to be preferred.  In Technomin Australia Pty Ltd v Xstrata Nickel 
Australasia Operations Pty Ltd,41 for instance, McLure P (with whom Newnes JA agreed) 
explained: 
 
After careful consideration of multiple High Court decisions on the subject, a number of 
intermediate appellate courts in this country came to the view that evidence of 
                                                      
38 [2016] VSCA 280. 
39 Ibid [137] – [138] (footnotes omitted). 
40 Ibid [231] – [232] (footnotes omitted). 
41 [2014] WASCA 164. 
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surrounding circumstances was always admissible to assist in the construction of a 
contract, whether or not the contractual language was ambiguous or susceptible of more 
than one meaning.  However, in dismissing the special leave application in Western 
Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd [2011] HCA 45; (2011) 282 ALR 604, 
three members of the High Court (Gummow, Heydon & Bell JJ) said that conclusion was 
inconsistent with binding authority. … This court has taken the view that the guidance in 
Western Export Services should be followed until further direction from the High Court 
… The controversy has raised its head again. The appellant contends that the 'true rule' in 
Codelfa is the law and, as the meaning of the language of the GPR Deed is unambiguously 
clear, evidence of surrounding circumstances is (subject to limited exceptions) 
inadmissible for construction purposes.  The respondents contend that the recent High 
Court decision in Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside 
Energy Ltd [2014] HCA 7 (EGC), has vindicated the pre-Western Export Services 
position adopted by those intermediate appellate courts that had abandoned the gateway 
requirement that the language of a contract had to be ambiguous or susceptible of more 
than one meaning before regard could be had to evidence of surrounding circumstances 
to assist in the construction of a contract. The construction issue was not raised by the 
EGC parties in this court.  Gummow and Heydon JJ had retired before the hearing of 
EGC and Bell J did not sit. Western Export Services and the response of intermediate 
appellate courts thereto were not directly addressed by the High Court in EGC. However, 
the respondent points to the approach taken in the majority judgment.  There can be no 
doubt that the majority in EGC took into account surrounding circumstances known to 
both parties in the construction of the gas supply agreement: [35], [48]. However, there 
is no express consideration by the majority of whether, or finding that, the language of 
the gas supply agreement was ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning.  The 
respondent also drew this court's attention to the reliance by the majority in EGC on [14] 
of the English decision in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50; [2011] 1 WLR 
2900, 2906 - 2907. That paragraph cites with approval Lord Hoffman's first principle in 
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (No 1) [1997] 
UKHL 28; [1998] 1 WLR 896 … Lord Hoffman's first principle is not consistent with the 
gateway requirement in Mason J's 'true rule' in Codelfa.  However, the appellant contends 
that the High Court would not impliedly repudiate the express repudiation in Western 
Export Services of the abandonment of the gateway requirement by some intermediate 
appellate courts.  The aridity of this debate at the intermediate appellate court level is 
manifest. Until the High Court expressly states its position on the subject, I propose to 
continue to apply the 'true rule' as explained in Hancock Prospecting at [9], [74] - [81]. 
In that case this court concluded that the true rule permits regard to be had to some 
surrounding circumstances for construction purposes without having to satisfy the 
gateway requirement [81].42 
 
It is not necessary to belabour the point.  It is plain that until the High Court explicitly addresses 
and resolves the difficulty in this area, intermediate appellate courts will continue to offer 
divergent views.  It is thus worth considering what view the High Court is likely to endorse 








                                                      
42 Ibid [35] – [45] (footnotes omitted).  See also: McCourt v Cranston [2012] WASCA 60; MacKinlay v Derry 
Dew Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 24; Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2012) 45 WAR 
29. 
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III WHAT WILL THE HIGH COURT DECIDE? 
 
Offering a firm view as to the High Court’s likely conclusion in respect of this question is not 
entirely straightforward.  As was seen above in respect of Royal Botanic and Byrnes v Kendle, 
where the Court has adverted explicitly to the controversy in this area, it has expressly declined 
to offer a view as to its resolution.  Even so, it is suggested that there are, on balance, good 
reasons to favour the view that the High Court will, when the question arises, endorse an 
approach to construction in which recourse may be had to ‘surrounding circumstances’ without 
it first being necessary to point to ‘ambiguity’.  There are, broadly speaking, two key bases for 
such a view. 
 
The first is found in the statements of Kiefel and Keane JJ in Wright Prospecting.  Though 
their Honours were cautious not to offer any view as to how the controversy ought ultimately 
to be resolved, their judgment is nonetheless noteworthy for its expression of the view that 
Mason J’s ‘true rule’ is silent as to how an ambiguity might be identified.  As their Honours 
explained: 
 
The “ambiguity” which Mason J said may need to be resolved arises when the words are 
“susceptible of more than one meaning”. His Honour did not say how such an ambiguity 
might be identified. His Honour’s reasons in Codelfa are directed to how an ambiguity 
might be resolved. In reasons for the refusal of special leave to appeal given in Western 
Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd, reference was made to a requirement 
that it is essential to identify ambiguity in the language of the contract before the court 
may have regard to the surrounding circumstances and the object of the transaction. There 
may be differences of views about whether this requirement arises from what was said in 
Codelfa. This is not the occasion to resolve that question.  It should, however, be observed 
that statements made in the course of reasons for refusing an application for special leave 
create no precedent and are binding on no one. An application for special leave is merely 
an application to commence proceedings in the Court. Until the grant of special leave 
there are no proceedings inter partes before the Court.  The question whether an ambiguity 
in the meaning of terms in a commercial contract may be identified by reference to matters 
external to the contract does not arise in this case and the issue identified in Jireh has not 
been the subject of submissions before this Court. To the extent that there is any possible 
ambiguity as to the meaning of the words “deriving title through or under”, it arises from 
the terms of cl 24(iii) itself.43  
 
Insofar as this passage leaves the way open to an approach akin to that in Mainteck – that is, 
adopting a reading of Codelfa that dispenses with the ‘ambiguity gateway’ – it offers some clue 
as to the High Court’s likely approach.  Of course, whether Mason J’s remarks are readily 
                                                      
43 Wright Prospecting, 132 – 133 (footnotes omitted). 
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susceptible of such a reading is another question: indeed, Thomas Prince has strongly criticised 
Mainteck on precisely this point.44  
 
The second basis for the view proffered here is the general lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
commentators and courts for the notion of an ‘ambiguity gateway’.  As has already been noted, 
it is no object of this paper to enter at length into the normative debate as to what evidence a 
court ought to consider when construing a contract (or the debate as to the relative importance 
which ought to be accorded to language and context).45  Even so, it is important to note that 
though there are many commentators who contend that the modern law of contractual 
interpretation has accorded too much weight to extrinsic material at the expense of language,46 
such views are very rarely accompanied by a suggestion that an ‘ambiguity gateway’, or any 
similar such rule, is normatively desirable.47  Indeed, the lack of support for the notion of an 
‘ambiguity gateway’ is well-illustrated by considering the line of recent English cases which 
has been held up as evidence of a retreat from the importance formerly accorded to extrinsic 
material.48  The statements as to the nature of construction in these cases is distinctly at odds 
with any notion of an ‘ambiguity gateway’.  As Lord Hodge (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord 
Mance, Lord Clarke and Lord Sumption agreed) explained in Wood v Capita Insurance Services 
Limited: 
 
Interpretation is, as Lord Clarke stated in Rainy Sky (para 21), a unitary exercise; where 
there are rival meanings, the court can give weight to the implications of rival 
constructions by reaching a view as to which construction is more consistent with 
business common sense. But, in striking a balance between the indications given by the 
language and the implications of the competing constructions the court must consider the 
quality of drafting of the clause … and it must also be alive to the possibility that one side 
may have agreed to something which with hindsight did not serve his interest … 
Similarly, the court must not lose sight of the possibility that a provision may be a 
negotiated compromise or that the negotiators were not able to agree more precise terms.  
This unitary exercise involves an iterative process by which each suggested interpretation 
is checked against the provisions of the contract and its commercial consequences are 
investigated … To my mind once one has read the language in dispute and the relevant 
parts of the contract that provide its context, it does not matter whether the more detailed 
analysis commences with the factual background and the implications of rival 
                                                      
44 Prince, above n 29, 494 – 495.  The manner in which Mason J’s ‘true rule’ is expressed has been subjected to 
some considerable textual analysis.  See, further: Reynolds, above n 29, 191 – 192. 
45 It is also no object of this paper to weigh in on the question as to the proper intersection of construction and 
rectification.  For a discussion of this point, see: Paul S Davies, ‘Interpretation and Rectification in Australia’ 
(2017) 76 Cambridge Law Journal 483. 
46 For a recent example, see: Sumption, above n 8.  
47 Of course, exceptions do exist.  See, eg: Prince, above n 29. 
48 See, eg: Re Sigma Finance Corporation [2010] 1 All ER 571; Marley v Rawlings [2014] 2 WLR 213; Arnold 
v Britton [2015] AC 1619; Wood v Capita Insurance Services Limited [2017] 2 WLR 1095, and generally the 
discussion in: Rohan Havelock, ‘The ‘Unitary Exercise’ of Contractual Interpretation’ (2017) 76 Cambridge 
Law Journal 486. 
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constructions or a close examination of the relevant language in the contract, so long as 
the court balances the indications given by each.49 
 
The lack of enthusiasm for the notion of an ‘ambiguity’ is unsurprising.  Even if an approach 
is sought which seeks to emphasise the primacy of contractual language, the imposition of an 
‘ambiguity gateway’ is an unnecessarily complex and fraught means of achieving such an end.  
It is far preferable to seek to promote the primacy of language without taking up a test which 
necessarily involves the answering such questions as what it is for a contractual term to be 
‘ambiguous’.50   
 
For these reasons, then, it is submitted that the High Court is likely, when the occasion presents 
itself, to endorse an approach to construction in which recourse may be had to ‘surrounding 







It is worth, in closing, reflecting upon why the confusion in this area has proven to be so 
persistent.  Of course, in light of the discussion above, the immediate answer to this question 
may seem obvious: it is the apparent (if not actual) vacillation of the High Court which has led 
to confusion and divergence in lower courts.  To put the point in this way, however, simply 
masks the important question of why the High Court has opted, in cases such as Wright 
Prospecting, to decline to dispel the uncertainty which has been productive of so much 
difficulty. 
 
Such a course was, at least in principle, open to the High Court on a number of occasions.  The 
High Court has stated clearly that lower courts are to follow the ‘seriously considered dicta’ of 
a majority of the High Court,51 and it has been seen that lower courts do indeed abide by this 
injunction.52  Even if the High Court had offered guidance in this sphere which was wholly 
obiter, it would almost certainly have been followed by lower courts. 
 
                                                      
49 [2017] 2 WLR 1095, [11] – [12] (footnotes omitted). 
50 Mainteck, 655; B & B Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Brian A Cheeseman & Associates Pty Ltd (1994) 35 
NSWLR 227, 234. 
51 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 151. 
52 See the discussion in: Matthew Harding and Ian Malkin, ‘The High Court of Australia's Obiter Dicta and 
Decision-Making in the Lower Courts’ (2012) 34 Sydney Law Review 12. 
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The High Court’s reticence is likely a function of it adhering to the principle that a court ought 
not to determine a question where it is not necessary to do so in resolving the matter before it. 
As Dyson Heydon has forcefully observed: 
 
A discursive analysis of the law can be appropriate if it is necessary to decide the matter. 
An intermediate appellate court may be confronted with a conflict of authorities in 
different trial courts throughout Australia, and may have to choose. The possibilities are 
wider still in the High Court. But even in these courts it is wrong to deal with issues 
which, even though they have been raised, are not issues which it is necessary for the 
specific outcome of the case to deal with. It is even worse to deal with unnecessary issues 
which have not been raised. A badge of suspicion must attach to a judgment which, after 
setting out various issues and arguments, says “Though it is not necessary to decide this 
point, in deference to the careful submissions of the parties, the court will deal with it.” 
Courts are not supposed to decide questions which are merely moot, theoretical, abstract 
or hypothetical. They are not supposed to offer opinions which are merely advisory, 
having no foreseeable consequences for the particular parties. Their determinations are 
supposed to be conclusive or final decisions on concrete controversies, not inconclusive 
and tentative speculations on controversies which have not yet arisen. Excessive and self-
indulgent surveys of the law and debates about the background to and future of particular 
rules contravene these prohibitions, which are based on good sense.53 
 
Few would cavil with the contention that a court should be slow to offer a view on points which 
are wholly academic or hypothetical.  Even so, reasonable views may differ as to the degree of 
circumspection owed by the High Court when presented with an opportunity to provide 
guidance on a point which has been productive of confusion and difficulty in lower courts.  The 
proper approach in such cases might be thought to depend upon the importance of the question 
and the degree to which the Court has had the opportunity to explore the competing arguments. 
 
If considered in this way, it is difficult to find the approach adopted by the Court in this sphere 
wholly satisfactory.  It is profoundly concerning that the law is in a state of such confusion in 
respect of a matter so fundamental to the law of contract.  Indeed, there is considerable evidence 
that the difficulties in this area are the cause of much vexation for courts at first instance: a 
recent study of the most frequently-cited judgments in Australian contract law, for instance, 
found that Jireh, notwithstanding its lack of precedential force, is the 75th most cited ‘authority’ 
in the Australian law of contract.54  If the High Court forbears from offering guidance on this 
point until its hand is forced, there is every reason to believe this confusion and difficulty will 
continue for some considerable time: after all, in order for it to become necessary to decide 
this point, the Court will have to be presented with a matter which turns on the construction of 
                                                      
53 J D Heydon, ‘Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law’ (2003) 23 Australian Bar Review 110, 120 
– 121. 
54 See: Daniel Reynolds and Lyndon Goddard Leading Cases in Contract Law: A Guide to the 100 Most 
Frequently Cited Cases in Contract and Related Subjects (Federation Press, 2017).   
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apparently unambiguous language.  There are, in short, good reasons to conclude that the High 
Court ought to abandon its reticence on this point and take the opportunity to offer explicit 
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Abstract 
This paper gives an account of recent developments in respect of the penalty rule in Australia and England, before 
going on to explore two unresolved questions. The first is whether Australian law recognises two jurisdictions to 
relieve against penalties – one in equity and another at common law – or instead a unitary penalty doctrine. The 
second is the important question of how the recent developments are playing out “on the ground”.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In both England and Australia, the rule against penalties is in a state of flux.1 Recent years have 
seen a string of decisions which have seen the doctrine transformed. At the same time, the 
scrutiny to which the rule has been subject has reignited a number of important normative 
debates as to its justification and proper function. 
    These developments have elicited a considerable volume of thoughtful commentary.2 Yet 
though the ground in this area is now well-tilled, a number of important questions remain to be 
                                                      
 BA LLB(Hons) (Adelaide) LLM(Cambridge); Lecturer, University of Sydney Law School; PhD Candidate, 
Adelaide Law School. I am grateful to John Carter and Andrew Stewart for discussing this paper with me. They 
should not be taken to agree with the views expressed here, and any errors remain my own. This research is part 
of a project which is generously supported by the Society of Construction Law Australia. 
1 To employ such an expression as ‘the rule against penalties’ is to presuppose the existence of a unitary 
doctrine. Such expressions are employed throughout this paper, even though (as is made clear below) the current 
state of the authorities might be thought to make them inapt.   
2 For just some of the writings in respect of these recent developments, see: J W Carter, Wayne Courtney, 
Elisabeth Peden, Andrew Stewart and G J Tolhurst ‘Contractual Penalties: Resurrecting the Equitable 
Jurisdiction’ (2013) 30 Journal of Contract Law 99; Anthony Gray, ‘Contractual Penalties in Australian Law 
After Andrews: An Opportunity Missed’ (2013) 18 Deakin Law Review 1; Paul Davies and P G Turner, ‘Relief 
Against Penalties Without a Breach of Contract’ [2013] Cambridge Law Journal 20; Sirko Harder, ‘The 
Relevance of Breach to the Applicability of the Rule Against Penalties’ (2013) 30 Journal of Contract Law 52; 
Edwin Peel, 'The Rule Against Penalties' (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 152; Edwin Peel, 'Unjustified 
Penalties or an Unjustified Rule Against Penalties?' (2014) 130 Law Quarterly Review 365; Katy Barnett, 
‘Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd: Are Late Payment Fees on Credit Cards 
Enforceable?’ (2015) 37 Sydney Law Review 595; Jessica Palmer, ‘Implications of the New Rule Against 
Penalties’ (2016) 47 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 305; Lord Hope ‘The Law on Penalties – A 
Wasted Opportunity?’ (2016) 33 Journal of Contract Law 93; Sarah Worthington, ‘The Death of Penalties in 
Two Legal Cultures?’ [2016] UK Supreme Court Yearbook 129; Jonathan Morgan, ‘The Penalty Clause 
Doctrine: Unloveable but Untouchable’ [2016] Cambridge Law Journal 11; Nicholas Tiverios, ‘Doctrinal 
Approaches to the Law of Penalties: A post-Andrews Intention-Based Defence of Relief Against Fixed 
Contractual Penalties’ in Simone Degeling, James Edelman and James Goudkamp (eds), Contract in 
Commercial Law (Lawbook 2016); Sirko Harder, ‘The Scope of the Rule Against Contractual Penalties: A New 
Divergence’ in Andrew Robertson and Michael Tilbury (eds) Divergences in Private Law (Hart Publishing, 
2016); John Stumbles, ‘Paciocco in the High Court: Penalties and Late Payment Fees’ (2017) 91 Australian 
Law Journal 969; J W Carter, Wayne Courtney and G J Tolhurst ‘Assessment of Contractual Penalties: Dunlop 
Deflated’ (2017) 34 Journal of Contract Law 4; Nicholas Tiverios ‘A Restatement of Relief Against Contractual 
Penalties (I): Underlying Principles in Equity and at Common Law’ (2017) 11 Journal of Equity 1; Nicholas 
Tiverios ‘A Restatement of Relief Against Contractual Penalties (II): A Framework for Applying the Australian 
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resolved. This short paper has two objects. The first is to give a concise account of the recent 
developments in this sphere. The second is to essay a tentative resolution to two questions, and 
in doing so to illuminate a number of general patterns and trends in the law of contract in 
Australia and England. 
    The first question is whether Australian law recognises two jurisdictions to relieve against 
penalties – one in equity and another at common law – or instead a unitary penalty doctrine. 
Though the answer to this question might seem at first to be straightforward, there is, as will 
be seen, a surprising diversity of views as to the correct answer. It is suggested that though the 
preponderance of authority supports the recognition of two jurisdictions to relieve against 
penalties which operate side-by-side, the normative case for the embrace of a unitary penalty 
doctrine is compelling. 
    The second question relates to how the recent developments in this sphere in both England 
and Australia are playing out “on the ground”. A preliminary review of authorities suggests 
that the blurring of the doctrine’s scope in Australia has not had the deleterious impact which 
was feared in some quarters. At the same time, it seems possible that the recent restatement of 
the test for adjudging whether an impugned provision is penal has had a more muted impact 
than was initially anticipated. It is suggested, however, that a clear understanding of the 
doctrine’s practical operation can only be arrived at through a wide-ranging analysis of 
decisions which apply the “new” law. 
 
THE PENALTY RULE TRANSFORMED 
The penalty rule is no stranger to difficulty or controversy. For much of its modern history it 
has been attended by doctrinal technicality and doubt as to its proper normative basis.3 Even 
so, up until relatively recently, the core features of the rule could be said to be well-settled.  
                                                      
and English Approaches’ (2017) 11 Journal of Equity 185; Andrew Summers ‘Unresolved Issues in the Law on 
Penalties’ [2017] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 95; P G Turner, ‘Lex Sequitur Equitatem: 
Fusion and the Penalty Doctrine’ in John C P Goldberg, Henry E Smith and P G Turner (eds) Equity and Law: 
Fusion and Fission (Cambridge University Press, 2018) (forthcoming). 
3 A number of important doctrinal questions in respect of the penalty rule have remained unresolved for many 
years. One example is the question of whether the sum fixed in an irrecoverable penalty operates as a ‘ceiling’ on 
the damages recoverable in an action for breach. Compare the views expressed in: Lord Elphinstone v Markland 
Iron & Coal Co Ltd (1886) 11 App Cas 332, 346; Public Works Commissioner v Hills [1906] AC 368; Wall v 
Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude [1915] 3 KB 66; Watts, Watts & Co v Mitsui [1917] AC 227. For the debate as to the 
rule’s normative basis, see, eg: Charles J Goetz and Robert E Scott, ‘Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just 
Compensation Principle’ (1977) 77 Columbia Law Review 554; Samuel A Rea, ‘Efficiency Implications of 
Penalties and Liquidated Damages’ (1984) 13 Journal of Legal Studies 147; Elisabeth Lanyon, 'Equity and the 
Doctrine of Penalties' (1996) 9 Journal of Contract Law 234; P D Baron, ‘Confused in Words: Unconscionability 
and the Doctrine of Penalties’ (2008) 34 Monash University Law Review 285; Carmine Conte, Penalties 
Reworked: the Rule Against Penalties Restated, Justified and Refined (DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014). 
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    In consequence of a succession of recent decisions at the highest level, the rule has been 
almost wholly transformed. In giving an account of the relevant developments, it is best to 
consider first the expansion of the doctrine’s scope, before turning to an examination of the 
reformulation of the test for adjudging whether an impugned provision is penal. 
The rule’s scope 
Though any critique of the developments as to the scope of the penalty rule is necessarily 
complex, the upshot of those developments can nonetheless be stated simply. Recent years 
have seen the rejection, in Australian law, of the notion that the penalty rule is capable of being 
invoked only in respect of provisions triggered by breach of contract. At the same time, English 
law has firmly set its face against such a position, opting instead to reaffirm the “breach 
limitation” as a firm control on the doctrine’s scope. 
    The rejection of any “breach limitation” in Australian law was effected by the High Court’s 
decision in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (“Andrews”).4 That 
decision, as is well known, arose in the context of a representative action which challenged the 
enforceability of a range of bank fees and charges.5 The matter initially came before Gordon J 
in the Federal Court of Australia, where the plaintiffs were met with the argument that a number 
of the impugned fees, being triggered by events other than breach of contract, were altogether 
outside the rule’s scope.6 
    Gordon J determined the question as to the rule’s scope in the bank’s favour. Her Honour 
noted that the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Interstar Wholesale Finance 
Pty Ltd v Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd (“Interstar”)7 precluded a holding that the penalty rule 
was capable of being invoked in respect of a stipulation triggered by an event other than breach 
of contract.8 An appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court against her Honour’s decision 
was removed to the High Court.9 
                                                      
4 (2012) 247 CLR 205. 
5 The plaintiffs founded their challenge not only on the penalty rule, but also on a number of statutory 
provisions, eg; Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001(Cth) ss 12CB, 12CC; Fair Trading 
Act 1999 (Vic) ss 8, 8A. 
6 Andrews v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2011] FCA 1376. 
7 (2008) 257 ALR 292. 
8 In Interstar, the New South Wales Court of Appeal rejected the contrary view expressed by Brereton J at first 
instance. See: Integral Home Loans Pty Ltd v Interstar Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 592. Though 
Interstar did not proceed to the High Court, it nonetheless attracted considerable comment and speculation. See, 
eg: Elisabeth Peden, ‘Penalty Clauses and What Would the High Court Have Made of Interstar Wholesale Finance 
Pty Ltd v Integral Home Loans?’ (2009) 23 Commercial Law Quarterly 6. 
9 Pursuant to Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 40(2). 
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    The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal. Though the reasons traverse the penalty 
rule’s history at some length, they can be distilled in brief form as follows. First, the Court 
traced the rule’s origin to the practice of the Chancery in granting relief against the enforcement 
of conditional bonds.10 Such instruments typically created an obligation for the payment of a 
sum of money on a fixed date, subject to a condition that the bond should be discharged upon 
the satisfaction of some other stipulation (which was often endorsed on the back of the bond 
itself), such as the rendering of services or the provision of goods.11 Such a device might seem 
an awkward mechanism for the imposition of promissory liability, but the technicalities of the 
forms of action meant that such an approach had considerable appeal. From at least 1321, the 
writ of covenant could be successfully brought only where plaintiff could produce a deed.12 It 
was thus unwise for parties to conclude substantial bargains informally. This, combined with 
the procedural advantages presented by the writ of debt and the desire to avoid the uncertainty 
inherent in having damages assessed by a jury, drove parties to prefer the employment of 
conditional bonds. The practice which eventually emerged in the Chancery involved the routine 
grant of relief against the enforcement of such bonds where it was possible for compensation 
to be made for loss actually sustained.13 
    The second step in the reasoning was to conclude that, contrary to the view earlier expressed 
in the High Court, this equitable jurisdiction to relieve against penalties remained alive and 
well. In particular, the High Court rejected the suggestion that the jurisdiction had “withered 
on the vine” after the courts of common law began to follow Chancery in granting relief against 
the enforcement of penal stipulations.14 This extant equitable jurisdiction, having developed in 
the context of the grant of relief against the enforcement of conditional bonds, was, in the High 
Court’s view, plainly not limited in scope to stipulations triggered by breach of contract.  
                                                      
10 For the classic account of the history of relief against conditional bonds, see: A W B Simpson, ‘The Penal 
Bond With Conditional Defeasance’ (1966) 82 Law Quarterly Review 392.  
11 See the discussion in: David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 28-30.  
12 The circumstances surrounding the emergence of the deed requirement in covenant are not wholly clear. See 
the discussion in: David Ibbetson, ‘Words and Deeds: the Action of Covenant in the Reign of Edward I’ (1986) 
4 Law and History Review 71; Patrick Philbin, ‘Proving the Will of Another: The Specialty Requirement in 
Covenant’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 2001; John H Baker, ‘Deeds Speak Louder Than Words: Covenants 
and the Law of Proof, 1290–1321’ in Susanne Jenks, Jonathan Rose and Christopher Whittick (eds) Law, 
Lawyers and Texts: Studies in Medieval Legal History in Honour of Paul Brand (Brill, 2012). 
13 The Chancery typically secured the quantification of such loss by a jury by directing an issue of quantum 
damnificatus. See: Andrews, [58]; Astley v Weldon (1801) 2 Bos & Pul 346; 126 ER 1318; Hardy v Martin 
(1783) 1 Cox 26; 29 ER 1046. 
14 For such a suggestion, see: AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, 191 (Mason and Wilson 
JJ). There is some debate as to the circumstances in which the courts of common law began to offer relief 
analogous to that available in Chancery. This point is discussed further below. 
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    Having rejected the notion of a breach requirement, it was necessary for the High Court to 
posit a statement of the penalty rule which offered some alternative means of demarcating the 
doctrine’s scope. The Court thus proffered a statement of the rule as follows:  
“In general terms, a stipulation prima facie imposes a penalty on a party (the first party) 
if, as a matter of substance, it is collateral (or accessory) to a primary stipulation in favour 
of a second party and this collateral stipulation, upon the failure of the primary 
stipulation, imposes upon the first party an additional detriment, the penalty, to the benefit 
of the second party. In that sense, the collateral or accessory stipulation is described as 
being in the nature of a security for and in terrorem of the satisfaction of the primary 
stipulation.”15 
This restatement of the law caused considerable consternation in some quarters. Much of the 
concern stemmed from the Court’s election to eschew any examination of policy factors in 
favour of a purely historical analysis.16 Indeed, this aspect of Andrews was singled out for 
criticism by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Cavendish Square Holding BV v 
El Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis (“Cavendish”),17 in which the Australian view as to 
the scope of the penalty rule was considered and rejected. As Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Sumption (with whom Lord Carnwath agreed) stated: 
“Any decision of the High Court of Australia has strong persuasive force in this court. 
But we cannot accept that English law should take the same path, quite apart from its 
inconsistency with established and unchallenged House of Lords authority. In the first 
place, although the reasoning in Andrews was entirely historical, it is not in fact consistent 
with the equitable rule as it developed historically. The equitable jurisdiction to relieve 
from penalties arose wholly in the context of bonds defeasible in the event of the 
performance of a contractual obligation. It necessarily posited a breach of that obligation. 
Secondly, if there is a distinct and still subsisting equitable jurisdiction to relieve against 
penalties which is wider than the common law jurisdiction, with three possible exceptions 
it appears to have left no trace in the authorities since the fusion of law and equity in 1873 
… Thirdly, the High Court’s redefinition of a penalty is, with respect, difficult to apply 
to the case to which it is supposedly directed, namely where there is no breach of contract. 
It treats as a potential penalty any clause which is ‘in the nature of a security for and in 
terrorem of the satisfaction of the primary stipulation.’ By a ‘security’ it means a 
provision to secure ‘compensation … for the prejudice suffered by the failure of the 
primary stipulation’. This analysis assumes that the ‘primary stipulation’ is some kind of 
promise, in which case its failure is necessarily a breach of that promise … Finally, the 
High Court’s decision does not address the major legal and commercial implications of 
transforming a rule for controlling remedies for breach of contract into a jurisdiction to 
review the content of the substantive obligations which the parties have agreed. Modern 
contracts contain a very great variety of contingent obligations … The potential 
assimilation of all of these to clauses imposing penal remedies for breach of contract 
                                                      
15 Ibid 216 – 217. 
16 See, eg: J W Carter, Wayne Courtney, Elisabeth Peden, Andrew Stewart and G J Tolhurst ‘Contractual 
Penalties: Resurrecting the Equitable Jurisdiction’ (2013) 30 Journal of Contract Law 99, 132. 
17 [2015] UKSC 67. 
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would represent the expansion of the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction into a new territory 
of uncertain boundaries, which has hitherto been treated as wholly governed by mutual 
agreement.”18 
The upshot of these developments is that English and Australian law have now clearly 
diverged in respect of the rule’s scope.19 At the same time, the potentially extensive reach of 
the rule in Australia has given rise to the question of whether it operates to curtail freedom of 
contract to a significantly greater degree than its English counterpart.20  
When is a stipulation a penalty? 
The second recent development in respect of the penalty rule relates to the test for adjudging 
whether an impugned provision is penal. In this sphere, English and Australian law are now 
largely aligned.  
    As is well-known, the traditional tests for ascertaining whether an impugned provision is 
indeed a penalty were found in the speech of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co 
Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd (“Dunlop”).21 In Cavendish, those tests were distilled 
in the following terms: 
“(a) [T]hat the provision would be penal if ‘the sum stipulated for is extravagant and 
unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be 
proved to have followed from the breach’; (b) that the provision would be penal if the 
breach consisted only in the non-payment of money and it provided for the payment of a 
larger sum; (c) that there was a presumption (but no more) that it would be penal if it was 
payable in a number of events of varying gravity; and (d) that it would not be treated as 
penal by reason only of the impossibility of precisely pre-estimating the true loss.”22 
It is the first of his Lordship’s tests that is the most notable. Put simply, the application of this 
test involved a comparison of the sum fixed by the impugned stipulation with the sum which 
might be recoverable in an action for breach of contract. 
                                                      
18 Cavendish Square Holding BV v El Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, [42]. The three 
examples instanced by the Supreme Court are, first, In re Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co; Ex p Hulse (1873) LR 
8 Ch App 1022 Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank [1966] 1 WLR 1428 (though this was dismissed by their 
Lordships as involving ‘no more than an unsupported throw-away line in the judgment of Diplock LJ’); and 
Jobson v Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 1026. 
19 This divergence has been explicitly remarked upon in the High Court. See: Paciocco v Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Limited (2016) 258 CLR 525, [7] – [10] (French CJ). 
20 To the extent that the Australian position sanctions a significant curtailment of party autonomy in the interests 
of fairness, this might be seen as a manifestation of a concern for fair dealing which permeates the Australian law 
of contract. For a discussion of the notion of a distinctively ‘Australian’ law of contract, and the role in Australian 
law of notions of conscience and fair dealing, see, eg: M P Ellinghaus, ‘An Australian Contract Law?’ (1989) 2 
Journal of Contract Law 13; Paul Finn, ‘Commerce, the Common Law and Morality’ (1989) 17 Melbourne 
University Law Review 100; J W Carter and Andrew Stewart, ‘Commerce and Conscience: The High Court’s 
Developing View of Contract’ (1993) 23 University of Western Australia Law Review 49. 
21 [1915] AC 79. 
22 Cavendish, [21]. 
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    In Cavendish, the Supreme Court revisited Lord Dunedin’s tests. Their Lordships observed 
the “unfortunate” fact that “[s]ome of the many decisions on the validity of damages clauses 
are little more than a detailed exegesis or application of his four tests with a view to 
discovering whether the clause in issue can be brought within one or more of them”.23 Their 
Lordships, upon a re-examination of the relevant authorities, restated the relevant test in the 
following terms: 
“The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes 
a detriment on the contract-breaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the 
innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation. The innocent party can have 
no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in 
some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages 
clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we 
therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to 
determine its validity. But compensation is not necessarily the only legitimate interest 
that the innocent party may have in the performance of the defaulter’s primary 
obligations.”24 
In contrast with the orthodox approach set out in the speech of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop, this 
test permits regard to be had to a wider range of matters when adjudging whether an impugned 
provision is penal.  
    The approach taken in Cavendish has been the subject of considerable criticism in some 
quarters.25 All the same, a similar approach has been followed by the High Court of Australia. 
That step was taken in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited 
(“Paciocco”),26 a further instalment in the representative action of which Andrews formed 
part. The High Court, after engaging in a re-examination of the relevant authorities, 
reformulated the test for adjudging whether an impugned provision is penal. Kiefel J (as her 
Honour then was, and with whom French CJ relevantly agreed), framed the question as being 
that of “whether the sum is ‘out of all proportion’ to the interests said to be damaged in the 
event of default”.27  
    Gageler J framed the inquiry as being that of whether “the stipulation in issue is properly 
characterised as having no purpose other than to punish”.28  Insofar as this formulation differs 
from that adopted in Cavendish, his Honour noted:  
                                                      
23 Cavendish, [22]. 
24 Cavendish, [32]. 
25 See, eg: J W Carter, Wayne Courtney and G J Tolhurst ‘Assessment of Contractual Penalties: Dunlop Deflated’ 
(2017) 34 Journal of Contract Law 4; W M C Gummow,‘What is in a Word? 'Legitimate' Interests and 
Expectations as Common Law Criteria’ (2018) 45 Australian Bar Review 23. 
26 (2016) 258 CLR 525. 
27 Paciocco, [57].  
28 Ibid [165]. 
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“Framing the inquiry in terms of whether the stipulation in issue is properly characterised 
as having no purpose other than to punish compels a more tailored inquiry into the 
commercial circumstances within which the parties entered into the contract containing 
the stipulation than might be involved in asking, as did the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom in Cavendish, whether the stipulation serves a ‘legitimate interest’.  That is not, 
of course, to say that the differently framed inquiries might not lead to the same result.”29 
Keane J quoted with approval the statement in Cavendish that whether an impugned provision 
is penal turns on “whether the sum or remedy stipulated as a consequence of a breach of 
contract is exorbitant or unconscionable when regard is had to the innocent party’s interest in 
the performance of the contract”.30   
    Nettle J was the sole dissentient.  His Honour, while accepting Cavendish as a correct 
statement of the law, stressed the notion that the test posited in Cavendish is consistent with 
the earlier authorities.  His Honour explained: 
“Asking whether the sum agreed is out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the 
innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation reprises the test formulated 
by Lord Robertson in Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Company v Yzquierdo y 
Castaneda … for application to a case where the damage suffered by the innocent party 
as a result of a breach is incapable of precise or even approximate quantification.  The 
Andrews description of Dunlop, as being concerned with whether the sum agreed was 
commensurate with the interest protected by the bargain, was part of the Court’s 
consideration of cases in which damage is incapable of even approximate quantification.  
Nothing said in Andrews runs counter to the approach adopted in Ringrow that ‘in typical 
penalty cases, the court compares what would be recoverable as unliquidated damages 
with the sum of money stipulated as payable on breach’.”31 
In sum, though expressed (consistently with the holding in Andrews) in terms capable of 
extending beyond stipulations triggered by breach of contract, Paciocco largely involved an 
alignment of Australian law with the approach taken in Cavendish. 
 
We do this at common law but that in equity? 
Perhaps the most perplexing outstanding issue in respect of the penalty rule is the question of 
whether Australian law recognises two jurisdictions to relieve against penalties – one in equity 
and another at common law – or instead a unitary penalty doctrine. Though this question was 
definitively settled for English law by the decision in Cavendish – which rejected the existence 
of any equitable jurisdiction to relieve against penalties – the position in Australia remains 
unclear. 
                                                      
29 Ibid [166]. 
30 Ibid [270]. 
31 Ibid [320]. 
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    Though this question might be thought to be of fundamental importance, it has attracted 
relatively little sustained analysis.32 The notable exception in this regard is an important paper 
of Nicholas Tiverios, who has addressed this question thoughtfully and at some length. Tiverios 
has argued that Australian law ought to, and does, recognise a unitary penalty rule. He has 
advanced four reasons in support of this contention, each of which merits separate attention. 
    First, Tiverios observes that “in Andrews the High Court staunchly rejected the proposition 
that the penalties doctrine in Australia is a conceptually distinct rule of common law and not 
equity”.33 Tiverios is doubtless right to say that Andrews involves a rejection of the notion that 
the rule is one of common law alone. Yet it is quite another thing to say, as Tiverios does, that 
“the High Court’s approach signifies a single rule against penalties albeit with equitable 
origins”.34 In truth, this is a question on which Andrews offers no explicit guidance.  
    The second argument proffered by Tiverios is purely doctrinal, resting on the contention 
“the cases decided after Paciocco appeared to be adopting a clear trend toward applying a 
unified approach”.35 Though Tiverios acknowledges that the recent decision of the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal in Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd v Linfield 
Developments Pty Ltd; Guan v Linfield Developments Pty Ltd36 poses some difficulty for this 
argument, it is nonetheless important to stress the extent to which the authorities are at odds 
with the recognition of a unified penalty rule.  
    It is true that some of the cases decided since Paciocco lend some support to the recognition 
of a unified rule.37 But it is not just Australia Capital Financial Management which can be said 
to support the contrary view. Indeed, in that case, Ward JA expressly rested her conclusion as 
to the existence of two separate jurisdictions to relieve against penalties on the reasons of 
Gageler J in Paciocco. As Ward JA explained: 
“In Paciocco (HCA), the reasons of Gageler J (at [118]-[127]) lend support to an 
                                                      
32 This is certainly not to say that the point has been wholly ignored. In addition to the exploration of this point 
by Nicholas Tiverios, see further the discussion in: J W Carter, Wayne Courtney, Elisabeth Peden, Andrew 
Stewart and G J Tolhurst ‘Contractual Penalties: Resurrecting the Equitable Jurisdiction’ (2013) 30 Journal of 
Contract Law 99; John Stumbles, ‘Paciocco in the High Court: Penalties and Late Payment Fees’ (2017) 91 
Australian Law Journal 969. 
33 Nicholas Tiverios ‘A Restatement of Relief Against Contractual Penalties (II): A Framework for Applying the 
Australian and English Approaches’ (2017) 11 Journal of Equity 185, 214. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Nicholas Tiverios ‘A Restatement of Relief Against Contractual Penalties (II): A Framework for Applying 
the Australian and English Approaches’ (2017) 11 Journal of Equity 185, 215 (footnotes omitted). 
36 [2017] NSWCA 99. 
37 Tiverios instances: Sydney Constructions & Developments Pty Ltd v Reynolds Private Wealth Pty Ltd [2016] 
NSWSC 1104 [45 ]– [52]; Wu v Ling [2016] NSWCA 322 [1], [21]; [117] – [123]; Arab Bank Australia Ltd v 
Sayde Developments Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 328 [69]–[112] (though, as noted below, this authority has been 
relied upon as being consistent with the recognition of two jurisdictions to relieve against penalties); Magnin v 
Creevey [2017] NSWSC 375 [10] – [12]. 
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interpretation of Andrews as envisioning a common law penalties doctrine, applicable in 
most circumstances, modified by a flexible equitable doctrine in certain circumstances. 
Such an interpretation is consistent with that adopted by Gordon J in Paciocco (FCA) at 
first instance (at [13]-[32]) and with the approach adopted in this Court in the recent 
decision of Arab Bank [Arab Bank Australia Ltd v Sayde Developments Pty Ltd [2016] 
NSWCA 328] a case in which the alleged penalty was triggered by a breach of 
contract.”38 
The key passage from the reasons of Gageler J in Paciocco is as follows: 
“The statement in Andrews that ‘[i]t is the availability of compensation which generates 
the “equity” upon which the court intervenes’ without which ‘the parties are left to their 
legal rights and obligations’ is, in context, a reference to the historically important, 
although now comparatively rare, exercise of equitable jurisdiction to grant relief against 
penalties. The statements that, ‘[i]n general terms’, a penalty is enforced ‘only to the 
extent’ that compensation can be made for prejudice suffered by failure of the primary 
stipulation and that a party who can provide compensation ‘is relieved to that degree from 
liability to satisfy the collateral stipulation’ are similarly directed to, and broadly 
descriptive of, the grant of equitable relief. The present case does not involve the grant 
of equitable relief. Nor does the present case involve non-observance of a non-promissory 
primary contractual stipulation. The customers’ claim to recover the amounts charged as, 
and paid following the imposition of, the late payment fee in the representative 
proceeding, although variously and elaborately framed, was in substance a common law 
action in restitution which turned on the enforceability at common law of an obligation 
to pay a specified sum of money on breach of contract.”39 
The reasons of Gordon J in Paciocco at first instance also cast doubt on the recognition of a 
unified rule. Her Honour proceeded on the footing that it was necessary to consider the position 
at common law and the position in equity separately (though it is important to note that the 
parties were in agreement as to this course, and accordingly the point was not the subject of 
submissions).  As her Honour explained: 
“The Applicants alleged that the Exception Fee Provisions were penalties at common law 
and, further or alternatively, penalties in equity. The need to consider them separately 
was said by both sides to arise from the decision of the High Court in Andrews v Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30; (2012) 247 CLR 205 (Andrews 
High Court). The penalty doctrine in equity has not been subsumed into the common law: 
Andrews High Court at [51].  Although it is said now by both sides to be necessary to 
consider the penalties question at law and in equity separately, the principles, and the 
relief, are not unconnected. While the circumstances necessary to enliven the common 
law doctrine are different from those necessary to enliven equity, a stipulation (to pay a 
sum or other property) will not constitute a penalty at law or in equity unless it is 
‘extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that 
could conceivably be proved’: Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v New Garage 
and Motor Company Limited [1914] UKHL 1; [1915] AC 79 at 87.”40 
                                                      
38 Australia Capital Financial Management Pty Ltd v Linfield Developments Pty Ltd; Guan v Linfield 
Developments Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCA 99, [360] (Ward JA).  
39 Paciocco, [125] – [126] (footnotes omitted).  
40 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2014] FCA 35, [13] – [14].  
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This approach was subsequently approved in the Full Federal Court, though again it must be 
noted that the point was not the subject of argument. Allsop CJ explained:  
“From [13]-[48] of the reasons, the primary judge set out the relevant principles in the 
light of the High Court’s decision in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30; 247 CLR 205 (Andrews (HC)). As her Honour pointed out, 
the principal operative conclusion from Andrews (HC) was that the doctrine of penalties 
in Equity had not been subsumed in the common law leading to the necessity to consider 
the question at common law and in Equity.” 41   
There is, in sum, little reason to conclude that the authorities point clearly towards the 
recognition of a unified penalty rule. Tiverios does not, however, rest his contention solely on 
this doctrinal footing, instead going on to make two normative arguments. First, Tiverios notes 
that an insistence upon two distinct rules is productive of needless complexity, with contracts 
being “read and enforced in a complex and bifurcated manner”.42 Secondly, and in a similar 
vein, Tiverios notes that the very substantial overlap between the putative common law and 
equitable rules makes the retention of both unnecessary and unhelpful.43 
    It is these observations which illuminate the true position in respect of the question under 
examination here. Though the preponderance of authority supports the recognition in Australia 
of two jurisdictions to relieve against penalties which operate side-by-side, the normative case 
for the embrace of a unitary penalty doctrine is compelling. 
    Though this conclusion might well be controversial in some quarters, one need not be an 
ardent adherent of fusion to perceive the merit in the embrace of a unified rule.44 The 
relationship between equity and common law in a post-judicature system was famously said 
by Professor Burrows to be capable of categorisation as follows: 
“The first category is where common law and equity co-exist coherently and where the 
historical labels of common law and equity remain the best or, at least, useful 
terminology. … The second category is where common law and equity co-exist 
coherently but, in contrast to the first category, there is nothing to be gained by adherence 
to those historical labels. If we are to take fusion seriously, the labels common law and 
                                                      
41 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2015] FCAFC 50, [19] (Allsop CJ). It is 
worth noting that Allsop CJ’s extracurial writings suggest his Honour views the authorities as they currently 
stand as supporting the existence of two jurisdictions to relieve against penalties. See: James Allsop, ‘The 
Doctrine of Penalties in Modern Contract Law’ (2018) 30 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 1. 
42 Nicholas Tiverios ‘A Restatement of Relief Against Contractual Penalties (II): A Framework for Applying the 
Australian and English Approaches’ (2017) 11 Journal of Equity 185, 215. 
43 Nicholas Tiverios ‘A Restatement of Relief Against Contractual Penalties (II): A Framework for Applying the 
Australian and English Approaches’ (2017) 11 Journal of Equity 185, 215 – 216 (footnotes omitted). Tiverios 
notes the view of Ben McFarlane to the same effect. See: Ben McFarlane, ‘Penalties and Forfeiture’ in John 
McGhee (gen ed), Snell’s Equity (33rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015). 
44 As is well-known, the debate as to the ‘fusion fallacy’ has been especially heated in Australia. See, eg: J D 
Heydon, M J Leeming and P G Turner, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines & Remedies 
(LexisNexis, 5th ed, 2015), 47-61; Michael Tilbury, ‘Fallacy or Furphy? Fusion in a Judicature World’ (2003) 
26 University of New South Wales Law Journal 357. 
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equity in the areas of the law covered by this category should be abandoned at a stroke. 
Take, for example, the law on mistake in contract. In explaining the law we almost 
invariably distinguish between the position at common law and the position in equity. 
However, there is no reason why we could not say – and this would make the law more 
immediately comprehensible – that there are, for example, some shared or common 
mistakes that are so serious as to render a contract void: and some mistakes that are less 
serious and render a contract voidable or even voidable on terms … The third category is 
more complex. It comprises probably most of our civil law. In this category, in contrast 
to both of the first two categories, common law and equity do not exist coherently. If we 
are to take fusion seriously, what is needed is a change in the law, albeit often only a 
small change, so as to produce a principled product which may combine elements of law 
and equity.”45 
The current Australian law respecting penalties must be said to fall within the third, or, at best, 
second of these categories. In short, the normative question as to whether the law ought to 
recognise two jurisdictions to relieve against penalties is inextricably tied up with the anterior, 
descriptive question of what it is that sets the putative common law and equitable jurisdictions 
apart. The difficulty encountered when seeking to provide a clear answer to this descriptive 
question suggests that the recognition of two jurisdictions does more to obscure than to 
illuminate.  
    It might be said that the common law rule is limited in scope to stipulations triggered by 
breach of contract, while the equitable rule is not so limited. But if this is the full extent of the 
distinction between the two rules in their modern form, it is not at all clear what is to be gained 
by the application of the labels “equity” and “common law”. As a matter of substance, there is, 
on this view, a single jurisdiction to relieve against penalties, which is not subject to any breach 
limitation. Indeed, the description of the doctrine as “equitable” when invoked in respect of a 
stipulation triggered by an event other than breach of contract seems, on this view, to have no 
substantive implications whatsoever. If this is the case, there seems little to be lost in dispensing 
with historical labels altogether in this setting. 
    If, on the other hand, the rules are also distinct in that the consequence of a stipulation being 
penal at common law is that the provision is void, whereas in equity such a provision is 
enforced pro tanto, then a number of real difficulties arise as to the interaction between the two 
rules. The difficulty, put simply, is that the scope of the equitable rule seems to encompass all 
that is covered by the common law rule, since a stipulation triggered by breach of contract must 
necessarily be accessory or collateral to a primary stipulation in the sense set out in Andrews. 
                                                      
45 Andrew Burrows, ‘We Do This at Common Law but That in Equity’ (2002) 22 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1, 6 – 7. Tiverios also draws upon Burrows in concluding that the embrace of a unified penalty rule is 
warranted. See: Nicholas Tiverios ‘A Restatement of Relief Against Contractual Penalties (II): A Framework 
for Applying the Australian and English Approaches’ (2017) 11 Journal of Equity 185, fn 173. 
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On this latter view, it is not immediately obvious how the two jurisdictions are to operate 
coherently. Indeed, the difficulties which can arise when rules of common law and rules of 
equity cover overlapping terrain, yet yield different results in their application, are well 
known.46 It seems that, insofar as the authorities recognise the existence of two jurisdictions to 
relieve against penalties, they also suggest that the equitable jurisdiction has no role to play 
where the common law rule is engaged.47 If Australian law is to recognise two jurisdictions to 
relieve against penalties, it does seem that this is the best explanation for how the two 
jurisdictions are to operate side-by-side. Yet at the same time, such an approach involves the 
recognition of two jurisdictions which, while occupying the same sphere, differ in ways which 
defy normative justification. The undesirability of such a state of affairs suggests there is a 
strong case for judicial consolidation of the two rules. If the rules were to be consolidated in 
Australia, it seems any unified rule must necessarily see a penal stipulation enforced pro tanto. 
Where a penal provision is rendered void in a case involving an underlying breach, the innocent 
party is relegated to his or her right to common law damages. If a penal stipulation were 
rendered void in a non-breach case, however, the innocent party would have no entitlement to 
compensation whatsoever. 
    To be clear, the embrace of a unified penalty rule need not involve an acceptance of the view 
that the rule is solely one of common law. Indeed, Peter Turner has recently suggested that the 
long-accepted notion that the courts of common law came to exercise a jurisdiction in respect 
of penalties analogous to that exercised in the Chancery is in truth a misapprehension, and that 
no such jurisdiction developed at common law prior to the intervention of statute.48 This 
historical analysis might well be accepted as correct. For present purposes, however, it is beside 
the point to focus on the question of whether the jurisdiction to relieve against penalties is 
traceable to either or both of the courts of common law or the Chancery. The question is instead 
that of how the doctrine ought to be understood today so as to operate rationally and coherently. 
 
 
                                                      
46 An analogy might be made with the difficulties occasioned by the approaches taken in equity and at common 
law to relief in respect of a common mistake. These difficulties were part of the reason for the rejection of the 
equitable jurisdiction in English law by the Court of Appeal. See: Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris 
(International) Ltd [2003] QB 679. The position in Australia is less clear. See: Warren Swain, ‘Common 
Mistake in Equity: Some Unanswered Questions’ (2015) 40 Australian Bar Review 124. 
47 See, eg, the passage of Gageler J in Paciocco set out above. 
48 P G Turner, ‘Lex Sequitur Equitatem: Fusion and the Penalty Doctrine’ in John C P Goldberg, Henry E Smith 
and P G Turner (eds) Equity and Law: Fusion and Fission (Cambridge University Press, 2018) (forthcoming). Cf 
John Biancalana, ‘Contractual Penalties in the King’s Court 1260-1360’ [2005] Cambridge Law Journal 212. 
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PENALTIES IN THE REAL WORLD 
A less technical (though equally important) question which arises in the wake of recent 
developments is that of how the rule is now operating “on the ground” in both Australia and 
England. Though the effects of recent developments are yet to be fully appreciated, it is 
nonetheless possible to make a number of tentative observations in this respect. 
    Given recent developments in Australia have enlarged the penalty rule’s scope while at the 
same time raising the bar for those seeking to demonstrate that an impugned provision is penal, 
it is not obvious whether, on balance, the rule has been left with greater or lesser practical 
force.49 Even so, a consideration of a number of cases decided in the wake of Paciocco suggests 
that though courts are citing and relying upon the “interests test”, it is doubtful whether the 
new law is being applied in such a way as to yield outcomes different from those which would 
have followed upon an application of the orthodox tests.50 Equally, it is not clear whether 
Andrews has led to a significant enlargement of the scope of the penalty rule in practice – 
indeed, it is difficult to point to successful challenges to stipulations triggered by events other 
than breach of contract.51 
    The position seems similar in England. Though litigants still seek to invoke the penalty rule 
with some regularity,52 it is difficult to point to a clear example of a case in which the 
application of the “interests test” led to an outcome different from that which would have 
followed upon an orthodox application of the Dunlop tests.53 It may well be that the impact of 
Cavendish has been less marked than expected.  
    These observations are necessarily tentative. Indeed, engaging in a rigorous examination of 
how the penalty rule is operating in practice is not wholly straightforward. The best means of 
gauging how the rule is operating in practice is to engage in a thorough and rigorous 
examination of the first-instance authorities in both Australia and England. There are a number 
                                                      
49 This point was acknowledged by Sackville AJA in Arab Bank Australia Ltd v Sayde Developments Pty Ltd 
[2016] NSWCA 328 at [10]. 
50 See, eg: Melbourne Linh Son Buddhist Society v Gippsreal [2017] VSCA 161. 
51 Though see, eg: Cedar Meats (Aust) Pty Ltd Five Star Lamb Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 32. 
52 See, eg: Wright & Anor (Liquidators of SHB Realisations Ltd) v The Prudential Assurance Company Ltd 
[2018] Bus LR 1173; Holyoake & Anor v Candy & Ors [2017] EWHC 3397 (Ch); Zccm Investments Holdings 
Plc v Konkola Copper Mines Plc [2017] EWHC 3288 (Comm); Vivienne Westwood Ltd v Conduit Street 
Development Ltd [2017] EWHC 350 (Ch). 
53 For a possible example of where a different conclusion might have been arrived at upon an application of the 
‘old’ law, see: Signia Wealth Ltd v Vector Trustees Ltd & Ors [2018] EWHC 1040. It is important to note that 
the Court’s observations on this point were obiter, the stipulation in question having been held to have been 
triggered by an event other than breach of contract. 
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of models for how such an empirical analysis might proceed.54 Though such an exercise is 
made difficult by the relatively short period of time which has passed since the relevant 
developments took place, and the consequent dearth of authority in superior courts, this 
difficulty is ameliorated to some degree by the fact that both Australian and English authority 
can be drawn upon in answering the relevant questions. There is, in sum, much which might 
be gained from such an exercise.55 
 
CONCLUSION 
Finally, something should be said as to what these developments suggest about the present state 
of contract law in both Australia and England. It is now more than six years since the Australian 
Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department issued a discussion paper which canvassed 
the possibility of codifying or otherwise substantially reforming the Australian law of 
contract.56 Though it attracted a large number of responses and a significant body of 
commentary, that reform initiative now appears to have lost momentum entirely.57 Indeed, 
there is little reason to think that any large-scale reform of the Australian law of contract is 
likely in the near term.58  
    So long as significant statutory intervention remains improbable, there is greater need than 
ever for the display of judicial leadership on the part of the High Court of Australia. Put simply, 
the Court must fill the field vacated by the legislature. Though there are, of course, inherent 
limits to the judiciary’s capacity to “reform” the law, it should be noted that many of the 
                                                      
54 See, eg: James Goudkamp and Eleni Katsampouka, ‘An Empirical Study of Punitive Damages’ (2017) 38 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 90; James Goudkamp and Donal Nolan, ‘Contributory Negligence in the Court 
of Appeal: an Empirical Study’ (2017) 37 Legal Studies 437.  
55 This exercise is currently being undertaken by the author in the course of a project funded by the Society of 
Construction Law Australia. 
56 Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Improving Australia’s Law and Justice Framework: A Discussion 
Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law (2012).   
57 For some such commentary, see, eg: Andrew Stewart, ‘What’s Wrong with the Australian Law of Contract?’ 
(2012) 29 Journal of Contract Law 74; Warren Swain ‘Codification of Contract Law: Some Lessons from 
History’ (2012) 31 University of Queensland Law Journal 39; Warren Swain, ‘Contract Codification in 
Australia: Is it Necessary, Desirable and Possible?’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 131; Martin Doris, 
‘Promising Options, Dead Ends and the Reform of Australian Contract Law’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 24; Mary 
Keyes and Therese Wilson (eds) Codifying Contract Law: International and Consumer Law Perspectives 
(Ashgate, 2014); Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, ‘Taking (Legal) Traditions Seriously, Or Why Australian Contract Law 
Should Not Be Codified: An Unconventional Inquiry’ (2015) 34 University of Queensland Law Journal 99; 
John Eldridge, ‘Contract Codification and ‘Certainty’’ (2018) 35 Journal of Contract Law (forthcoming). 
58 See the discussion in: Warren Swain, ‘’The Steaming Lungs of a Pigeon’’: Predicting the Direction of 
Australian Contract Law in the Next 25 Years’ in Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather and Ross Grantham, (eds) 
Private Law in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, 2017). 
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questions canvassed above are matters which plainly fall within the judicial province.59 
Whatever may be the merits of the recognition of a unitary penalty doctrine, for instance, it is 
clear that the question of whether such a step should be taken is a matter not only for the 
legislature, but also for the courts.60 
    These observations are at once encouraging and discouraging. On the one hand, the ructions 
in respect of the penalty rule have been one of the principal causes of uncertainty and difficulty 
in the Australian law of contract in the past decade.61 The fact that the position might well be 
clarified and simplified without the need for Parliamentary intervention is therefore cause for 
optimism. 
    On the other hand, recent years have seen no shortage of criticism of the High Court’s 
leadership in developing and clarifying the law of contract.62 A consideration of recent 
developments in respect of the penalty rule might well lead to a concern that the Court is 
disinclined to avail itself of opportunities to impose order on this important area of law. 
    This judicial reticence might be contrasted with the more adventurous spirit in evidence in 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Recent years have seen no shortage of cases in 
which the Supreme Court has evinced a clear willingness to grapple squarely with controversial 
questions and restate the law in a manner intended to provide clarity for lower courts. Though 
this tendency has not been limited to the domain of private law,63 a number of important and 
recent contract appeals nonetheless suggest themselves as clear examples.64 In sum, some 
                                                      
59 For a general discussion of law reform and the judicial function, see: Anthony Mason, ‘Law Reform and the 
Courts’ in David Weisbrot, (ed) The Promise of Law Reform (Federation Press, 2005). See further the discussion 
in: Gabrielle Golding, ‘The Role of Judges in the Regulation of Australian Employment Contracts’ (2016) 32 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law & Industrial Relations 69. 
60 A contrast might be made with other areas of the law of contract in which the High Court has been asked to 
effect change, and has demurred on the basis that the relevant question is one for the Parliament. See, eg: 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169.  
61 The other contender must undoubtedly be the question of when regard might be had to evidence of 
‘surrounding circumstances’ in construction. That controversy has been on foot for some time. See the 
discussion in: John Eldridge, ‘Cherry v Steele-Park’ (2018) 92 Australian Law Journal 249. 
62 See, eg: Stewart and J W Carter, ‘The High Court and Contract Law in the New Millennium’ (2003) 6 
Flinders Journal of Law Reform 185; Andrew Stewart, ‘What’s Wrong with the Australian Law of Contract?’ 
(2012) 29 Journal of Contract Law 74, 79 – 81; J W Carter, Wayne Courtney, Elisabeth Peden, Andrew Stewart 
and G J Tolhurst ‘Contractual Penalties: Resurrecting the Equitable Jurisdiction’ (2013) 30 Journal of Contract 
Law 99, 128 – 130; John Eldridge, ‘Lawful-Act Duress and Marital Agreements’ [2018] Cambridge Law 
Journal 32. 
63 An example outside of contract (though arising within a contract appeal) is the important decision of the 
Supreme Court reforming the law as to dishonesty in the criminal law. See: Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a 
Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67. For discussion, see: Graham Virgo, ‘Cheating and Dishonesty’ [2018] Cambridge 
Law Journal 18; John Eldridge, ‘Ivey v Genting Casinos’ (2018) 92 Australian Law Journal 27. 
64 See, eg, the recent decision in respect of ‘Wrotham Park’ damages: Morris-Garner v One Step (Support) Ltd 
[2018] UKSC 20. For discussion, see: John Eldridge, ‘Morris-Garner v One Step’ (2018) 92 Australian Law 
Journal 345. Further examples might be the decisions in Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities 
Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 and Rock Advertising 
Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd [2018] UKSC 24. 
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lawyers in the antipodes might well envy the degree to which the United Kingdom’s apex court 
has sought to clarify and simplify the law of contract, and might well think that a similarly bold 
approach is needed in Australia if the outstanding questions in respect of the penalty rule are 
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CONTRACT CODIFICATION: CAUTIONARY 




In March 2012, the Australian Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department published 
a Discussion Paper which explored the prospect of codifying or otherwise reforming the 
Australian law of contract. There is little reason to think that the codification of the 
Australian law of contract is likely to be embarked upon in the foreseeable future.  At the 
same time, recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in codification in Britain. This 
paper examines the experience of contract codification efforts in Australia with a view to 
identifying a number of cautionary lessons. It focuses on two challenges inherent in contract 




B. CONTRACT CODIFICATION IN AUSTRALIA: A SHORT HISTORY 
C. THE CONCEPTUAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSION OF CONTRACT CODIFICATION 
(1) Contract codification and contract theory 
(2) Codification and Legal Culture 




In March 2012, the Australian Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department published an 
ambitious Discussion Paper which explored the prospect of codifying or otherwise reforming 
the law of contract.1  The Discussion Paper prompted a wide range of thoughtful responses,2  
which together serve as a reminder of the potential for codification proposals to produce sharp 
divisions of opinion.3  
Despite the boldness of the 2012 Discussion Paper, there is little reason to think that the 
codification of the Australian law of contract is likely to be embarked upon in the foreseeable 
                                                      
☼ Lecturer, University of Sydney Law School; PhD Candidate, Adelaide Law School. 
1 Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Improving Australia’s Law and Justice Framework: A Discussion 
Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law, 2012.   
2 See, eg, A Stewart, “What’s Wrong with the Australian Law of Contract?” (2012) 29 JCL 74; W Swain, 
“Codification of Contract Law: Some Lessons from History” (2012) 31 UQLJ 39; W Swain, “Contract 
Codification in Australia: Is it Necessary, Desirable and Possible?” (2014) 36 Syd LR 131; M Doris, “Promising 
Options, Dead Ends and the Reform of Australian Contract Law” (2014) 34 LS 24; M Keyes and T Wilson, 
(eds) Codifying Contract Law: International and Consumer Law Perspectives, (2014); L Siliquini-Cinelli, 
“Taking (Legal) Traditions Seriously, Or Why Australian Contract Law Should Not Be Codified: An 
Unconventional Inquiry” (2015) 34 UQLJ 99. 
3 Codification has rightly been described as a ‘polemical topic’: J H Farrar, Law Reform and the Law 
Commission (1974) 57. 
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future.4 Yet at the same time, recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in codification in 
Britain.5  Despite doubt in some quarters, it may be that, with the approach of Brexit and the 
concomitant waning of British interest in pan-European law reform, contract codification 
within Britain will once more become a subject of widespread interest and debate.6  
This article cannot, and does not, seek to examine the full range of matters which arise when 
asking whether the law of contract ought to be codified.  To do so would require grappling with 
a vast range of questions, including whether codification is an effective mechanism for 
substantive reform of the law of contract, whether the domestic law of contract ought to be 
‘harmonized’ with international instruments or with other legal systems,7 and whether 
codification would promote ‘certainty’ or ‘coherence’ in the law.8  This paper also eschews 
engagement with more general questions, such as why contract codification has been taken up 
with enthusiasm in some jurisdictions while having been met with a lukewarm reception 
elsewhere.9 
A comprehensive examination of these issues must await another day.10  This article has 
instead a more modest object.  It seeks to examine contract codification efforts in Australia in 
order to highlight a number of cautionary lessons for would-be codifiers of the law of contract.  
                                                      
4 See the discussion in: W Swain, “‘The Steaming Lungs of a Pigeon’: Predicting the Direction of Australian 
Contract Law in the Next 25 Years” in K Barker, K Fairweather and R Grantham (eds), Private Law in the 21st 
Century (2017).  
5 See, eg: A Tettenborn “Codifying Contracts – An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” (2014) 67 CLP 273; M A 
Hogg, “Codification of Private Law: Scots Law at the Crossroads of Common and Civil Law” in K Barker, K 
Fairweather and R Grantham (eds), Private Law in the 21st Century (2017); J A Bargenda and S W Stark, “The 
Legal Holy Grail? German Lessons on Codification for a Fragmented Britain” (2018) 22 EdinLR 183. 
6 For doubt as to the prospects of contract codification in England, see, eg: R Brownsword, “After Brexit: 
Regulatory-Instrumentalism, Coherentism and the English Law of Contract” (2017) 34 JCL 139, 148. 
7 For an exploration of this question in respect of Australia, see: D Robertson, “The International Harmonisation 
of Australian Contract Law” (2012) 29 JCL 1.  
8 For a detailed examination of codification’s potential to promote ‘certainty’ in the law of contract, see: J 
Eldridge, “Contract Codification and ‘Certainty’” (2018) 35 JCL (forthcoming).  For a recent general discussion 
of the notion of ‘coherence’ in Australian private law, see: A Fell, “The Concept of Coherence in Australian 
Private Law” (2018) 41 MULR 1160. 
9 The success of the Indian Contract Act 1872, for instance, can only be understood once due regard is had to 
the broader historical context surrounding its enactment.  For a discussion of the history of this code, see: S 
Tofaris, A Historical Study in the Indian Contract Act 1872 (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011). For a 
contemporaneous discussion of the Act, see: C Ilbert, “Indian Codification” (1889) 5 LQR 347.  Equally, an 
examination of the history of pan-European contract codification throws up a number of themes and concerns 
which are specific to the project of legal harmonisation across Europe.  For a discussion of European contract 
harmonisation, see: F de Elizalde, ed, Uniform Rules for European Contract Law? A Critical Assessment, 
(2018); L Miller, The Emergence of EU Contract Law: Exploring Europeanization, (2012); S Vogenauer and S 
Weatherill, (eds) The Harmonisation of European Contract Law: Implications for European Private Laws, 
Business and Legal Practice, (2006). 
10 For a seminal overview of the arguments for and against contract codification, see: A Diamond, “Codification 
of the Law of Contract” (1968) 31 MLR 361.  For a more sceptical, though similarly wide-ranging analysis, see: 
H R Hahlo “Here Lies the Common Law: Rest in Peace” (1967) 30 MLR 241. For a wide-ranging examination 
of the prospects of contract codification in Australia, see: W Swain, “Contract Codification in Australia: Is it 
Necessary, Desirable and Possible?” (2014) 36 Syd LR 131. 
 96 
The paper proceeds in three parts. It first gives an overview of the history of contract 
codification in Australia. Against this backdrop, it then proceeds to identify and examine two 
challenges inherent in contract codification which have been given too little attention by the 
proponents of reform in Australia.11 
The first species of difficulty arises from the conceptual and cultural dimensions of 
codification.  As will be seen, building support for a contract code is made especially 
challenging by the continued lack of agreement as to contract law’s proper purpose.  Even in 
the wake of decades of academic debate as to the objects and nature of the law of contract, 
consensus remains elusive. After offering a very brief overview of the nature and extent of the 
continuing controversy, it will be shown that these unresolved theoretical questions have real 
ramifications for the way in which the codification process ought to be carried out, and the 
nature and content of any code. Indeed, as will be seen, the 2012 Discussion Paper issued by 
the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department is a clear example of a reform proposal 
which fails to negotiate a clear path through competing conceptions of contract’s purpose. If 
contract codification is to stand a real chance of being achieved in Australia, far more must be 
done on the part of its proponents to engage with the ongoing conceptual debates which 
continue to produce widespread division. 
In addition to this conceptual challenge, the successful implementation of a contract code is 
often made difficult by the lack of enthusiasm typically evinced for codifying instruments on 
the part of practitioners and judges. As will be seen, much has been written in respect of 
common lawyers’ tendency to view statute as an extraneous incursion upon the common law. 
Comparatively little, however, has been said about the degree to which codes are susceptible 
to being undermined by judicial and professional resistance. It is suggested that the proponents 
of codification ought to do far more to engage with stakeholders in the judiciary and the 
profession.12  
Having charted these conceptual and cultural matters, the paper then moves on to an 
examination of the second type of difficulty, which is that encountered in seeking to identify a 
core body of rules and principles which together constitute ‘contract law’.  Any contract code 
must grapple not only with contract’s intersection with other bodies of law, but with the 
                                                      
11 In doing so, this paper joins a large body of writings which chart the challenges and hurdles inherent in 
codification. For other discussions in which this task is taken up, see: B Donald, “Codification in Common Law 
Systems” (1973) 47 ALJ 160, 172-173; H R Hahlo, “Codifying the Common Law: Protracted Gestation” (1975) 
38 MLR 23; A E Anton, “Obstacles to Codification” (1982) 15 JurRev 15; M Clarke, “Doubts from the Dark 
Side — the Case against Codes” [2001] JBL 605; Diamond (n 10). 
12 Would-be reformers must also, of course, attract the support of the political class and the broader public if 
reforms are to be successfully enacted.  
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divisions and fault lines internal to the law of contract. As will be seen, proponents of 
codification in Australia have too often sought to treat the law of contract as a monolithic and 
internally homogenous legal structure. In consequence of this, codification proposals have 
tended to elide important distinctions within the law of contract, and to pay too little attention 
to the important question of how any contract code will interact with other spheres of law with 
which the law of contract overlaps. It will be suggested that until an appropriate degree of 
sophistication is brought to the challenges posed in this area, contract codification is unlikely 
to proceed successfully. 
 
 
B. CONTRACT CODIFICATION IN AUSTRALIA: A SHORT HISTORY 
 
Though perhaps somewhat surprising in light of Australia’s colonial history, codification 
proposals have played a relatively minor part in the development of Australian private law.13 
Indeed, though Sir Samuel Griffith’s criminal code has had a lasting legacy,14 and British 
exercises in codification in such fields as the sale of goods and bills of exchange have been 
adopted in Australia without demur,15 there has been relatively little impetus within Australia 
for codification of the common law.16 Though the general lack of interest in codification in 
Australia is somewhat difficult to explain, it does make the task of surveying the relevant reform 
proposals relatively straightforward.17  
Before turning to a consideration of those proposals, however, something must be said by 
way of definition of the terms employed here, as ‘codification’ is an expression which admits 
                                                      
13 Much has been written about the relationship between codification and the emergence of nationhood. See, eg: 
H L MacQueen, “Private Law’s Revolutionaries: Authors, Codifiers and Merchants?” in S Worthington, A 
Robertson and G Virgo (eds), Revolution and Evolution in Private Law, (2018), 41-43; R Zimmermann, 
“Codification: History and Present Significance of an Idea” (1995) 1 ERPL 95.  
14 For a discussion of Griffith’s code and its legacy, see: G Mackenzie, “An Enduring Influence: Sir Samuel 
Griffith and his Contribution to Criminal Justice in Queensland” (2002) 2 Queensland University of Technology 
Law and Justice Journal 53. Griffith’s work as a codifier was not limited to the criminal law. See, eg: 
Defamation Act 1889 (Qld). 
15 For a discussion of the English legislation which was eventually adopted in much of the Commonwealth, see: 
A Rodger, “The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain” (1992) 108 LQR 570. 
16 There are, of course, important exceptions, the Uniform Evidence Law being perhaps the most significant. 
(Though as to whether the Uniform Evidence Law can properly be termed a code of the law of evidence, see: 
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588, 631-632). 
17 For general discussions which may shed light on the question of why codification has generally failed to 
command widespread interest in Australia, see: M Tilbury, “A History of Law Reform in Australia” in B 
Opeskin and D Weisbrot (eds), The Promise of Law Reform, (2005); J M Bennett, “Historical Trends in 
Australian Law Reform: (1970) 9 UWA L Rev 211. 
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of a range of understandings.18 At least for present purposes, it is possible to adopt the 
definition proffered by Catherine Skinner, who has suggested that a code, at least in a common 
law system, should be understood to be:19 
 
[A]n instrument enacted by the legislature which forms the principal source of law on a 
particular topic.  It aims to codify all leading rules derived from both judge-made and 
statutory law in a particular field.  And codification is the process of drafting and enacting 
such an instrument.  A code by this definition is distinct from an ordinary statute because it 
is designed to be a comprehensive and coherent presentation of the law. Thus it has an 
organising and indexing role that an ordinary statute does not share. 
 
To this it is necessary to add only two further points. The first is that, at least for the purposes 
of the present discussion, ‘codification’ should not be understood as being limited to an 
instrument that seeks simply to restate the common law in a statutory form. It encompasses 
also those reforms which seek to both restate and reform the law.20 Indeed, it is doubtful 
whether a clear line can even be drawn between those codes which seek to reform the law and 
those which purport merely to restate it. An instrument which seeks merely to restate the law 
can prompt debate and discussion which in turn leads to substantive reform.21 Moreover, at 
least where the content and scope of a legal rule is the subject of disagreement and debate, any 
restatement must necessarily make a choice as to the which of the competing views ought to 
be preferred. Insofar as the making of such a choice might precipitate a resolution of the 
relevant debate, the process of restating the law is inextricably tied up with its reform.22  
The second point to be made is that codes, in a common law system, are typically construed 
in a manner consonant with their intended character as the principal statements of the law on 
their subject. The seminal statement of the proper approach to the construction of a code can 
be found in the speech of Lord Herschell in Bank of England v Vagliano Brothers:23 
                                                      
18 See the discussions in: E Caldwell, “A Vision of Tidiness: Codes, Consolidations, and Statute Law Revision” 
in Opeskin & Weisbrot (n 22); G L Gretton, “The Duty to Make the Law More Accessible? The Two C-Words” 
in D M J Lee, S Wilson-Stark (eds), Fifty Years of the Law Commissions: The Dynamics of Law Reform (2016) 
93. For a recent overview of different understandings of ‘codification’, see: S Wilson Stark, The Work of the 
British Law Commissions: Law Reform … Now?, (2017), 157-159. 
19 C Skinner, “Codification and the Common Law” (2009) 11 EJLR 225, 228.   
20 Indeed, several of the reform proposals discussed below fall squarely within this category. 
21 For an assessment of the impact of the recent restatement of the English law of unjust enrichment, see: K 
Barker, “Centripetal Force: The Law of Unjust Enrichment Restated in England and Wales” (2014) 34 OJLS 
155. For the restatement itself, see: A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (2012). 
22 A clear example of an ongoing debate of this type in the Australian law of contract is that as to the 
circumstances in which recourse may be had to evidence of ‘surrounding circumstances’ as an aid to 
construction. The authorities on this point are now in a hopeless state of confusion. For a recent overview of the 
debate, see: J Eldridge, “Cherry v Steele-Park” (2018) 92 ALJ 249. 
23 [1891] AC 107, 144. Of course, disputes often arise as to whether, when construing a provision of a code, it is 
legitimate to have recourse to concepts and rules which precede its enactment. See, eg, the discussion in: 
Gamer's Motor Centre (Newcastle) Pty Ltd v Natwest Wholesale Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 236; 
Brennan v The King (1936) 55 CLR 253, 263. 
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I think the proper course is in the first instance to examine the language of the statute and to 
ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any considerations derived from the previous 
state of the law, and not to start with inquiring how the law previously stood, and then, 
assuming that it was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the words of the 
enactment will bear an interpretation in conformity with this view. 
 
Armed with these definitions, it is possible to turn to a consideration of the principal 
Australian contract codification proposals. The first such proposal is the ill-fated code drawn 
up by William Edward Hearn, the inaugural Dean of Law in the University of Melbourne. 24 
Michael Tilbury has explained:25 
 
[Hearn] sought no less than the codification of the main body of the general law of Victoria 
in a Bill, ‘The General Code 1885’, which he presented to the [Legislative] Council in 1885, 
the result of his academic work, particularly on the classifications of law. Notwithstanding a 
favourable report from a Joint Committee of both Houses, the Victorian Parliament 
succumbed to opposition from the legal profession and, after Hearn’s death, failed to enact 
‘Australia’s most interesting experiment in applied jurisprudence’. 
 
The fate of Hearn’s code perhaps acted to deter other would-be codifiers, at least in respect 
of the law of contract. Despite sporadic suggestions for reform,26 and in spite of the brief period 
of enthusiasm for contract codification in Britain in the wake of the establishment of the Law 
Commission and Scottish Law Commission,27 it was not until the 1990s that another serious 
Australian contract codification proposal was put forward. 
That proposal was advanced by Fred Ellinghaus and Ted Wright, who together have been 
key figures in the debate respecting contract codification in Australia. Ellinghaus and Wright’s 
first major contribution to the debate in respect of contract codification in Australia was the 
drafting of the Australian Contract Code, a compact code of the law of contract prepared on 
behalf of the Law Reform Commission of Victoria.28 Given its originality and significance, it 
is worth considering the Australian Contract Code in some detail.  
                                                      
24 For further discussion of Hearn’s code and its fate, see: A Castles, An Australian Legal History, (1982) 480-
485. 
25 Tilbury (n 17) at 7 (footnotes omitted). The concluding quotation is drawn from Bennett (n 17) at 216. 
26 See, eg: J G Starke, “A Restatement of the Australian Law of Contract as a First Step Towards an Australian 
Uniform Contract Code” (1978) 49 ALJ 234; D Svantesson, “Codifying Australia’s Contract Law — Time for a 
Stocktake in the Common Law Factory” (2008) 20 Bond LR 1. 
27 Though a British contract code never came to fruition, a complete draft was prepared by the late Harvey 
McGregor QC, and was later published. See: H McGregor, Contract Code: Drawn Up on Behalf of the English 
Law Commission, (1993). The proposal’s fate was partly a consequence of disagreements between the Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.  For further discussion, see: F M B Reynolds, “Contract: 
Codification, Legislation and Judicial Development” (1995) 9 JCL 11, 13-17; S Waddams, “Codification, Law 
Reform and Judicial Development” (1996) 9 JCL 192. 
28 See: Law Reform Commission of Victoria, An Australian Contract Code, Discussion Paper No 27, 1992. 
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The Australian Contract Code is distinctive in many respects.  Comprised of only twenty-
seven articles, it is by far the shortest code of the common law of contract yet to be proposed.29 
The Code is also unusual insofar as it favours discretion at the expense of fixed rules. The 





A person may not assert a right or deny an obligation to the extent that it would be 
unconscionable to do so. 
 
This zeal for discretion is a feature of much of Ellinghaus and Wright’s work in respect of 
contract codification. Indeed, as will be discussed further below, the authors later undertook 
empirical research which concluded that, notwithstanding this broad discretion, the Australian 
Contract Code, when applied, yielded results which were no less predictable than those of the 
common law.31 
No less unusual is the fact that the Australian Contract Code sought to dispense with the 
doctrine of precedent. The Code provides:32 
 
Article 3 
Neither past nor future decisions govern the application of the Code. 
 
Plainly, then, the Australian Contract Code was a novel and bold reform proposal. Even so, 
the Code struggled to find favour either with the legislature or the profession. Now, decades 
after its publication, it seems distinctly improbable that the Code will ever be adopted in 
Australia. In reflecting on why this is so, two points immediately suggest themselves. 
First, the highly discretionary approach which the Code sanctions is at odds with much 
received wisdom as to how contractual disputes ought to be resolved. Indeed, it seems precisely 
the type of approach which Lord Radcliffe had in mind when cautioning that “‘unconscionable’ 
must not be taken to be a panacea for adjusting any contract between competent parties when 
it shows a rough edge to one side or the other”.33 It is perhaps unsurprising that such a radical 
departure from orthodoxy attracted few supporters. 
                                                      
29 By way of contrast, Harvey McGregor’s code contained 673 clauses. See: McGregor, (n 27). Indeed, the 
brevity of the Australian Contract Code makes it an extreme outlier when compared with other like instruments 
See the discussion in: Swain (n 10) at 145. 
30 Law Reform Commission of Victoria (n 28) at 17. 
31 See: M P Ellinghaus, E W Wright and M Karras, Models of Contract Law: An Empirical Evaluation of their 
Utility, (2005).  See also: M P Ellinghaus and E W Wright, “The Common Law of Contracts: are Broad 
Principles better than Detailed Rules? An Empirical Investigation” (2005) 11 TexWesleyan LRev 399. 
32 Law Reform Commission of Victoria (n 28). 
33 Campbell Discount Co Limited v Bridge [1962] AC 600, 626. This point is also made in: Eldridge (n 8). 
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Second, some considerable doubt attends the persuasiveness of the empirical studies which 
the Code’s authors later relied upon in its support. In order to test the relative utility of several 
‘models’ of contract law, including both the common law as it then stood and the Australian 
Contract Code, a series of experiments was carried out involving 1800 Australian university 
students. As the authors explained, the study:34   
 
[A]dopted a conception of utility which reflects the demands which are in fact most often 
made of legal systems by lawyers and non-lawyers alike.  These are that the law should be: 
• certain (predictable outcomes) 
• just (fair outcomes) 
• accessible (clear language and logic) 
• efficient (easy to comprehend and apply)  
 
The authors described their experiments as follows:35 
 
In the first experiment, law students enrolled in Contract Law were given the facts of a 
dispute and a statement of the relevant law, drawn from one of the three models, and asked 
to decide the dispute.  They were asked to record their decision (for plaintiff or defendant), 
along with the time at which it was reached.  They were also asked to supply a brief statement 
of their reasons indicating how they applied the law.  A maximum of 80 minutes was allowed 
to complete these tasks.  After this time the students were asked to rank their level of 
agreement with a number of propositions relating to the utility of the law model (the Likert 
technique).  They were given 10 minutes for this task … Experiment 2 was a replication of 
Experiment 1 with one difference, namely the student judges worked in pairs … In 
Experiment 3, university students not enrolled in law were asked to read a statement of the 
facts of a dispute and a judgment deciding the dispute, using one of the law models.  They 
were also asked to complete a questionnaire by responding to a number of propositions about 
the judgment, again using the Likert technique.  Then they were asked to re-familiarise 
themselves with the facts, read a second judgment in favour of the other party, based on the 
same or a different law model, and complete an identical questionnaire.  They had a 
maximum of one hour to complete these tasks. 
 
Though subjecting the Australian Contract Code to empirical analysis was sound in 
principle,36 it is highly doubtful whether this experimental design adequately emulates real-
world conditions.37 Indeed, the experiment, in employing university students as its test subjects, 
raises more questions than it answers. What results, for instance, might the experiment have 
yielded had professional judges been employed as participants? How, if at all, might the results 
have varied had the participants been given more time to arrive at their determinations? Though 
                                                      
34 Ellinghaus et al, Models (n 31) at 25-26. 
35 Ibid 27-28. 
36 It is worth noting that empirical studies of this type were, not long ago, almost unheard of in law reform. For a 
very strong criticism of mid-twentieth century English law reform, for instance, see: P S Atiyah, “Law Reform 
Committee: Twelfth Report” (1966) 29 MLR 541, 545 (‘The moral of this Report is that we are unlikely ever to 
have really satisfactory law reform in this country until those responsible for it see that the basic research is 
undertaken on which sensible proposals can be formulated.’) 
37 The authors’ assumptions and experimental design have been the subject of criticism and scepticism 
elsewhere. For further discussion, see: N Thompson, “Book Reviews” (2006) 27 QL 80, 82-83; Swain (n 10) at 
149. 
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of undoubted interest, there is good reason to question the extent to which the authors’ 
experiments buttressed the case for the code’s adoption.38 
It may be that the failure of the Australian Contract Code to gain traction was instrumental 
in its authors’ later embrace of a more conventional approach. In response to the 2012 
Discussion Paper, Ellinghaus and Wright (along with David Kelly), drafted what is the second 
major reform proposal which merits mentioning here. The Australian Law of Contract, which 
is comprised of 109 articles, eschews the more radical features of the Australian Contract Code, 
opting instead simply to take as its core the current Australian law of contract and then modify 
and ‘modernise’ the law in a range of ways.39 Like the Australian Contract Code, it seeks to 
dispense with strict rules of precedent in its construction and application.40 
The Australian Law of Contract, like the Australian Contract Code, has failed to gain 
traction. Given its more modest ambitions, the explanation for its fortunes is not immediately 
apparent. The question of why this more conventional code has fared relatively poorly will be 
explored further below. 
The third reform initiative which merits mention here is, of course, the 2012 Discussion 
Paper itself. Though it would be quite wrong to call the Paper a ‘codification proposal’, there 
can be no doubt that codification figured prominently in the responses which the Paper 
elicited.41 
Despite the broad-ranging content of the Discussion Paper – the content of which will be 
discussed in more detail below – and the significant response it attracted, the initiative appears 
to have stalled, if not wholly collapsed. Indeed, the publication of the Discussion Paper was 
followed by only limited further activity on the part of the Attorney General’s Department, and 
the initiative as a whole appears no longer to be a priority. 
In sum, then, contract codification has fared poorly in Australia. Before turning to a detailed 
consideration of the key hurdles which have stood in the way of such a reform, it is worth 
dispensing briefly with a constitutional difficulty which, at first glance, might seem to supply 
the answer to the question of why an Australian contract code has yet to come to fruition.   
There can be no doubt that the enactment of a national contract code is particularly 
challenging in Australia in consequence of the constitutional constraints within which any 
                                                      
38 The authors contended that the experiments sufficiently emulated real-world results so as to yield useful 
findings.  See: Ellinghaus et al, Models (n 31) at 32-33. 
39 See: M P Ellinghaus, D StL Kelly and E W Wright, “A Draft Australian Law of Contract” Working Paper No 
03-03-14, Newcastle Law School. Perhaps the most radical provision in the Australian Law of Contract is its 
abolition, in Article 13, of the requirement of consideration. 
40 The relevant Articles are 1-4. 
41 See, for instance, the works cited in fn 2. 
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reform must be implemented. Though the Commonwealth enjoys some limited power to make 
laws in respect of certain species of contract,42 and is competent to make laws for the 
facilitation of some modes of contracting,43 the Commonwealth lacks any general power to 
make laws in respect of the negotiation, conclusion or performance of contracts.44 If a national 
contract code were to be adopted, it would consequently be necessary to obtain the cooperation 
of the States in securing its implementation. Though views might reasonably differ as to the 
precise manner in which that result might be achieved, there are nonetheless a number of 
models to which reference might be had.45 As these models have proven to be workable, there 
seems little reason to think that constitutional concerns peculiar to Australia have played a 
significant role in dampening enthusiasm for an antipodean contract code.46  
 
 
C. THE CONCEPTUAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSION OF CONTRACT 
CODIFICATION 
 
(1) Contract codification and contract theory 
 
The conceptual dimension of the contract codification debate has received relatively little 
attention.47 This is in many ways quite surprising. If a reform proposal of this kind is to be 
successfully executed, it is plainly important for those driving the process to have a clear notion 
of what a ‘successful’ reform would entail. Arriving at an agreed conception of ‘success’ in 
this setting in turn calls for agreement as to what function contract law is intended to serve. 
Such agreement is hardly forthcoming. Notwithstanding decades of heated debate, a number 
of intersecting, ongoing, and long-lived arguments as to the nature and role of contract law 
                                                      
42 An example can be seen in contracts of insurance.  In the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), the 
Commonwealth has enacted a comprehensive statutory regime in respect of insurance contracts, further 
discussion of which can be seen below. 
43 See, eg, Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth). 
44 The same point has been made elsewhere.  See, eg: Swain (n 10) at 136. Though it would be possible in 
principle for a power in respect of contracts and contracting to be adopted via referendum, there is little 
likelihood of such a reform being attempted. Even if attempted, its success is by no means assured. For a history 
of the referendum in Australia, and an analysis of why proposals to amend the Constitution have so often failed, 
see: G Williams and D Hume, People Power: The History and Future of the Referendum in Australia (2010). 
45 The key example is that of the Australian Consumer Law, which is applied as a law of the Commonwealth to 
the extent of the Commonwealth’s legislative competency, and is also applied as a law of each state. In applying 
a contract code as a law of the Commonwealth, the corporations power would likely be of particular 
significance insofar as commercial contracting is concerned. For an overview of the expansive modern approach 
to the interpretation of the corporations power, see: J Stellios, Zines’s The High Court and the Constitution 
(2015) ch 5. 
46 Of course, the substance of the Australian Consumer Law has been the subject of criticism. See, eg: J W 
Carter, “The Commercial Side of Australian Consumer Protection Law” (2010) 26 JCL 221. 
47 Though some commentators have approached the debate on a conceptual footing. See, eg: Siliquini-Cinelli (n 
2). 
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remain unresolved.48  These debates run along multiple axes.  On one hand is the well-known 
tension between the notion of ‘freedom of contract’ and the countervailing pressure to 
intervene in parties’ bargains in the interest of fairness.49  On the other are more fundamental 
debates as to the proper normative justifications for the enforcement of contractual 
obligations.50 Further still – and of somewhat greater significance for the debate in respect of 
codification – is the ongoing clash between what can be termed ‘contextual’ and ‘formal’ 
approaches to contract law and contract adjudication.51  Though there are some who have 
suggested that the labels can sometimes obscure rather than illuminate,52 there remains on any 
view a significant divergence of approach which divides academics, practitioners and judges.53 
This disagreement has posed a formidable hurdle to any successful codification of the 
Australian law of contract. This is largely in consequence of the degree to which reform 
proposals have failed to grapple with the debates in this sphere. Indeed, Ellinghaus and 
Wright’s Australian Contract Code seeks, in substance, to deftly side-step at least one of the 
conceptual debates insofar as its authors contended that flexible, discretionary standards – 
which are generally thought to be more capable of ensuring fair outcomes in particular cases – 
produce outcomes which are no less certain than clear, fixed rules.54 If this premise is not 
accepted, one might well view the Australian Contract Code to be one which opts very strongly 
in favour of discretion at the expense of certainty. Though such a normative choice is plainly 
a contentious one, the authors of the Code do not seek to make a detailed case for why striking 
a balance between fairness and certainty in this way is warranted. 
                                                      
48 For surveys of the relevant debates, see: S A Smith, Contract Theory (2004); J Morgan, Great Debates in 
Contract Law (2015). 
49 For the classic treatment of the history of this debate, see: P S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of 
Contract (1979).  For a recent suggestion that this framework is in some respects unhelpful, see: C Willett, “Re-
Theorising Consumer Law” [2018] CLJ 179. 
50 See, eg: J Gava, “Can Contract Law be Justified on Economic Grounds?” (2006) 25 UQLJ 253; C Fried, 
Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (1981); Lord Steyn, “Fulfilling the Reasonable 
Expectations of Honest Men” (1997) 113 LQR 438. 
51 For an introduction to this debate, see: Morgan, (n 48) at 70-91.  For examples of seminal contributions from 
contextualist and formalist perspectives, see, respectively: H Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999); J Morgan, 
Contract Law Minimalism: A Formalist Restatement of Commercial Contract Law (2013). 
52 See, eg: Z X Tan “Beyond the Real and the Paper Deal: The Quest for Contextual Coherence in Contractual 
Interpretation” (2016) 79 MLR 623, 623 (“Contract lawyers are often divided between two schools of thought: 
formalism and contextualism. In the realm of contractual interpretation, this division illuminates various debates 
surrounding the modern contextual approach. Ultimately, however, the divide between the ‘real and the paper 
deal’ does not fully reflect the relevant fault lines. The real contest is between rival interpretations attempting to 
make the most coherent sense of the available text and context surrounding the document.”) 
53 See the discussion in: J Gava, “How Should Judges Decide Commercial Contract Cases?” (2013) 30 JCL 133. 
54 See the discussion above. 
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Similar difficulties beset the 2012 Discussion Paper, which opens with the identification of 
eight questions upon which comment is sought. These are:55 
 
1. What are the main problems experienced by users of Australian contract law? 
Which drivers of reform are the most important for contract law? 
Are there any other drivers of reform that should be considered? 
 
2. What costs, difficulties, inefficiencies or lost opportunities do businesses 
experience as a result of the domestic operation of Australian contract law? 
 
3. How can Australian contract law better meet the emerging needs of the digital 
economy? In what circumstances should online terms and conditions be given 
effect? 
 
4. To what extent do businesses experience costs, difficulties, inefficiencies or lost 
opportunities as a result of differences between Australian and foreign contract 
law? 
 
5. What are the costs and benefits of internationalising Australian contract law? 
 
6. Which reform options (restatement, simplification or substantial reform of 
contract law) would be preferable? What benefits and costs would result from 
each? 
 
7. How should any reform of contract law be implemented? 
 
8. What next steps should be conducted? Who should be involved? 
 
The paper then proceeds to expand upon the considerations adverted to in these questions.  
Most importantly, the paper instances what are suggested to be the principal ‘drivers of reform’ 
in the domain of contract law. These are drawn in part from the principles articulated in the 
2009 Strategic Framework for Access to Justice,56 and are said to be:57 
• Accessibility 
• Certainty 
• Simplification and removal of technicality 
• Setting acceptable standards of conduct58 
• Supporting innovation 
• Maximising participation in the digital economy 
• Suitability for small and medium sized-business 
• Elasticity59 
                                                      
55 Attorney-General’s Department (Cth) (n 1) at iii. 
56 Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil 
Justice System, 2009. 
57 This is an abridged form of the factors which are set out in the Discussion Paper. See: Attorney-General’s 
Department (Cth) (n 1) at 3-6. 
58 The Discussion Paper explicitly cites the need, in this connection, for acknowledgement of Australia’s 
cultural diversity.  As the Discussion Paper explains: ‘Standards of acceptable conduct should be unambiguous, 
simple to understand and take particular account of the needs of people from different cultural backgrounds or 
experiencing disparate circumstances. Australia’s cultural diversity demands that our contract law should be 
readily translatable into other languages to facilitate domestic and international trade and improve general public 
awareness of the law.’ See: Attorney-General’s Department (Cth) (n 1) at 4. 
59 The paper suggests that ‘elasticity … may help support relational contracts; that is, long-term contracts which 





The difficulty here is of a different kind to that evident in Ellinghaus and Wright’s proposal. 
Rather than cleaving to a particular conception of the purpose and role of contract, or adopting 
a clear stance in respect of the various debates canvassed above, the 2012 Discussion Paper is 
characterised by its failure to adopt a coherent stance in respect of underlying normative 
questions. So much is made clear by the fact that the paper fails to indicate how the competing 
‘drivers of reform’ might be reconciled where they are in tension with one another. This tension 
is, as is no doubt plain, quite real. There is, for instance, some considerable difficulty in 
reconciling the imperative to make the law of contract ‘certain’ with the imperative to ensure 
contract law “take[s] particular account of the needs of people from different cultural 
backgrounds or experiencing disparate circumstances”.61  
Of course, one answer to this criticism of the Discussion Paper is that it was only ever 
intended to be the first step in a long process of law reform, and that the task of arriving at a 
normative stance of the type under discussion here is one which properly ought to be 
undertaken at a later stage. Indeed, it might well be thought that any proper contract reform 
process ought at first to leave these fundamental questions open, with a view to permitting 
debate and discussion. A law reform project, however, is not an exercise in legal philosophy. 
In failing to take at least a preliminary stance at the outset on contentious questions of this type, 
there is a risk that the reform process as a whole will simply become an arena for the re-
agitation of these long-running conceptual debates, with the result that the taking of practical 
steps is stalled.62  
These observations ought to give the proponents of codification pause for thought. Even so, 
some care must be taken not to overstate the difficulties under discussion here. It is certainly 
not suggested that contract is beset by theoretical debate to a significantly greater extent than 
other areas of private law.63 Nor is it suggested that the mere existence of theoretical disputation 
                                                      
between the parties over a significant period of time. The use of flexible, gap-filling concepts like good faith, 
reasonableness or adaptation for hardship may be needed to help these contracts work as time passes and 
circumstances change.’ See: Attorney-General’s Department (Cth) (n 1) at 5. 
60 Which in the Discussion Paper connotes harmonisation with international norms. 
61 Attorney-General’s Department (Cth) (n 1) at 4. 
62 Indeed, the 2012 Discussion Paper soon prompted a re-agitation of familiar conceptual debates. See, eg: J Gava, 
“Contract Law is Ignored by the Market, So Why Reform It?” The Australian, 8 March 2013, 26. 
63 The normative basis of the law of restitution, for instance, continues to be the subject of intense scholarly 
debate. See, eg: C Webb, Reason and Restitution: A Theory of Unjust Enrichment, (2016); F Wilmot-Smith, 
“Reasons? For Restitution?” (2016) 79 MLR 1116; F Wilmot-Smith, “Should the Payee Pay?” (2017) 37 OJLS 
844; J E Penner, “We All Make Mistakes: A ‘Duty of Virtue’ Theory of Restitutionary Liability for Mistaken 
Payments” (2018) 81 MLR 222.  
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in respect of a body of law precludes the possibility of a successful project of codification – 
indeed, the successful Australian experience in respect of the Uniform Evidence Law suggests 
that this cannot be so.64 It might be thought, however, that contract is riven by theoretical 
disputation to a greater extent than some areas of law which have been the subject of successful 
codification proposals.65  
What lessons emerge from this experience for would-be codifiers of the law of contract? Put 
simply, it is suggested that if a contract codification project is to succeed, it ought at the outset 
to adopt and defend a clear stance in respect of the underlying debates as to the nature and 
purpose of the law of contract. In doing so, such a proposal can ensure that the debate which it 
foments is directed as far as possible to practical questions which must be answered if the 
reform is to be successful. At the same time, such an approach guards against the risk of the 
reform initiative being overwhelmed by theoretical disputation. Though it would be quite 
unrealistic to suppose that such theoretical debate could ever be wholly avoided, the Australian 
experience stands as a clear example of how such disputation can be invited unnecessarily.  
 
 
(2) Codification and Legal Culture 
 
The indifference which judges and practitioners often display in respect of codification projects 
and codifying instruments is merely one aspect of a broader want of enthusiasm for legislation 
as a source of law. This phenomenon is hardly new. As long ago as 1908, Roscoe Pound 
observed:66 
 
Not the least notable characteristics of American law today are the excessive output of 
legislation in all our jurisdictions and the indifference, if not contempt, with which that output 
is regarded by courts and lawyers. Text-writers who scrupulously gather up from every 
remote corner the most obsolete decisions and cite all of them, seldom cite any statutes except 
those landmarks which have become a part of our American common law, or, if they do refer 
to legislation, do so through the judicial decisions which apply it. The courts, likewise, incline 
to ignore important legislation; not merely deciding it to be declaratory, but sometimes 
assuming silently that it is declaratory without adducing any reasons, citing prior judicial 
decisions and making no mention of the statute. 
 
                                                      
64 The law of evidence is attended by rich and long-running theoretical debate. See, eg: M S Pardo, “The Nature 
and Purpose of Evidence Theory” (2013) 66 VandLRev 547, 548-553. One might also instance the success in 
the United States of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
65 The law respecting bills of exchange, for instance, has been the subject of relatively little theoretical debate. 
66 R Pound, “Common Law and Legislation” (1908) 21 HarvLRev 383, 383. 
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Indeed, this want of interest in statute law is not confined to the judiciary and profession, 
and seems to manifest itself equally in the academy. Elise Bant, in seeking to explain this state 
of affairs, has noted:67 
 
Explanations by the few commentators who have addressed the want of scholarship in this 
area include: the perception (often first gained at law school) that legislation is comparatively 
‘unexciting’; the sense that it is an intruder on foundational judge-made law; what might be 
termed constitutional concerns about the necessary separation of reasoning derived from the 
two sources of law; appreciation that the piecemeal and limited operation of many statutes 
make them ill-suited to inform debates concerning broader legal issues; and, finally, the view 
that legislation is often the poorly drafted outcome of political expediency, rather than 
reflective of legal principle. Underpinning all factors is a sense, often assumed and 
unarticulated, that the two sources of civil law liability are ‘oil and water’: separate sources 
of law that do not mix. 
 
This may well be accurate, though further explanations also suggest themselves. Part of the 
explanation, for instance, at least insofar as private law is concerned, might be found in the 
somewhat mixed track record of recent statutory interventions.68 Equally, it may partly arise 
from a want of a sense of ownership – that is to say, from an apprehension that legislation is 
imposed on the profession by law reformers and the political class, rather than being the 
product of the profession itself.69 Insofar as codes are concerned, resistance may arise in part 
from a suspicion of or distaste for the Civil Law,70 along with an apprehension that codification 
entails the adoption of Civilian techniques and concepts.71 Yet whatever may be the 
                                                      
67 E Bant, “Statute and Common Law: Interaction and Influence in Light of the Principle of Coherence” (2015) 
38 UNSWLJ 367, 369 (footnotes omitted). Bant cites in turn: P S Atiyah, “Common Law and Statute Law” 
(1985) 48 MLR 1; J Beatson, “Has the Common Law a Future?” [1997] CLJ 291; J Beatson, “The Role of 
Statute in the Development of Common Law Doctrine”, (2001) 117 LQR 247; A Burrows, “The Relationship 
between Common Law and Statute in the Law of Obligations” (2012) 128 LQR 232; A Mason, “A Judicial 
Perspective on the Development of Common Law Doctrine in the Light of Statutory Developments” (Paper 
presented at the Obligations VII Conference, University of Hong Kong, 17 July 2014).  
68 The significant statutory incursions into the law of negligence in Australia have generally been poorly 
received. See, eg: H Luntz, “Reform of the law of Negligence: Wrong Questions – Wrong Answers” (2002) 25 
UNSWLJ 836; B McDonald, “Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The Common Law, Statutory 
Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia” (2005) 27 Syd LR 443, 443. Reforms have been met with criticism 
even in England, where statute has made more limited inroads. See: J Goudkamp, “Restating the Common Law? 
The Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015” (2017) 37 LS 577. Statutory interventions in respect 
of the law of contract have also not been wholly happy. See, eg: A Stewart, “The South Australian Frustrated 
Contracts Act” (1992) 5 JCL 220; A Stewart and J W Carter, “Frustrated Contracts and Statutory Adjustment: 
The Case For a Reappraisal” [1992] CLJ 66. 
69 Such a view, of course, entails the acceptance of a number of premises that are not necessarily sound. 
70 There is some considerable evidence for the existence of a fear on the part of common lawyers that the 
common law’s continued survival is in doubt. See, eg: S McLeish, “Challenges to the Survival of the Common 
Law” (2014) 38 MULR 818; J Beatson, “Has the Common Law a Future?” [1997] CLJ 291. Others have been 
avowedly optimistic in this regard. See, eg: R Goff, “The Future of the Common Law” (1997) 46 ICLQ 745. 
71 In truth, it is inexcusably simplistic to view the process of codification in a common law legal system to 
involve an adoption of a civilian scheme. This is, however, one of the most common misapprehensions in the 
codification debate. See: H Kötz, “Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously” (1987) 50 MLR 1, 2 (“First, it was 
assumed implicitly that codification in England would be more or less tantamount to what it is on the Continent.  
Secondly, Continental codes were described as being based on a number of distinctive and uniform 
characteristics.”) 
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explanation for this phenomenon, it seems clear that, notwithstanding calls for lawyers to 
abandon the mindset described above,72 there remains a general lack of enthusiasm for statute 
and for statutory reform on the part of the legal profession. 
This state of affairs has significant ramifications for the prospects of contract codification. 
First, and most obviously, a lack of enthusiasm for statutory reform on the part of the judiciary 
and profession is likely to present a hurdle when seeking to build support for any proposed 
code.73 Indeed, a survey of the submissions to the 2012 Discussion Paper reveals a scepticism 
as to the merits of codification on the part of the judiciary and profession.74 This scepticism is, 
moreover, not peculiar to Australia. Lord Goff, for instance, was sceptical of any need for the 
codification of commercial law. His Lordship explained:75 
 
Another feature of our commercial law which our continental friends find almost impossible 
to understand is that we have no commercial code set alongside but distinct from a civil code. 
The continental lawyer goes around with his civil code in his pocket – or his commercial 
code, I suppose, if he is a commercial lawyer. We cannot do that. But there is, so far as I am 
aware, no call for a commercial code coming from our commercial judges or practitioners. 
There are academic lawyers who do call for one, most notably perhaps Professor Roy Goode, 
who speaks of a need for a commercial code as self evident … In a sense, we do not have 
one commercial code but several, to be found in all the standard forms so widely used 
throughout the world – the Lloyds form of standard marine policy, the various forms of 
charter party and commodity trade contract, and so on. 
 
In sum, the proponents of codification have much work to do if broad-based support for 
codification from the judiciary and profession is to be secured. Until such support is 
forthcoming, the task of securing reform will remain especially difficult, particularly if senior 
judicial figures continue to caution against the institution of significant change.76 
The foregoing points are by themselves sufficient to give would-be reformers pause for 
thought. Yet it would be wrong to view a lack of support in the judiciary and profession as 
posing a challenge only to the task of securing the enactment of a contract code.77 Indeed, even 
                                                      
72 See, eg: El Bant and J M Paterson, “Consumer Redress Legislation: Simplifying or Subverting the Law of 
Contract” (2017) 80 MLR 895. 
73 This has been observed on a number of occasions. See, eg: Diamond (n 10) at 377.   
74 See the discussion in: L Nottage, “The Government’s Proposed Review of Australia’s Contract Law: An 
Interim Positive Response” in Keyes & Wilson Codifying (n 2). Particularly notable in this respect is the 
submission of T F Bathurst, the Chief Justice of New South Wales (Submission No 11). 
75 R Goff, “Opening Address” (1992) 5 JCL 1, 3. For a distillation of Professor Goode’s views in respect of the 
codification of commercial law, see: R Goode, “The Codification of Commercial Law” (1988) 14 Mon LR 135. 
76 Of course, not all senior judicial figures harbour hostility towards codification initiatives. For a notable 
example of judicial enthusiasm in this sphere, see: M Arden, “Time for an English Commercial Code?” [1997] 
CLJ 516. 
77 The difficulties posed by judicial and professional resistance are not, of course, confined to contract 
codification projects. For a discussion of judicial resistance to codification of the criminal law, see: R Cross, 
“The Reports of the Criminal Law Commissioners (1833– 1849) and the Abortive Bills of 1853” in P R 
Glazebrook (ed), Reshaping the Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of Glanville Williams (1978) 9-10. 
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if a code is successfully enacted in the face of lacklustre support, a want of judicial and 
professional enthusiasm can lead to its being undermined once in operation. 
The judicial approach to the construction of the California Civil Code provides perhaps the 
most powerful illustration of the degree to which the judiciary is capable of manipulating the 
operation of a code in order to achieve a desired end.78 Presented with the dilemma of a code 
which seemingly precluded a desired development of the law of contributory negligence, in 
circumstances where legislative intervention did not appear imminent, it was left to the judges 
to craft a solution. That solution was found in Li v Yellow Cab Co.79 As the majority there 
explained:80 
 
It is urged that any change in the law of contributory negligence must be made by the 
Legislature, not by this court. Although the doctrine of contributory negligence is of judicial 
origin -- its genesis being traditionally attributed to the opinion of Lord Ellenborough in 
Butterfield v. Forrester (K.B. 1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926 -- the enactment of section 1714 of 
the Civil Code in 1872 codified the doctrine as it stood at that date and, the argument 
continues, rendered it invulnerable to attack in the courts except on constitutional grounds. 
Subsequent cases of this court, it is pointed out, have unanimously affirmed that -- barring 
the appearance of some constitutional infirmity -- the "all-or-nothing" rule is the law of this 
state and shall remain so until the Legislature directs otherwise … We have concluded that 
the foregoing argument, in spite of its superficial appeal, is fundamentally misguided … it 
was not the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 1714 of the Civil Code, as well as 
other sections of that code declarative of the common law, to insulate the matters therein 
expressed from further judicial development; rather it was the intention of the Legislature to 
announce and formulate existing common law principles and definitions for purposes of 
orderly and concise presentation and with a distinct view toward continuing judicial 
evolution. 
 
Though this conclusion served to resolve the immediate difficulty before the Court, there 
can be little doubt that it is starkly at odds with the notion of a code as the principal statement 
of the law on its subject.81 Indeed, insofar as it amounts to a judicial reclamation of 
responsibility for the law’s development, the decision stands as a clear warning of the extent 
to which the fate of a code is in the hands of the judges.82 This only reinforces the need for a 
code to have a broad base of support among those who will be responsible for its application. 
                                                      
78 For an overview of the circumstances leading to the Code’s enactment, see: M E Harrison, “The First Half 
Century of the California Civil Code” (1922) 10 CLR 185. 
79 (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 804. 
80 Li v Yellow Cab Co (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 804 at 813-814. For further discussion, see: R Hyland, “Codification 
and the American Discussion About How Judges Decide Cases” in Keyes & Wilson Codifying (n 2) at 206. 
81 Of course, in a common law system, it is always wrong to conceive of a code as amounting to an exhaustive 
statement of the law on its subject. See the discussion in: Eldridge (n 8). 
82 Another rather different example might well be the Defamation Act 1958 (NSW), a code of the law of 
defamation which, in consequence of a succession of judicial decisions, was gradually rendered unworkable. 
The Act was subsequently repealed. For a discussion of the Act and its fate, see: D Rolph, Defamation Law, 
(2016), 52-55. 
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What, then, can be said in respect of Australian contract codification proposals and reform 
initiatives in light of these points? The most obvious observation to be made is that the 
proposed Australian Contract Code put forward by Ellinghaus and Wright did not garner the 
level of support in the judiciary or the profession which would have been essential to its 
success.83 Much the same can be said of the Australian Law of Contract.84 Equally, the 2012 
Discussion Paper did not elicit responses which point to a consensus – or even a significant 
majority – in favour of codification. Yet to make these points is simply to invite the more 
important question of what might be done to build the requisite support.  
This indeed ought to be recognised as one of the most pressing questions facing the 
proponents of contract codification. Yet unfortunately for those sympathetic to such a reform, 
no obvious solutions are forthcoming. Indeed, a consideration of the processes surrounding 
successful reform proposals suggests that the best that can be done is to endeavour to work 
closely with the judiciary and profession throughout the reform process. In addition to 
examples from other areas of law,85 there exist a number of potential models for such an 
approach to contract law reform. John Gava and Peter Kincaid, for instance, in examining 
attitudes in the Australian legal profession towards changes in the law of contract, engaged in 
an empirical survey which gathered hard evidence of the views and preferences of practising 
lawyers.86 Such evidence may well be valuable in ascertaining how engagement with the 
profession ought to proceed.  
Lessons might also be derived from the approach taken by the American Law Institute, 
which has traditionally involved a wide and diverse range of stakeholders in the preparation of 
restatements of the general law.87 Indeed, this approach has already been emulated to some 
extent elsewhere. Andrew Burrows, in preparing his recent restatement of English contract 
law,88 drew upon the expertise of an advisory group which included many senior figures from 
                                                      
83 Indeed, as noted above, Ellinghaus and Wright’s proposal seems never to have been in favour among 
practitioners. It should be noted, however, that the Hon. Michael Kirby did offer support for reform: M Kirby, 
“Foreword” in Ellinghaus et al Models (n 31). 
84 It should be noted that the Australian Law of Contract did attract mainstream interest. See, eg: C Merritt, 
“Meet the Great Reformers of Contract Law”, The Australian, 17 August 2012, 29. 
85 Perhaps the best example within Australia is provided by the reform processes which led to the Uniform 
Evidence Law. A rigorous reform process, led by the Australian Law Reform Commission, engaged with a wide 
range of stakeholders in the course of the legislation’s development. See: Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Evidence, Report No 38, 1987. 
86 J Gava and P Kincaid, “Contract and Conventionalism: Professional Attitudes to Changes in Contract Law in 
Australia” (1996) 10 JCL 141. 
87 E A Farnsworth, “Ingredients in the Redaction of The Restatement (Second) of Contracts” (1981) 81 
ColumLRev 1. Others have also suggested that the processes of the American Law Institute may be instructive. 
See, eg: Swain (n 10) at 146. 
88 See: A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Contract (2016). A restatement has also recently been 
drafted by Professor Andrews: N Andrews, Contract Law Rules: Decoding English Law (2016). 
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the judiciary and the profession.89 If this example were followed in respect of future contract 
codification projects, it might well be easier to win the support of the judiciary and the 
profession. Indeed, would-be codifiers might even see projects such as Burrows’ restatement 
as a useful precursor to a code, at least insofar as such a document might acclimatise the 
profession and the judiciary to the notion of an instrument which purports to set out the whole 
of the law of contract.  
There are, of course, a range of other reasons for seeking to consult broadly in the course of 
a codification project, not least the desire to avoid errors and oversights.90 Yet, in light of the 
considerations canvassed above as to the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the judiciary and 
the profession for reform of this type, perhaps the most significant benefit to be derived from 
following this example is the building of goodwill with those whose support is necessary if a 
code is to be successfully enacted and implemented. 
 
 
D. THE UNCERTAIN METES AND BOUNDS OF ‘CONTRACT LAW’ 
 
Any contract code must grapple not only with contract’s intersection with other bodies of law, 
but with the divisions and fault lines internal to the law of contract. Yet proponents of contract 
codification in Australia have too often sought to treat the law of contract as a monolithic and 
internally homogenous legal structure. The result has been that codification proposals have 
often elided distinctions within the law of contract, and have failed to adequately explain how 
the proposed code will interact with other areas of law with which the law of contract overlaps.  
It is not difficult to see how the difficulties under consideration here come to arise. There 
does seem to be an intuitive sense in which ‘contract’ is felt to be a unitary legal category, 
                                                      
89 The advisory group comprised: Lord Toulson, Lord Justice Longmore, Lord Justice Gross, Lord Justice 
Lewison, Lord Justice Beatson, Mr Justice Hamblen, Mr Stephen Moriarty QC, Mr Laurence Rabinowitz QC, 
Mr Marcus Smith QC, Mr Richard Calnan, Professor Hugh Beale, Professor Mindy Chen-Wishart, Mr Richard 
Hooley, Professor Ewan McKendrick, Professor Gerard McMeel, Dr Janet O'Sullivan, Professor Robert 
Stevens, Professor Andrew Tettenborn, Professor Simon Whittaker, and Dr Frederick Wilmot-Smith. A similar 
approach was taken to the drafting of Professor Burrows’ restatement of the English law of unjust enrichment, 
for which, see: A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (2012). 
90 It should be noted, however, that even the involvement of eminent experts cannot wholly eliminate the risk of 
error. By way of example, Professor Burrows’ restatement was compiled with the assistance of a panel of 
leading figures from the judiciary and the academy.  Yet the finished product omitted any restatement of the 
important (albeit nascent) principle of ‘contractual estoppel’. See: G Leggatt “Publication Review: A 
Restatement of the English Law of Contract” (2017) 133 LQR 521, 523.  As to contractual estoppel, see: J 
Braithwaite, “The Origins and Implications of Contractual Estoppel” (2016) 132 LQR 132. Of course, this 
omission was likely welcomed in some quarters. See, eg: G McMeel, “Documentary Fundamentalism in the 
Senior Courts: the Myth of Contractual Estoppel” [2011] LMCLQ 185; G McMeel, “The Impact of Exemption 
Clauses and Disclaimers: Construction, Contractual Estoppel and Public Policy” in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and 
F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Contract (2017). 
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subject to core organising principles and susceptible to reduction to a coherent and intelligible 
codifying instrument.91 The same intuition does not arise in respect of all areas of law. Nobody 
has attempted, for instance, the codification of ‘equity’, and the notion of such a project seems 
distinctly improbable.92 Yet the notion that ‘contract’ exists as a wholly discrete and unified 
body of legal doctrine begins to break down upon even cursory examination. 
Consider, for instance, how one might go about drawing a bright line around the rules and 
principles which together constitute the ‘law of contract’. While some rules and principles – 
such as the requirement of consideration – might be thought to be at the heart of contract law,93 
others defy such easy categorisation. Does the doctrine of undue influence form part of the law 
of contract?  Or is it instead a general equitable doctrine that may, in some instances, apply to 
vitiate a contract? This absence of precisely demarcated categories, whilst a hallmark of the 
common law, has been the cause of much vexation.  Some have looked enviously at the 
comparatively elegant scheme of the Roman law of obligations.94 Others have gone further, 
advancing a private law theory that has categorisation and taxonomy at its core.95 
For textbook authors, this absence of clear boundaries has generally been resolved by the 
taking of a broad view of the subjects which ought to be included. Accordingly, texts and 
reference works often include discussions of a range of doctrines which, while not limited to 
the domain of contract, are often invoked in factual settings in which the existence, 
performance or breach of a contract is in question. So it is that leading contract texts regularly 
include an introductory treatment of such subjects as the law of restitution.96  
                                                      
91 It is worth noting that though the existence of such an intuition may be widespread today, this was not always 
so. Indeed, the modern conception of contract as a coherent body of principle was for many centuries obscured 
by the forms of action. Obligations which today would be characterised as contractual were enforced variously 
in covenant, debt, and, most importantly, assumpsit. See: S F C Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common 
Law (1981) chs 10 – 12. 
92 Indeed, a number of commentators of great authority have claimed that equity (as distinct from particular 
equitable doctrines) is insusceptible even of a clear definition.  See, eg: J D Heydon, M J Leeming and P G 
Turner, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (2014), [1-005] (“Equity can be 
described but not defined.”); P Millett, “The Common Lawyer and the Equity Practitioner” [2015] UK Supreme 
Court Yearbook 193, 193 (“Equity is not a set of rules but a state of mind.”) It should be noted that though no 
attempt has been made to codify equity as a body of doctrine, particular equitable doctrines have been ‘picked 
up’ and modified by statute. Most notable in this respect is the law respecting the duties owed by company 
directors. See, eg: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180, 181. 
93 Despite being the subject of perennial criticism.  See, eg: Lord Wright, ‘Ought the Doctrine of Consideration 
to be Abolished from the Common Law?’ (1936) 49 HarvLRev 1225; A Burrows, “Improving Contract and 
Tort” in A Burrows (ed) Understanding the Law of Obligations (1998), 197. For a defence of consideration, see: 
M Chen-Wishart, “In Defence of Consideration” (2013) 13 OUCLJ 209.  
94 For an example of a survey of the law of obligations in which some considerable sympathy for Roman legal 
thought is evident, see: D Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligation, (1999). 
95 The most famous such work is that of the late Professor Birks. See, eg: P Birks, An Introduction to the Law of 
Restitution (1989); P Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (1997). 
96 See, eg: J W Carter, Contract Law in Australia (2018), ch 38; N C Seddon and R A Bigwood, Cheshire and 
Fifoot: Law of Contract (2017), ch 26. 
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Such a solution is not readily available to one who seeks to codify the law of contract. 
Consider again a doctrine such as undue influence, which can be invoked in respect of a 
contract and also in respect of other transactions, such as a voluntary inter vivos disposition of 
property.97 If contract law is to be codified, ought undue influence be included in the code? If 
so, should the code state the law of undue influence only insofar as it operates in respect of 
contracts?  Such an approach might result in two substantively different doctrines of undue 
influence: a codified doctrine which would operate in respect of contracts, and a general law 
doctrine which would apply in respect of non-contractual transactions.98 It is not at all easy to 
see how such a position could be justified.99 Indeed, the unwelcome prospect of this seems 
reason enough to conclude that if undue influence is to be codified at all, the code ought to 
state the whole of the law of undue influence. But the objection to this course is also plain: a 
contract code which states the operation of the doctrine of undue influence in general seems to 
be a code which has spilled over its banks. Indeed, once it is accepted that a contract code 
might extend to embrace doctrines which merely intersect with contract, it is difficult to 
adjudge where the code’s boundaries ought to be drawn.  
Plainly, the lack of a clear demarcation as to where ‘the law of contract’ begins and ends is 
a problem with which would-be codifiers and reformers must grapple.100 There can be no doubt 
that the task is a challenging one.101 It is compounded by the fact that relatively few successful 
examples can be drawn from elsewhere. The same challenges do not arise in a civilian setting, 
for instance, where the boundary line between the code and the common law need not be 
drawn.102 The difficulties in this sphere are also less pronounced where, as is the case in New 
Zealand, it is sought to codify only clearly-demarcated parts of the law of contract.103 Indeed, 
even where comprehensive contract codes have been successfully enacted in the context of a 
                                                      
97 Indeed, the doctrine’s application to voluntary inter vivos dispositions is of some considerable practical 
importance. See the discussion in: F R Burns, “Undue Influence Inter Vivos and the Elderly” (2002) 26 MULR 
499. 
98 This outcome might be the result of a deliberate choice, when drafting the code, to codify undue influence in a 
modified form. Yet even if the code sought simply to re-state the general law, there would remain the possibility 
of the courts construing the code in a manner giving rise to a divergence from the position at general law. 
99 It should of course be noted that there is nothing unusual in the notion of a doctrine operating in a way which 
is sensitive to context, such that its practical operation may differ slightly from one setting to another. 
100 The challenge has been remarked upon elsewhere. See, eg, Swain (n 10) at 143. 
101 Indeed, any exercise which calls for the crafting of a clear statement of the metes and bounds of ‘the law of 
contract’ is a perilous one. See the discussion in: J Eldridge, “Book Review: Leading Cases in Contract Law” 
(2017) 34 JCL 174, 175. 
102 This is not to discount the difficulties which can arise in determining the internal demarcations which ought 
to be observed when drafting such a code. 
103 As to the New Zealand reforms, see: F G Barton, “The Effect of the Contract Statutes in New Zealand” 
(2000) 16 JCL 233; R Bigwood, “The Partial Codification of Contract Law: Lessons From New Zealand” in 
Keyes & Wilson Codifying (n 2). The New Zealand statutes have recently been consolidated in the Contract and 
Commercial Law Act 2017 (NZ). 
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common law system, reforms have often proceeded in a way which avoided the necessity of 
setting down boundaries in this way: the Indian Contract Act 1872, for instance, deliberately 
sought to codify not just the law of contract, but also a wide range of other subjects with which 
the law of contract overlaps.104 
In light of these difficulties, it is somewhat surprising that the taxonomical challenges 
inherent in identifying the boundaries of the law of contract have often been dealt with cursorily 
by the proponents of reform in Australia. It is not entirely clear, for instance, how the Australian 
Contract Code or Australian Law of Contract are to operate alongside other bodies of law: each 
code is simply to be given effect according to its terms, and any deleterious consequences for 
the coherence of private law as a whole are seemingly left to be grappled with by the courts.105 
Even putting to one side the difficulties encountered in identifying the boundaries of the law 
of contract, equally vexing challenges are posed by contract law’s internal fault lines. These 
divisions exist in at least two senses. First, there is the well-understood recognition of a range 
of special rules and principles which govern particular species of contract (or particular species 
of contractual term). These special categories arise as a consequence of common law rules and 
through statutory intervention.106 Second, there are the various conceptual ways in which the 
law of contract might be divided or categorised. One might, for instance, seek to classify some 
bargains as ‘relational’ contracts.107  Though this second species of fault line is itself the subject 
of considerable debate,108 it could scarcely be suggested that such distinctions within the law 
of contract can be altogether ignored. Indeed, at least one conceptual sub-category of contract 
– that of the consumer contract – is now almost universally recognised.109  
The challenge for would-be codifiers and reformers is to bring an appropriate degree of 
sophistication to the task of engaging with these internal divisions. It is not wholly clear, for 
instance, how Ellinghaus and Wright’s Australian Contract Code is intended to interact with 
                                                      
104 See the discussion in: Tofaris (n 9). 
105 Though these difficulties may strengthen the appeal of a more far-reaching reform, such as a civil code, the 
prospects of such an instrument being successfully enacted seem relatively poor. 
106 The common law, for instance, recognises that special principles are relevant to the construction of 
contractual indemnities. See generally: W Courtney, Contractual Indemnities (2014). For an important 
Australian example of special rules provided by statute, see: Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). It is worth 
observing that the entire second volume of Chitty on Contracts is devoted to ‘specific contracts’. See: H Beale, 
(ed) Chitty on Contracts (2015), vol 2. 
107 Though the notion of the ‘relational’ contract has now attained widespread currency, it remains largely a 
conceptual label, rather than a category recognised at the level of legal doctrine. See, eg, the discussion in: M A 
Eisenberg, “Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts” (1999) 94 NWULR 805. 
108 See, eg: S Mouzas and M Furmston, “A Proposed Taxonomy of Contracts” (2013) 30 JCL 1. 
109 See, eg: R Brownsword, “The Law of Contract: Doctrinal Impulses, External Pressures, Future Directions” 
(2014) 31 JCL 73, 73 (“Nowadays, it seems almost trite to remark that the law of contract does, and indeed 
should, distinguish between consumer transactions and business-to-business deals.”) 
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other statutory schemes which affect some species of contract.110 Similarly, while it seems that 
the Australian Law of Contract is intended to apply to all species of contract, the decision to 
assimilate both consumer and commercial contracts to a uniform set of rules invites a range of 
objections which are not squarely answered by the Code’s authors. In the same vein, the 2012 
Discussion Paper, insofar as it seeks to canvass the prospect of a wholesale reform of the law 
of contract, arguably fails to observe the necessity of approaching the reform of commercial 
contract law and the reform of consumer contract law as two discrete exercises. 
Would-be reformers might draw an important lesson from this experience. Put simply, what 
is needed is for reform proposals to engage explicitly with the difficulties and decisions under 
discussion here. There might, for instance, be sound reasons for declining to distinguish 
between consumer and commercial agreements when setting out the core principles of the law 
of contract (indeed, it may be that such an approach is ideal insofar as it promotes coherence 
in the law and avoids needless complexity).111 If such an approach is to be adopted, however, 
its proponents must proffer a clear and rigorous defence of the contentious choices it entails. 





The task of this paper has been to examine a number of challenges inherent in contract 
codification which have been given too little attention by the proponents of reform in Australia. 
Having done so, it remains only to make a number of points as to how the matters discussed in 
this paper bear upon the future prospects of contract codification both in Australia and 
elsewhere in the common law world. In particular, it is necessary to make mention of a number 
of matters which merit special attention when considering the prospects of contract codification 
in Britain. 
                                                      
110 The Code simply provides, in Article 2, that ‘The Code does not apply to the extent that it is inconsistent 
with Commonwealth, State or Territory legislation’. See: Law Reform Commission of Victoria (n 28) 13. The 
position is no clearer in respect of the Australian Law of Contract, which also makes relevant provision in this 
respect in Article 2. See: Ellinghaus et al (n 39) (“This Law states the rules that apply to a contract or proposed 
contract if the parties agree that Australian law applies, or the contract has its closest connection with an 
Australian jurisdiction, except to the extent that a statutory provision of an Australian jurisdiction applies to it.”) 
111 It might be noted, however, that in the most recent initiative by the American Law Institute in respect of the 
law of contract, consumer contracts have been singled out as being suitable for a discrete restatement. For a 
discussion of that project, see: O Bar-Gill, O Ben-Shahar and F Marotta-Wurgler, “Searching for the Common 
Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts” (2017) 84 UChiLRev 7. 
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First, it should be stressed that it is at no stage suggested that the difficulties canvassed in 
this paper pose insuperable barriers to the enactment of a successful contract code. Indeed, a 
number of points have been made as to how the proponents of reform might go about 
negotiating the difficulties examined here. What is suggested, however, is that Australian 
contract codification reform proposals have often failed to pay sufficient attention to a number 
of serious challenges which any successful reform proposal must find a means of negotiating.  
Second, it must always be borne in mind that ascertaining whether the codification of the 
law of contract is a worthwhile endeavour is a question of balancing a range of competing 
factors. None could deny that such a reform would be costly and time-consuming. Few would 
deny that such a reform would come with a range of risks. The points made in this paper must 
thus be understood in their proper context. It is only when taken together with the other 
contributions to the codification debate – and in particular, when weighed against the writings 
of the proponents of codification – that the points made here offer guidance as to whether such 
a reform is warranted. 
Finally, it must be remembered that any British contract codification project would be beset 
by challenges which are peculiar to the constitutional and political context in which that reform 
would be pursued. There is, therefore, some danger in extrapolating too readily from the 
Australian experience. Though a study of the difficulties encountered in Australia is instructive, 
it provides only imperfect guidance to reformers elsewhere. Indeed, the fact that contract 
codification proposals have fared significantly better in some jurisdictions than in others is a 
reminder of the importance of paying heed to the particular circumstances in which a reform 
proposal is put forward. 
The prospects of contract codification in Britain remain uncertain. As is clear from the 
discussion above, a glance at the history of codification in Britain offers up examples of both 
successful reforms – such as the sale of goods legislation – as well as those that failed to 
attract adequate support.112 Any would-be codifier of the British law of contract must also 
negotiate the complex reform environment ushered in by Brexit. While recent political 
developments might have opened the door to fresh efforts at contract law reform within 
Britain – at least insofar as those developments have led to the waning of British interest in 
pan-European law reform – they have also made law reform projects of this type far more 
challenging. Indeed, at least until the short-term legal and regulatory challenges posed by 
                                                      
112 The sale of goods legislation merits special mention for its successful negotiation of the differences between 
English law and Scots law. 
 118 
Brexit have been resolved, the competition for the resources and political capital which are 
necessary for the success of any ambitious law-reform initiative will continue to be fierce. It 
is, therefore, difficult to predict with any confidence whether contract codification is likely to 
enjoy a recrudescence in Britain in the near future. What can be said with confidence, 
however, is that those sympathetic to such a reform would be well-advised to give careful 
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In March 2012, the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department issued 
a discussion paper which flagged the possibility of codifying or otherwise 
reforming the Australian law of contract. Half a decade later, it seems 
distinctly improbable that the initiative will yield anything of substance. The 
result is that would-be reformers of the Australian law of contract might 
well feel frustrated at the uncertainty as to how the cause of reform ought 
to be prosecuted. The object of this paper is to offer up some suggestions in 
this regard. It seeks to identify some practical steps which might be taken 
by way of reform of the Australian law of contract. It seeks in particular to 
identify those reforms which are sufficiently uncontroversial as to attract 
support on the part of government. The paper also grapples with the 
question of whether the more radical options set out in the 2012 discussion 
paper – including the prospect of codification – were ever suitable 
responses to the challenges facing the Australian law of contract. 
 
In March 2012, the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department issued an ambitious 
discussion paper which flagged the possibility of codifying or otherwise reforming the 
Australian law of contract.1 The paper’s reception was mixed. Though it attracted 58 thoughtful 
submissions and a number of scholarly papers, no consensus emerged as to the course of action 
which ought to be taken. While some commentators saw a clear case for far-reaching reform, 
others were sceptical of the wisdom of radical change.2 Others, while forthright in setting out 
                                                      
 BA LLB(Hons) (Adelaide) LLM(Cambridge); Lecturer, University of Sydney Law School; PhD Candidate, 
Adelaide Law School.  Thanks are due to Andrew Stewart for his helpful advice and comments, and to Ben 
Chen and Luke Nottage for drawing useful material to my attention. Any errors remain the author’s own. 
1 Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Improving Australia’s Law and Justice Framework: A Discussion 
Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law, 2012.   
2 For an example of a commentator largely supportive of reform, see: Luke Nottage, ‘The Government’s 
Proposed Review of Australia’s Contract Law: An Interim Positive Response’ in Mary Keyes and Therese 
Wilson (eds) Codifying Contract Law: International and Consumer Law Perspectives (Ashgate, 2014). For 
papers evincing a scepticism of the wisdom of radical change, see: Warren Swain, ‘Codification of Contract 
Law: Some Lessons from History’ (2012) 31 University of Queensland Law Journal 39; Warren Swain, 
‘Contract Codification in Australia: Is it Necessary, Desirable and Possible?’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 
131; Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, ‘Taking (Legal) Traditions Seriously, Or Why Australian Contract Law Should Not 
Be Codified: An Unconventional Inquiry’ (2015) 34 University of Queensland Law Journal 99; John Eldridge, 
‘Contract Codification and ‘Certainty’’ (2018) 35 Journal of Contract Law (forthcoming); John Eldridge, 
‘Codifying Contract Law: Cautionary Lessons from Australia’ (2019) 23 Edinburgh Law Review (forthcoming). 
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the law’s shortcomings, took a cautious approach when considering the various mechanisms 
by which reform might be effected.3 
 
Though the 2012 reform project appeared to have strong support from within the cabinet, it 
nonetheless failed to maintain momentum.4 In the wake of the flurry of activity which followed 
upon the publication of the discussion paper, interest in the reform of the law of contract 
quickly subsided. Now, over half a decade after the discussion paper was issued, it seems 
distinctly improbable that the 2012 reform initiative – though never formally discontinued – 
will yield anything of substance. Indeed, few would now suggest that radical reform of the 
Australian law of contract is likely to eventuate in the near future.5   
 
The Australian law of contract therefore stands at something of a crossroads. Though there is 
little reason to think that there exists an urgent need for root-and-branch reform, few would 
suggest that the law as it presently stands is wholly satisfactory – indeed, even a cursory glance 
at the academic literature yields a panoply of suggested reforms and interventions.6 Yet at the 
same time, the lack of interest in contract law reform on the part of government means that 
there exists no obvious mechanism by which desirable change might be effected. The result is 
that would-be reformers of the Australian law of contract might well feel frustrated at the 
uncertainty as to how their cause ought to be prosecuted. 
 
                                                      
3 See, eg: Andrew Stewart, ‘What’s Wrong with the Australian Law of Contract?’ (2012) 29 Journal of 
Contract Law 74. 
4 For some suggestion of the strength of the then-Attorney-General’s commitment to the project at its outset, see: 
Nicola Roxon, ‘Time for the Great Contract Reform’, The Australian, 23 March 2012, 30. 
5 For a discussion of likely future developments in the Australian law of contract, see: Warren Swain, ‘‘The 
Steaming Lungs of a Pigeon’’: Predicting the Direction of Australian Contract Law in the Next 25 Years’ in Kit 
Barker, Karen Fairweather and Ross Grantham, (eds), Private Law in the 21st Century, (Hart Publishing, 2017). 
By way of contrast, one might look to the position in Britain, where contract codification may be enjoying a 
recrudescence. See, eg: Andrew Tettenborn ‘Codifying Contracts – An Idea Whose Time Has Come?’ (2014) 
67 Current Legal Problems 273; M A Hogg, ‘Codification of Private Law: Scots Law at the Crossroads of 
Common and Civil Law’ in Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather and Ross Grantham (eds), Private Law in the 21st 
Century (Hart Publishing, 2017); Neil Andrews, ‘Codification of Remedies for Breach of Commercial 
Contracts: A Blueprint’ in Graham Virgo and Sarah Worthington (eds) Commercial Remedies: Resolving 
Controversies (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Julia Anna Bargenda and Shona Wilson Stark, ‘The Legal 
Holy Grail? German Lessons on Codification for a Fragmented Britain’ (2018) 22 Edinburgh Law Review 183. 
The renewed interest in codification has followed in the wake of a series of ‘restatements’ of various aspects of 
English private law. See, eg: Andrew Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford 
University Press, 2012); Andrew Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Contract (Oxford University 
Press, 2016); Neil Andrews, Contract Law Rules: Decoding English Law (Intersentia, 2016). As to the impact 
of these restatements, see the discussion in: Kit Barker, ‘Centripetal Force: The Law of Unjust Enrichment 
Restated in England and Wales’ (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 155. 
6 Aspects of this literature are canvassed below. 
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The modest object of this short paper is to offer up some suggestions in this regard. It seeks to 
identify some practical steps which might be taken by way of reform of the Australian law of 
contract. As will be seen below, it seeks in particular to identify those reforms which are 
sufficiently uncontroversial as to attract support on the part of government. In the course of its 
analysis, the paper also grapples with the question of whether the more radical options set out 
in the 2012 discussion paper – including the prospect of codification – were ever suitable 
responses to the challenges facing the Australian law of contract. 
 
The paper proceeds in two broad parts. The first offers up a very short overview of past contract 
law reform initiatives in Australia – including those which were ultimately unsuccessful. 
Against this backdrop, the second part proceeds to identify and assess several key opportunities 
for reform. As will be seen, each of these potential reforms can in truth be seen as steps towards 
an overarching goal – namely that of creating a ‘uniform’ law of contract within Australia, free 
of the inconsistencies and irregularities which, while minor, are nonetheless productive of 
considerable inconvenience. 
 
CONTRACT LAW REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Ambitious law reform proposals often have their genesis in discontent. Where a body of law is 
widely thought to be operating satisfactorily, there will typically be little appetite for 
fundamental reform.7 Thus viewed, the relative lack of interest in the reform of the Australian 
law of contract might well be seen as a sign that it has largely met the needs and expectations 
of those who rely upon it.8 Indeed, a survey of the history of the Australian law of contract 
reveals a body of law which has evolved slowly and incrementally, and which has only 
gradually moved away from its English roots.9 
                                                      
7 It has been observed, however, that at least some law reform initiatives – in particular codification exercises – 
stem in part from a desire to signal the emergence of nationhood, and not solely from an apprehension that the 
existing law is unsatisfactory in its practical operation. See, eg, the discussion in: Hector L MacQueen, ‘Private 
Law’s Revolutionaries: Authors, Codifiers and Merchants?’ in Sarah Worthington, Andrew Robertson and 
Graham Virgo, (eds) Revolution and Evolution in Private Law, (Hart Publishing, 2018), 41-3. 
8 Of course, the identification of exactly what those needs and expectations are – or, more generally, the 
identification of the proper normative objects of the law of contract – is not wholly straightforward. There exists 
a rich literature in respect of the law of contract’s normative underpinnings. See, eg: Charles Fried, Contract as 
Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation, (Oxford University Press, 1981); J Steyn, 'Contract Law: 
Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men' (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 433; Hugh Collins, 
Regulating Contracts (Oxford University Press, 1999); John Gava, ‘Can Contract Law be Justified on Economic 
Grounds?’ (2006) 25 University of Queensland Law Journal 253; Jonathan Morgan, Contract Law Minimalism: 
A Formalist Restatement of Commercial Contract Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Hanoch Dagan and 
Michael Heller, The Choice Theory of Contracts (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
9 For writings which document and debate the emergence of an ‘Australian’ law of contract, see: Anthony 
Mason, ‘Australian Contract Law’ (1988) 1 Journal of Contract Law 1; M P Ellinghaus, ‘An Australian 
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Many of the most notable changes in the Australian law of contract in the past half-century 
have originated in statute. In addition to those statutes which operate directly upon the law of 
contract – by, for instance, providing special rules which apply to particular types of agreement 
– there are also a number of enactments which have had a significant indirect impact on the 
law’s operation and development.10  
 
Though one must take care not to understate the extent of the influence which these statutory 
interventions have had on the Australian law of contract, they nonetheless pale in comparison 
with a number of more radical reform initiatives which – while ultimately unsuccessful – would 
have rendered the law of contract almost wholly unrecognisable. Most notable among these 
abortive reform initiatives are the various proposals to codify the Australian law of contract.11 
Though the debate respecting contract codification has a long history and spans many 
jurisdictions,12 and even within Australia has captured the interest of a diverse range of 
commentators,13 it is beyond question that the most extensive contributions to the contract 
codification debate in Australia have been made by Fred Ellinghaus and Ted Wright. In order 
to arrive at a clear understanding of the landmarks of contract law reform in Australia, and to 
ascertain whether codification has promise as a mechanism for effecting substantive reform of 
the law, Ellinghaus and Wright’s work merits careful consideration.14 
                                                      
Contract Law?’ (1989) 2 Journal of Contract Law 13; John Gava, ‘An Australian Contract Law? – A Reply’ 
(1998) 12 Journal of Contract Law 242; J W Carter and A Stewart, ‘Commerce and Conscience: The High 
Court’s Developing View of Contract’ (1993) 23 University of Western Australia Law Review 49. 
10 A key instance of the former type of statute is the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). Perhaps the most 
important example of the latter type of enactment is the statutory proscription of misleading or deceptive 
conduct, which was first set out in Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52. For a discussion of that section’s impact 
on the law of contract, see: David Harland, ‘The Statutory Prohibition of Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in 
Australia and its Impact on the Law of Contract’ (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 100. The statutory 
proscription of misleading or deceptive conduct is now found in Australian Consumer Law s 18. 
11 This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of the various shades of meaning which can attach to 
‘codification’. For a discussion of a range of different understandings of codification, see: Shona Wilson Stark, 
The Work of the British Law Commissions: Law Reform … Now?, (Hart Publishing, 2017), 157-9. 
12 For seminal contributions to the debate, see: Aubrey Diamond, ‘Codification of the Law of Contract’ (1968) 
31 Modern Law Review 361; H R Hahlo ‘Here Lies the Common Law: Rest in Peace’ (1967) 30 Modern Law 
Review 241. Some English commentators have also suggested broader codification exercises which might have 
encompassed the law of contract. See, eg: Roy Goode, ‘The Codification of Commercial Law’ (1988) 14 
Monash University Law Review 135; Mary Arden, ‘Time for an English Commercial Code?’ [1997] Cambridge 
Law Journal 516. 
13 For some examples of contributions to the contract codification debate within Australia, see, in addition to the 
works discussed below: J Starke, ‘A Restatement of the Australian Law of Contract as a First Step Towards an 
Australian Uniform Contract Code’ (1978) 49 Australian Law Journal 234; Dan Svantesson ‘Codifying 
Australia’s Contract Law - Time for A Stocktake in the Common Law Factory’ (2008) 20 Bond Law Review 1.  
14 For a more detailed overview of the history of contract codification in Australia, see: John Eldridge, 
‘Codifying Contract Law: Cautionary Lessons from Australia’ (2019) 23 Edinburgh Law Review (forthcoming). 
What follows here is an abridged form of that discussion. 
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At the core of Ellinghaus and Wright’s work on contract codification is the Australian Contract 
Code, a code of the law of contract prepared at the behest of the Law Reform Commission of 
Victoria and published in 1992.15 Though several models existed to which the authors might 
have looked when drafting their code – notably the Indian Contract Act 1872, as well as the 
British contract code drafted by the late Harvey McGregor QC – the Australian Contract Code 
eschewed the approach taken by these earlier instruments, opting instead to chart its own 
distinctive course.16 
 
Almost every aspect of the Australian Contract Code sets it apart from the contract codes which 
have preceded it.  At a mere 27 articles, it is the shortest code of the common law of contract 
ever to be proposed (indeed, by way of contrast, McGregor’s code contained 673 clauses). It 
also differs from the instruments mentioned above insofar as it favours discretion over fixed 




A person may not assert a right or deny an obligation to the extent that it would be 
unconscionable to do so. 
 
 
This approach – in which discretion takes the place of prescriptive and restrictive rules – was 
at the heart of the authors’ approach. As is explained below, the authors later carried out 
empirical research which purported to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the discretion afforded 
to a decision maker under the Australian Contract Code, it was in practice no less predictable 
and certain than the common law.18 
 
                                                      
15 See: Law Reform Commission of Victoria, An Australian Contract Code, Discussion Paper No 27, 1992. 
16 For a detailed study of the Indian Contract Act 1872, see: Stellios Tofaris, A Historical Study in the Indian 
Contract Act 1972 (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011). For Harvey McGregor’s draft code, see: 
Harvey McGregor, Contract Code: Drawn Up on Behalf of the English Law Commission, (Guiffré, 1993). For 
discussion of the abortive British reforms, see: F M B Reynolds, ‘Contract: Codification, Legislation and 
Judicial Development’ (1995) 9 Journal of Contract Law 11, 13-17; Stephen Waddams, ‘Codification, Law 
Reform and Judicial Development’ (1996) 9 Journal of Contract Law 192. 
17 Law Reform Commission of Victoria, An Australian Contract Code, Discussion Paper No 27, 1992, 17. 
18 See: M P Ellinghaus, E W Wright and M Karras, Models of Contract Law: An Empirical Evaluation of their 
Utility, (Themis Press, 2005).  See also: M P Ellinghaus and E W Wright, ‘The Common Law of Contracts: Are 
Broad Principles better than Detailed Rules? An Empirical Investigation’ (2005) 11 Texas Wesleyan Law 
Review 399. Another radical aspect of the Code is its approach to the doctrine of precedent. Article 3 of the 
Code, which provides that ‘Neither past nor future decisions govern the application of the Code’, mandates a 
departure from conventional approaches to statutory interpretation and application. 
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Though there can be little doubt that the Australian Contract Code was bold in its originality, it 
nonetheless struggled to gain traction in the profession or to capture the imagination of the 
legislature. Indeed, few would suggest that the Code ever stood a realistic chance of being 
adopted. Though the lack of enthusiasm for the Australian Contract Code was doubtless partly 
attributable to its jarring contrast with the common law, it also seems possible that the 
difficulties it encountered stemmed in part from scepticism as to the findings of the empirical 
studies upon which its authors relied.19 
 
In order to compare the relative merits of different ‘models’ of contract law, including both the 
common law of contract and the Australian Contract Code, a series of experiments were 
conducted with the co-operation of 1800 Australian university students. The authors explained 
that the study:20   
 
adopted a conception of utility which reflects the demands which are in fact most often made 
of legal systems by lawyers and non-lawyers alike.  These are that the law should be: 
• certain (predictable outcomes) 
• just (fair outcomes) 
• accessible (clear language and logic) 
• efficient (easy to comprehend and apply)  
•  
The authors described their experimental design in the following way:21 
 
In the first experiment, law students enrolled in Contract Law were given the facts of a 
dispute and a statement of the relevant law, drawn from one of the three models, and asked 
to decide the dispute.  They were asked to record their decision (for plaintiff or defendant), 
along with the time at which it was reached.  They were also asked to supply a brief statement 
of their reasons indicating how they applied the law.  A maximum of 80 minutes was allowed 
to complete these tasks.  After this time the students were asked to rank their level of 
agreement with a number of propositions relating to the utility of the law model (the Likert 
technique).  They were given 10 minutes for this task … Experiment 2 was a replication of 
Experiment 1 with one difference, namely the student judges worked in pairs … In 
Experiment 3, university students not enrolled in law were asked to read a statement of the 
facts of a dispute and a judgment deciding the dispute, using one of the law models.  They 
were also asked to complete a questionnaire by responding to a number of propositions about 
the judgment, again using the Likert technique.  Then they were asked to re-familiarise 
themselves with the facts, read a second judgment in favour of the other party, based on the 
same or a different law model, and complete an identical questionnaire.  They had a 
maximum of one hour to complete these tasks. 
 
                                                      
19 It must be borne in mind, of course, that the authors’ empirical work was published many years after the 
initial publication of the Australian Contract Code. Accordingly, it cannot have influenced the Code’s initial 
reception. 
20 M P Ellinghaus, E W Wright and M Karras, Models of Contract Law: An Empirical Evaluation of their 
Utility, (Themis Press, 2005) 25-6. 
21 M P Ellinghaus, E W Wright and M Karras, Models of Contract Law: An Empirical Evaluation of their 
Utility, (Themis Press, 2005) 27-8. 
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Though of undoubted academic interest, it is doubtful whether the authors’ experimental work 
assisted in building mainstream support for the Australian Contract Code. It is not at all clear, 
for instance, whether the authors’ experimental design simulates real-world conditions to a 
sufficiently close degree.22 
 
Despite the lack of mainstream enthusiasm for the Australian Contract Code, its authors have 
remained steadfast proponents of contract codification. Shortly after the 2012 discussion paper 
was issued, Ellinghaus and Wright, along with David Kelly, published a further, quite different 
contract code, entitled the Australian Law of Contract. Comprised of 109 articles, this revised 
code is drafted along somewhat more conservative lines than the Australian Contract Code, 
taking the existing common law of contract as its foundation and then seeking to restate the law 
in a simplified form and ‘improve’ upon it in a number of ways.23 Despite this more cautious 
approach, and the authors’ efforts to build mainstream support, the Australian Law of Contract 
has thus far gained no more traction than the Australian Contract Code.24 
 
The fate of these two draft codes might well be thought to paint a discouraging picture for 
would-be reformers of the Australian law of contract. Indeed, the fact that even the Australian 
Law of Contract met with an indifferent reception, despite eschewing the more radical features 
of its predecessor, might fairly suggest that there is simply little appetite in Australia for the 
codification of the law of contract.25  
 
Even if this is so, however, it would be wrong to conclude that this apparent lack of enthusiasm 
for codification necessarily poses a serious hurdle to the implementation of thoroughgoing 
                                                      
22 The authors’ experimental design has been the subject of scepticism elsewhere. See, eg: Neil Thompson, 
‘Book Reviews’ (2006) 27 Queensland Lawyer 80, 82-3; Warren Swain, ‘Contract Codification in Australia: Is 
it Necessary, Desirable and Possible?’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 131, 149. See further the criticism in: John 
Eldridge, ‘Codifying Contract Law: Cautionary Lessons from Australia’ (2019) 23 Edinburgh Law Review 
(forthcoming). It should be noted that Ellinghaus and Wright were firmly of the view that the experiments 
sufficiently simulated real-world decision-making.  See: M P Ellinghaus, E W Wright and M Karras, Models of 
Contract Law: An Empirical Evaluation of their Utility, (Themis Press, 2005), 32-3. 
23 See: M P Ellinghaus, D StL Kelly and E W Wright, ‘A Draft Australian Law of Contract’ Working Paper No 
03-03-14, Newcastle Law School. One relatively significant departure from the common law is the abolition, in 
Article 13, of the requirement of consideration. Like the Australian Contract Code, the Australian Law of 
Contract also seeks, in Articles 1-4, to dispense with strict rules of precedent in its application. 
24 As to the authors’ efforts to build mainstream support, see: Chris Merritt, ‘Meet the Great Reformers of 
Contract Law’, The Australian, 17 August 2012, 29. 
25 There is, however, some basis for thinking that a future code of the Australian law of contract might fare 
better than its predecessors if the lessons of those unsuccessful reforms were heeded. See the discussion in: John 
Eldridge, ‘Codifying Contract Law: Cautionary Lessons from Australia’ (2019) 23 Edinburgh Law Review 
(forthcoming). 
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reform of the law of contract. Indeed, it must be emphasised that though it is possible to seize 
upon codification as a means of effecting substantive reform of contract law’s underlying rules, 
there is no necessary relationship between codification and substantive reform of this type.  
 
It is certainly possible to conceive of a code as an instrument which at once restates and reforms 
the law – indeed, both the Australian Contract Code and the Australian Law of Contract are 
instruments of this kind.26 Equally, it is possible to conceive of a code which endeavours solely 
to restate the law, eschewing substantive reform.27 Such an instrument might be favoured by 
those who believe that the principal benefit of a code is to be found not in its utility as a 
mechanism for substantive law reform, but in its supposed tendency to promote certainty and 
accessibility.28 Though it is the case that the most ambitious would-be reformers of the 
Australian law of contract have advanced their proposals through the rubric of codification, 
and while the responses to the 2012 discussion paper were perhaps unduly preoccupied with 
codification (either as proponents or detractors), it must be remembered that there remain a 
number of other mechanisms for substantive reform which, while promising, have been paid 
relatively little attention of late. Indeed, it is not necessary to look far afield in seeking 
instructive examples of alternative options. The approach taken in New Zealand, for instance, 
has been to subject the law of contract to statutory intervention in specific, limited areas.29 
 
It is consequently necessary to uncouple questions of substantive law reform from the question 
of whether the law ought to be codified.  Though there may well exist scenarios in which a 
body of law is in need of such thoroughgoing and fundamental substantive reform that 
codification is the only sensible means by which reform can be effected, there has been no 
serious effort made to demonstrate that this is so in respect of the Australian law of contract. 
                                                      
26 It is also possible to point to codes from other areas of law which belong within this category. The Uniform 
Evidence Acts are a clear example of an instrument which seeks to codify aspects of the common law while also 
effecting substantive reforms. (It should be added that it is unclear whether the Uniform Evidence Acts can truly 
be termed a code, given they presuppose the continued operation of some common law rules. See the discussion 
in: Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588 at 631-2; [2011] HCA 21 at [110] per Heydon J; J D 
Heydon, Cross on Evidence (LexisNexis, 11th ed, 2017) 148-158. 
27 Of course, where the law is uncertain, the task of ‘restating’ it will often involve a choice as to which view 
ought to be preferred. At least in cases such as this, the line between reform and ‘mere’ restatement is blurred.  
28 For a critique of this view, see: John Eldridge, ‘Contract Codification and ‘Certainty’’ (2018) 35 Journal of 
Contract Law (forthcoming). 
29 This approach – under which statutory intervention is limited to specific areas, such as illegality and mistake 
– has been termed a ‘partial codification’ by some. See: Rick Bigwood, ‘The Partial Codification of Contract 
Law: Lessons From New Zealand’ in Mary Keyes and Therese Wilson (eds) Codifying Contract Law: 
International and Consumer Law Perspectives (Ashgate, 2014); F G Barton, ‘The Effect of the Contract 
Statutes in New Zealand’ (2000) 16 Journal of Contract Law 233. The New Zealand contract statutes have 
recently been consolidated in the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 (NZ). 
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Indeed, as the discussion below shows, some aspects of the law of contract which are most 
frequently cited as being in need of reform can be addressed through targeted and limited 
statutory intervention. This conclusion casts serious doubt on whether the drastic step of 
codification – with its inevitable transition costs and the unavoidable risk of negative and 
unintended consequences – was ever a sensible mechanism for reform in this sphere. 
 
SUBSTANTIVE REFORM: THE PATH FORWARD 
 
Though the task of identifying desirable reforms in respect of a body of law as complex and 
important as the law of contract is by no means straightforward, any would-be reformer of the 
Australian law of contract is assisted by the rich body of writing devoted to identifying and 
studying the law’s shortcomings. A survey of the literature reveals no shortage of commentary 
on the major areas of current difficulty. The law respecting contractual penalties,30 the proper 
use which can be made of evidence of ‘surrounding circumstances’ in contractual 
interpretation,31 and the proper approach to the identification of implied terms have all been 
the subject of extensive scholarly examination.32 
 
The challenge in charting an appropriate course for reform is not, therefore, in identifying areas 
of difficulty, nor in gaining an understanding of the relevant debates. The challenge is instead 
that of isolating areas which are susceptible to uncontroversial resolution, such that the 
                                                      
30 For discussion of the various difficulties in this area, see: John Stumbles, ‘Paciocco in the High Court: 
Penalties and Late Payment Fees’ (2017) 91 Australian Law Journal 969; J W Carter, Wayne Courtney and G J 
Tolhurst ‘Assessment of Contractual Penalties: Dunlop Deflated’ (2017) 34 Journal of Contract Law 4; 
Nicholas Tiverios ‘A Restatement of Relief Against Contractual Penalties (I): Underlying Principles in Equity 
and at Common Law’ (2017) 11 Journal of Equity 1; Nicholas Tiverios ‘A Restatement of Relief Against 
Contractual Penalties (II): A Framework for Applying the Australian and English Approaches’ (2017) 11 
Journal of Equity 185; Andrew Summers ‘Unresolved Issues in the Law on Penalties’ [2017] Lloyd’s Maritime 
and Commercial Law Quarterly 95; John Eldridge, ‘The New Law of Penalties: Mapping the Terrain’ [2018] 
Journal of Business Law (forthcoming). 
31 For discussion of the continued confusion in this area, see: David McLauchlan and Matthew Lees, 
‘Construction Controversy’ (2011) 28 Journal of Contract Law 101; David McLauchlan and Matthew Lees, 
‘More Construction Controversy’ (2012) 29 Journal of Contract Law 97; The Hon Justice Kenneth Martin, 
'Contractual Construction: Surrounding Circumstances and the Ambiguity Gateway' (2013) 37 Australian Bar 
Review 118; The Hon Kevin Lindgren, 'The Ambiguity of Ambiguity in the Construction of Contracts' (2014) 
37 Australian Bar Review 153; Thomas Prince, ‘Defending Orthodoxy: Codelfa and Ambiguity’ (2015) 89 
Australian Law Journal 491; Daniel Reynolds, ‘Construction of Contracts After Mount Bruce Mining v Wright 
Prospecting’ (2016) 90 Australian Law Journal 190; John Eldridge, ‘’Surrounding Circumstances’ in 
Contractual Interpretation: Where are we Now?’ (2018) 32 Commercial Law Quarterly (forthcoming). 
32 See, eg: Wayne Courtney and J W Carter, ‘Implied Terms: What Is the Role of Construction’ (2014) 31 
Journal of Contract Law 151; David McLauchlan, ‘Construction and Implication: In Defence of Belize 
Telecom’ [2014] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 203; J W Carter and Wayne Courtney, 
‘Belize Telecom: A Reply to Professor McLauchlan’ [2015] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 
245; Gabrielle Golding, ‘Terms Implied by Law into Employment Contracts: Are they Necessary?’ (2015) 28 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 113. 
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requisite political support for reform can be readily attained.33 Indeed, the importance of 
building a broad base for any reform is one of the most important lessons to be derived from 
the lukewarm reception of most major contract law reform initiatives in Australia.34 Much the 
same lesson emerges from a consideration of reform efforts elsewhere – McGregor’s draft 
code, for instance, failed to be adopted largely in consequence of the inability of the Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission to reach agreement on controversial points of 
difference.35 
 
It would therefore be wrongheaded, when identifying sensible avenues for reform, to seize 
upon perennial yet controversial questions, such as the case for the abolition of the requirement 
of consideration.36 Equally, there is little to be gained from re-entering the well-known and 
interminable debate as to the proper role of good faith in the Australian law of contract.37 
 
Other reform proposals, while frequently mooted, break down upon closer examination. 
Perhaps the best examples are the regular calls for contract law to be ‘updated’ so as to be 
responsive to the needs of modern technology and e-commerce. While calls of this kind are 
common – indeed, they featured prominently in the 2012 discussion paper – it is not at all clear 
                                                      
33 It should be noted that though the focus here is on legislative law reform, there is also, plainly, a very real 
sense in which courts act as instruments of law reform. See the discussion in: Anthony Mason, ‘Law Reform 
and the Courts’ in David Weisbrot (ed), The Promise of Law Reform (Federation Press, 2005).  
34 A recent example of the difficulties inherent in securing the necessary support of the political class can be 
seen in the sphere of private international law. In 2016, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommended 
that Australia accede to the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. That step will require a 
statutory enactment. As of late-2018, such an enactment is yet to be introduced to Parliament. As to the 
proposed reform, see: Michael Douglas, ‘Choice of Court Agreements Under an International Civil Law Act’ 
(2018) 34 Journal of Contract Law 186; Brooke Adele Marshall and Mary Keyes, ‘Australia’s Accession to the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements’ (2017) 41 Melbourne University Law Review 246. 
35 For general discussion, see: F M B Reynolds, ‘Contract: Codification, Legislation and Judicial Development’ 
(1995) 9 Journal of Contract Law 11. 
36 See, eg: Lord Wright, ‘Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to be Abolished from the Common Law?’ (1936) 
49 Harvard Law Review 1225; Andrew Burrows, ‘Improving Contract and Tort’ in Andrew Burrows (ed) 
Understanding the Law of Obligations (Hart Publishing, 1998), 197. For a contrary view, see: Mindy Chen-
Wishart, ‘In Defence of Consideration’ (2013) 13 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 209. As noted 
above, both the Australian Contract Code and the Australian Law of Contract sought to abolish the requirement 
of consideration. 
37 Many proponents of contract codification have seen the enactment of a code as a convenient mechanism for 
the introduction of an obligation of good faith. See, eg: Mary Keyes, ‘The Challenges of Good Faith in Contract 
Law Codification’ in Mary Keyes and Therese Wilson (eds) Codifying Contract Law: International and 
Consumer Law Perspectives (Ashgate, 2014). The need for such an obligation in the Australian law of contract 
is controversial. Some commentators have suggested that good faith ought to be understood as being implicit in 
the Australian law of contract. See, eg: Elisabeth Peden, ‘Incorporating Terms of Good Faith in Contract Law in 
Australia’ (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 222; J W Carter and Elisabeth Peden, ‘Good Faith in Australian 
Contract Law’ (2003) 19 Journal of Contract Law 155; Elisabeth Peden, Good Faith in the Performance of 
Contracts (LexisNexis, 2003). For an overview of the position in Australia today, see: J W Carter, Contract Law 
in Australia (LexisNexis, 7th ed, 2018), ch 2. 
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what specific reforms are truly necessary in this connection.38 While there are a number of 
difficulties posed by the application of orthodox contract doctrine to ‘e-commerce’, these 
questions are for the most part confined to relatively narrow questions of law, and there is little 
reason to think that the confusion which they have caused has been generative of a great deal 
of inconvenience.39 Indeed, some of the purported difficulties which are flagged most 
frequently in this sphere often, on closer examination, prove to pose a far smaller challenge 
than is commonly thought.40 It is therefore not at all clear whether emerging technologies truly 
amount to a key driver for reform of the law of contract. At the very least, it cannot be said that 
the proper content of any such reform is straightforward or uncontroversial. 
 
Rather than pursuing these relatively unprofitable avenues of inquiry, would-be reformers of 
the Australian law of contract would do far better to concentrate their energies on the task of 
‘harmonising’ the law so as to eliminate inconsistencies and irregularities which cause practical 
inconvenience. Some care must be taken, however, when grappling with the question of 
‘harmonisation’ in this setting. Indeed, though ‘harmonisation’ seems at first to be a 
straightforward notion, it is crucial to make appropriate distinctions between ‘international’ 
and ‘domestic’ harmonisation imperatives.  
 
The ‘international harmonisation’ of the Australian law of contract has been a much-mooted 
topic by those concerned to reform and modernise the law.41 Indeed, an enthusiasm for this 
                                                      
38 For this aspect of the discussion paper, see the ‘drivers’ of reform identified in the paper, which advert to the 
challenges posed by electronic commerce: Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Improving Australia’s Law 
and Justice Framework: A Discussion Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law, 
2012, 3-6.  
39 For a discussion of some such difficulties, see: Eliza Mik, ‘The Effectiveness of Acceptances Communicated 
by Electronic Means, Or – Does the Postal Acceptance Rule Apply to Email?’ (2009) 26 Journal of Contract 
Law 68; Elisabeth Macdonald, ‘Incorporation of Standard Terms in Website Contracting – Clicking ‘I Agree’’ 
(2011) 27 Journal of Contract Law 198. Some difficulties in this sphere have been addressed through the 
adoption of the Electronic Transactions Acts. See, eg: Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth). 
40 Perhaps the best recent example is the debate as to the challenges posed by ‘smart contracts’. Though this 
technology is in some respects novel, there is good reason to think that it is largely capable of being 
accommodated within existing contract doctrine. See the discussion in: Eliza Mik, ‘Smart Contracts (Or: Much 
Ado About Nothing?)’ Paper Presented at the Journal of Contract Law Annual Conference, 2018. The 
mismatch between the interest in the challenges posed by smart contracts, and the actual difficulty which they 
seem to have occasioned, is part of a broader trend in which the challenges posed by new technologies are to 
some degree overstated. See the discussion in: Eliza Mik, ‘The Unimportance of Being Electronic – or Popular 
Misconceptions About “Internet Contracting”’ (2011) 19 International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology 324. 
41 See, eg, many of the essays in Mary Keyes and Therese Wilson (eds) Codifying Contract Law: International 
and Consumer Law Perspectives (Ashgate, 2014). The authors of the Australian Law of Contract were 
motivated to a significant degree by the desire to promote harmonisation of the Australian law of contract with 
international norms. See: M P Ellinghaus, D StL Kelly and E W Wright, ‘A Draft Australian Law of Contract’ 
Working Paper No 03-03-14, Newcastle Law School. The 2012 discussion paper was similarly concerned with 
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species of reform is not peculiar to Australia – the long-running efforts towards the creation of 
a harmonised private law within Europe have proven to be a high-profile example to reformers 
across many jurisdictions.42 Yet despite the enthusiasm evinced in many quarters for reform of 
this type, it remains unclear how such reforms ought to be implemented in practice, and, indeed, 
whether there truly is a demand for such reform from contract law’s ‘users’. 
 
‘International harmonisation’ is in truth a shorthand for several related species of reform. On 
the one hand is a reform initiative which seeks to ‘harmonise’ the Australian law of contract 
with the domestic contract law of other jurisdictions. This might be effected through the 
introduction of substantive reforms which seek to bring the law into closer conformity with the 
contract law of Australia’s major trading partners. On the other hand is a reform initiative 
which seeks to align the Australian law of contract with norms embodied in international 
instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(‘UPICC’) or the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(‘the Vienna Convention’).43 Though these two types of initiative may plainly overlap in some 
cases – that is, where an alignment of Australian law with the domestic law of a particular 
jurisdiction would also involve an alignment with norms embodied in international instruments 
– there is also some capacity for these two objects to be in tension. The proper approach to the 
resolution of this tension, where it exists, is not at all clear. 
 
Indeed, even if this tension is put to one side, there exists some doubt as to the extent to which 
the harmonisation of Australian law with the domestic law of other jurisdictions can truly be 
pursued. As has been observed, any effort to align Australian law with the law of a particular 
                                                      
this ‘driver’ of reform. See: Attorney-General’s Department (Cth), Improving Australia’s Law and Justice 
Framework: A Discussion Paper Exploring the Scope for Reforming Australian Contract Law, 2012, 3-6. For 
further discussion of the ‘international harmonisation’ of Australian contract law, see: Donald Robertson, ‘The 
International Harmonisation of Australian Contract Law’ (2012) 29 Journal of Contract Law 1; Paul Finn, 
‘Internationalisation or Isolation: The Australian cul de sac? The Case of Contract Law’ in Elise Bant and 
Matthew Harding (eds) Exploring Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
42 For discussion of the European harmonisation efforts, see: Francisco de Elizalde (ed) Uniform Rules for 
European Contract Law? A Critical Assessment, (Hart Publishing, 2018); Lucinda Miller, The Emergence of 
EU Contract Law: Exploring Europeanization, (Oxford University Press, 2012); Stefan Vogenauer and Stephen 
Weatherill, (eds) The Harmonisation of European Contract Law: Implications for European Private Laws, 
Business and Legal Practice, (Hart Publishing, 2006). For some cautionary lessons which emerge from a 
consideration of the European efforts, see: Martin Doris, ‘Promising Options, Dead Ends and the Reform of 
Australian Contract Law’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 24. 
43 As to the latter, see 1489 UNTS 3. 
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trading partner may well lead to a greater divergence between Australian law and the law of 
other, equally important jurisdictions.44 
 
One answer to these concerns may be to approach the ‘international harmonisation’ of the 
Australian law of contract with a focus solely on the second type of reform initiative described 
above – namely, the alignment of the Australian law of contract with norms embodied in 
international instruments. The difficulty with this approach is that there is serious doubt as to 
the extent of the demand for reform of this type. As has been noted in many quarters, there is 
a widespread feeling that the Australian legal profession makes little use of international 
instruments such as UPICC and the Vienna Convention.45To the extent this perception is 
accurate, it suggests a lack of interest in such instruments, and, by extension, a lack of desire 
for this species of ‘harmonisation’. 
 
It is, of course, possible that these widespread impressions as to the lack of interest in 
international instruments of this kind are mistaken. Yet all the same, it would be both unwise 
and impractical to proceed with this type of reform without carrying out empirical work aimed 
at rigorously investigating the extent to which these impressions reflect reality.46 Indeed, much 
might be gained in general from building an understanding of the factors which drive parties 
to choose Australian law as the governing law of their contract, or, similarly, from gathering 
empirical evidence as to the degree to which commercial actors suffer material inconvenience 
as a consequence of the dissimilarities between the Australian law of contract and the law of 
contract of Australia’s major trading partners.47 Until that work is carried out, however, it 
                                                      
44 See the discussion in: Warren Swain, ‘Contract Codification in Australia: Is it Necessary, Desirable and 
Possible?’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 131, 136. To give just one clear example, an alignment of Australian 
law with the Chinese law of contract would necessarily increase the divergence between Australian law and the 
contract law of the United States. Difficulties of this kind may be less pronounced where a state’s trading 
partners belong largely to a common legal tradition.  
45 See, eg, the discussion in: Lisa Spagnolo, ‘The Last Outpost: Automatic CISG Opt Outs, Misapplications and 
the Costs of Ignoring the Vienna Sales Convention for Australian Lawyers’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 141. 
46 Other commentators have also called for empirical work of this kind. See, eg: Warren Swain, ‘Contract 
Codification in Australia: Is it Necessary, Desirable and Possible?’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 131, 138. For 
a study of this type in the United States, see: Peter L Fitzgerald, ‘International Contracting Practices Survey 
Project: An Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the United Nations Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG) and the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, Jurists, and 
Legal Academics in the United States’ (2008) 27 Journal of Law and Commerce 1. 
47 Some empirical scholarship in this general vein already exists elsewhere. See, eg: Gilles Cuniberti, ‘The 
International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws’ (2014) 34 Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 455.  
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would be ill-advised to seek to progress the ‘international harmonisation’ of the Australian law 
of contract. 
 
This conclusion is doubtless somewhat discouraging for those seeking to progress the cause of 
law reform. Fortunately, however, the second dimension of ‘harmonisation’ – what might 
loosely be termed ‘domestic harmonisation’ – offers up a wide range of fruitful opportunities 
for reform.  
 
Though there is a single common law of Australia, it would nonetheless be misleading to 
conclude that there exists a single, unified Australian law of contract.48 Each State and Territory 
has enacted a complex web of legislation which operates to modify the operation of the 
common law. Though these statutory incursions do not differ in any radical respect, they are 
nonetheless subject to many small inconsistencies.49 Though this is not the place for a detailed 
survey of these enactments, it is nonetheless possible to identify at least three areas in which 
divergent approaches can be identified, and in respect of which the adoption of a consistent, 
national approach ought to be welcomed.50  
 
The first such divergence is the inconsistent approach taken in respect of statutory modification 
of the doctrine of privity. While the doctrine’s potential to work injustice has long been 
recognised, only Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia have enacted 
general provisions aimed at modifying the doctrine’s operation.51 Though not radically 
divergent, the approach taken in each of these three jurisdictions is not wholly identical.52 
While the existence of a divergence of this kind does not in and of itself amount to a case for 
reform, the case for the adoption of a unified approach in respect of privity is strengthened by 
                                                      
48 The existence of a single common law of Australia was affirmed by the High Court in Lipohar v The Queen 
(1999) 200 CLR 485. The correctness of this view has been doubted by some. See, eg: L J Priestley, 'A Federal 
Common Law in Australia?' (1995) 6 Public Law Review 221.  
49 For further discussion of these inconsistencies, see: Lisa Spagnolo, ‘Law Wars: Australian Contract Law 
Reform vs CISG vs CESL’ (2013) 58 Villanova Law Review 623. 
50 It is worth noting that inconsistencies also exist between enactments which are principally concerned with 
other areas of law, and which impact upon the law of contract only to a limited extent. Perhaps the best example 
is that of the civil liability legislation, which affects only some contracts. That statutory regime differs between 
jurisdictions. Compare, for instance: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 30; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 53. 
51 See: Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 55; Law of Property Act 2000 (NT) s 56; Property Law Act 1969 (WA) s 
11. There also exist a number of provisions which are aimed at specific types of contract. See, eg: Insurance 
Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 48; Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth) s 20(2).  
52 The Queensland and Northern Territory provisions are largely alike, though they differ from the approach 
taken in Western Australia. For further discussion, see: Michael Furmston and G J Tolhurst, Privity of Contract 
(Oxford University Press, 2015) ch 9. 
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the extent to which commentators have supported modification of the common law rule.53 
Though it would be wrong to suggest that the introduction of a unified, national approach to 
statutory modification of the privity doctrine would be wholly without difficulty, there can be 
little cause to think that it would meet with serious opposition.54  
 
The second area ripe for ‘domestic harmonisation’ is that of the rules respecting contractual 
capacity. Though few would suggest that questions of capacity arise with any real frequency, 
there can nonetheless be little justification for the status quo, under which only New South 
Wales has adopted a systematic approach to the reform of the common law.55 Few would 
suggest that there exists a convincing case for the retention, in an unmodified form, of the 
common law rules respecting contractual capacity.56 The present position, however, manages 
to combine both the shortcomings of the common law with the added confusion consequent 
upon inconsistency. 
 
Finally, there exists a strong case for the adoption of a uniform national approach to the 
statutory modification of the consequences of frustration at common law. Though the particular 
approaches which have been adopted have each been the subject of criticism, it is the want of 
national uniformity which truly merits objection.57 Given the infrequency with which questions 
of frustration present themselves, it is perhaps unsurprising that there has not yet been a push 
for the harmonisation of the law respecting frustration. Yet at the same time, the relative rarity 
of frustration disputes ought not to excuse the continued lack of national coherence in this 
aspect of the law. 
                                                      
53 See, eg: Arthur Corbin, ‘Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons’ (1930) 46 Law Quarterly Review 12; 
Gordon Samuels, ‘Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties’ (1968) 8 University of Western Australia Law 
Review 378; John N Adams and Roger Brownsword, ‘Privity and the Concept of a Network Contract’ (1990) 10 
Legal Studies 12. Criticism has also been levelled by law-reform bodies. See, eg: Law Commission, Privity of 
Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Report No. 242, 1996. The third-party rule has not been 
without its defenders. See, eg: Peter Kincaid, ‘Privity and the Essence of Contract’ (1989) 12 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 59; Stephen A Smith, ‘Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties: In Defence of the 
Third-Party Rule’ (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 643. 
54 Indeed, much of the difficulty would turn on the question of how best to effect the reform. A reform of this 
type might best be initiated by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General. 
55 See: Minors (Contracts and Property) Act 1970 (NSW). Other jurisdictions have eschewed the systematic 
approach taken in New South Wales. See, eg: Minors’ Contracts (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1979 (SA). 
56 For an overview of the common law rules, see: J W Carter, Contract Law in Australia (LexisNexis, 7th ed, 
2018) ch 15. 
57 Compare: Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 (NSW); Frustrated Contracts Act 1988 (SA); Australian Consumer 
Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (Vic) Pt 3.2. For a discussion of the differences between each jurisdiction, see: 
J W Carter, Contract Law in Australia (LexisNexis, 7th ed, 2018) ch 34. For criticism of the various approaches, 
see: Andrew Stewart and J W Carter, ‘Frustrated Contracts and Statutory Adjustment: The Case for a 
Reappraisal’ [1992] Cambridge Law Journal 66. 
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The suggestions mooted here could not be characterised as radical. They are, indeed, quite 
unlikely to excite passion in any quarter, though they have attracted sympathy from a number 
of commentators.58 Yet it is precisely this quality that gives each of the reforms canvassed here 
a real prospect of being successfully implemented. Indeed, as was noted at the outset, it is those 
reforms which are uncontroversial which are most likely to attract support on the part of 
government.59 The suggestions set out here, while far from revolutionary, can each be seen as 
steps towards a worthwhile and overarching goal – namely that of creating a ‘uniform’ law of 
contract within Australia, free of the inconsistencies and irregularities which, while minor, are 
nonetheless productive of considerable inconvenience. Though the implementation of the 
reforms mooted here would not of themselves create a wholly uniform Australian law of 
contract – and indeed, some might object that the suggestions set out here do not go far enough 





This paper has sought to identify some practical steps which might be taken by way of reform 
of the Australian law of contract. As has been seen, it is possible to identify a number of such 
reforms. Indeed, this paper has shown that some aspects of the law of contract which are most 
frequently cited as being in need of reform can be addressed through targeted and limited 
statutory intervention. This conclusion in turn casts serious doubt on whether the proponents 
of codification were correct to suggest that such a drastic step was ever a sensible mechanism 
for reform in this sphere. 
 
                                                      
58 See, eg: Lisa Spagnolo, ‘Law Wars: Australian Contract Law Reform vs CISG vs CESL’ (2013) 58 Villanova 
Law Review 623; Andrew Stewart, ‘What’s Wrong with the Australian Law of Contract?’ (2012) 29 Journal of 
Contract Law 74, 78; Warren Swain, ‘Contract Codification in Australia: Is it Necessary, Desirable and 
Possible?’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 131, 134-5. 
59 It would, of course, be wrong to exaggerate the ease with which these changes might be implemented. 
Though reforms such as these are unlikely to attract strong opposition, their relatively ‘unexciting’ nature makes 
the task of attracting the interest and attention of the political class somewhat challenging. Given these reforms 
would require co-operation across jurisdictional lines, such support is crucial.  
60 The difficulty, of course, in pursuing a broad-ranging harmonisation initiative, which seeks in one step to 
usher in a wholly uniform law of contract, is that such a scheme will inevitably capture subjects which are far 
more controversial than the reforms mooted here. Any attempted harmonisation of the civil liability acts, for 
instance, would risk reigniting familiar debates as to the proper balance to be struck between plaintiff and 
defendant in respect of claims for personal injury. The inclusion of such a reform as one part of a broader 
project would risk imperilling the initiative as a whole. 
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In the course of its analysis, this paper has also identified a number of matters which ought to 
be the subject of further investigation and analysis. These questions are for the most part those 
which can only be answered through the gathering of empirical evidence. Most significantly, 
it should be stressed that much might be gained from building an understanding of the factors 
which drive parties to prefer (or eschew) Australian law as the governing law of their contract, 
or, similarly, from gathering empirical evidence as to the degree to which commercial actors 
suffer material inconvenience as a consequence of the dissimilarities between the Australian 
law of contract and the law of contract of Australia’s major trading partners. It is hoped that a 
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